Opinion
C.A. No. 07A-09-002 WCC.
Submitted: April 22, 2008.
Decided: July 30, 2008.
Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. AFFIRMED.
Tykene Johnson, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Appellant.
Mary Page Bailey, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Thomas Ellis, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, Counsel for Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Introduction
Before this Court is Tykene Johnson's ("Appellant") appeal from the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's ("Board") decision, where it found that Mr. Johnson was ineligible for benefits based on fraud for failing to report his employment with Tristar Management Services, Inc., ("TMSI" or "Appellee") during a time he was previously receiving benefits. Upon review of the record in this matter, the Court finds the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is therefore AFFIRMED.
Facts
Appellant filed an unemployment claim effective January 1, 2006, and received benefit checks from January 7, 2006 through July 1, 2006 after which his claim was exhausted. While receiving benefits, Appellant obtained employment through a temporary employment service, Westaff, from March 2, 2006 through June 5, 2006, and worked at TMSI. On June 5, 2006 he was hired as a full-time employee of TMSI. Appellant submitted pay authorizations for the weeks ending June 10 through July 1 of 2006, which was during his full-time employment with TMSI, and failed to report that he was earning and/or receiving wages. Appellant maintains that he was unaware he needed to report wages earned during an initial probationary period of employment. The Appellant `s employment with TMSI was subsequently terminated, and he again filed for unemployment benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance determined that Appellant had knowingly failed to report his prior wages and employment in order to receive benefits, and as a result Appellant was disqualified from receipt of benefits on the basis of fraud for the period of one year. As such, his present request for benefits was denied.
According to Appellant, his initial full-time employment included a probationary period during which he could be terminated at will.
Appellant subsequently appealed this decision to the Appeals Referee, who affirmed the decision of the Division of Unemployment Insurance. Appellant then appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Referee's decision and the Appellant filed the instant appeal. Neither TMSI nor the Department of Labor filed briefs in this matter, therefore, the following represents the Court's decision on the matter based on the papers currently before it.
Standard of Review
This Court's role in reviewing an appeal from the Board is limited to an evaluation of the record, in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, to determine if it includes substantial evidence that a reasonable mind accepts as adequate support for the conclusion and is free from legal error. Therefore, the Court does not address issues of credibility or independently weigh the evidence presented to the Board. If the record supports the Board's findings, the Court must accept those findings even though the Court might reach a different conclusion on the facts presented.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 689 (Del. 1960)("The position of the Superior Court. . . on appeal is to determine only whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the Board. If there was, these findings must be affirmed.").
Michael A. Sinclair, Inc. v. Riley, 2004 WL 1731140, at *2 (Del.Super. July 30, 2004) (citing Unemploy. Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Div. of Unemploy. Ins, 803 A.2d 931, 937 (Del. 2002)("Questions of credibility are exclusively within the province of the Board which heard the evidence. As an appellate court, it [is] not within the province of the Superior Court to weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own factual findings.")).
H H Poultry Co. v. Whaley, 408 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 1979).
Discussion
The question before the Court is whether the Board had substantial evidence to determine that Appellant knowingly made a false statement or failed to disclose a material fact to the Department in order to receive benefits to which he was not entitled, thus making him ineligible for benefits for one year. The Court finds that the answer to this question is yes, and the Board had substantial evidence to reach its conclusion.Ordinarily in unemployment benefits cases, at the initial hearing an Appellee must prove its case by a "preponderance of the evidence." However, because the present matter is based on fraud, the burden of proof rises to a "clear and convincing" standard, which is more stringent than a mere "more likely than not" burden, yet less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Referee's Decision, Docket # 10022445, June 25, 2007 at 3 [hereinafter Referee's Decision at __]. See Congo v. News Journal Co., 1994 WL 465561, *4 n. 1 (Del.Super. July 15, 1994).
In its decision, the Board analyzed the relevant statute for the disqualification of unemployment benefits, which states,
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits if the Department determined such individual has made a false statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly has failed to disclose a material fact to obtain benefits to which the individual was not lawfully entitled, and such disqualification shall be for a period of 1 year beginning with the date on which the first false statement, false representation or failure to disclose a material fact occurred. A disqualification issued pursuant to this subsection shall be considered a disqualification due to fraud.
The Court agrees with the Board's finding that Appellee had met its burden. First, the Board heard testimony that Appellant was employed by Appellee in June of 2006. Appellant stated,
The first month I worked at TMSI I didn't know I had to report my earnings. The job was letting people go within 30 days in their employment. . . I didn't know if TMSI was going to let me go or not within my first 30 days. They didn't communicate with new hires. That's another reason why. . . I didn't want to let my benefits go. . . I was not trying to fraud the system.
Tr. of Hr'g before the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Bd. Aug. 8, 2007 at 3 [hereinafter Tr. of Bd.'s Hr'g at __].
Second, Appellant attempted to remedy the above admission by claiming he was unaware he needed to report wages earned during his initial employment, while he was employed on a probationary basis. However, Appellant had received the unemployment insurance handbook explaining that all earned wages must be reported, and had on previous occasions received unemployment benefits. Therefore, he was not a novice to the procedures or unaware of where to turn if he had questions about his obligations. Appellant knowingly entered "zero" on the authorization form which asks for earnings information, which clearly was a false and misleading statement. Indeed, the Board noted in its decision that Appellant was aware he was required to report his wages to the Board, and such "awareness" was sufficient to satisfy the Board that his omissions were made knowingly.
Tr. of Hr'g before the Referee, June 25, 2007, at 3 [hereinafter Tr. of Referee's Hr'g at __].
Id. at 2-3.
Bd.'s Decision at 2. "Knowingly" has been defined by the Superior Court as ""[w]ith knowledge; consciously; intentionally. An individual acts `knowingly' when he acts with awareness of the nature of his conduct." Watts v. M L Trucks, 1998 WL 730319, *3 (Del.Super. July 15, 1998).
Considering all of these factors, The Court finds the Board's decision to have adequate support in the record. There was substantial evidence to support its determination that by failing to report to the Department that he was employed and receiving wages, Appellant intended that the Department "remain ignorant of his employment," thus satisfying the scienter requirement of 19 Del. C. § 3314(6) Therefore, after examining the record below, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence before the Board to show that Appellant knowingly failed to disclose a material fact to the Department in order to receive benefits, and the Board's decision is affirmed.
Bd.'s Decision at 2.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED.