Opinion
NO. 03-15-00343-CV
06-16-2016
Eddie Don Johnson, Appellant v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Parole Division, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-13-001602, HONORABLE CHARLES R. RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
Eddie Don Johnson, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), appeals a final judgment dismissing, on a plea to the jurisdiction, a claim he asserted against TDCJ. Johnson filed a declaratory-judgment suit in which he challenged the imposition by TDCJ of a condition on his parole known as "Special Condition X SISP" (the Condition), an intensive regime of sex-offender treatment and counseling. His lawsuit contends that his legal rights were impaired when his parole was revoked for alleged violations of the Condition. See Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.038. We will affirm the trial court's final judgment dismissing with prejudice Johnson's claims.
DISCUSSION
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, procedural background, and legal standards of review, we dispense with a recitation of those here except as necessary to explain the basic reasons for our determination. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. --------
Johnson's pro se pleadings assert a declaratory-judgment claim under section 2001.038 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenging the TDCJ's Condition on his parole. Id. § 2001.038(a) ("The validity or applicability of a rule . . . may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment if it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff."). Specifically, he contends that the Condition is an invalid "rule" because it was improperly promulgated, that the Condition has been improperly applied to him, and that his legal rights were impaired when his parole was revoked on the ground of violation of the Condition.
In its plea to the jurisdiction, the TDCJ asserted that the waiver of sovereign immunity established in section 2001.038 of the APA does not apply to rules or internal procedures of the TDCJ due to an exception created by the legislature. Id. § 2001.226 ("This chapter does not apply to a rule or internal procedure of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice or Texas Board of Criminal Justice that applies to an inmate or any other person under the custody or control of the TDCJ or to an action taken under that rule or procedure."); see also id. § 2001.223 (Section 2001.038 "do[es] not apply to: . . . (3) a hearing or interview conducted by the Board of Pardons and Paroles or the Texas Department of Criminal Justice relating to the grant, rescission, or revocation of parole or other form of administrative release."). We agree with TDCJ.
Our ultimate inquiry when reviewing a trial court's authority to decide the subject matter of a claim is whether a claimant has presented facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which is a question of law that we review de novo. See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-27 (Tex. 2004). Therefore, even assuming that the Condition constitutes a "rule" under the APA, Johnson's own pleadings affirmatively negate the district court's jurisdiction because the facts he has pleaded demonstrate that his claim falls outside of section 2001.038 and that sovereign immunity, accordingly, bars it. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 2001.226, .223; Hernandez v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice-Parole Div., No. 03-13-00373-CV, 2014 WL 711028, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 19, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). We hold that the trial court properly dismissed Johnson's suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's final judgment dismissing Johnson's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
/s/_________
David Puryear, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Bourland Affirmed Filed: June 16, 2016