Opinion
Civil Action 24-cv-13
07-15-2024
DENZEL JOHNSON, SR., Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI HUNTINGDON; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Respondents.
ROBERT J. COLVILLE, DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dismissal should be without prejudice to Petitioner's claims for federal habeas relief in Johnson v, Superintendent of SCI Huntingdon, which currently is pending at Civil Action No. 23-881 before this Court. It is further recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.
II. REPORT
Petitioner Denzel Johnson (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”) in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. Petitioner submitted a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the “Petition”), which was received by this Court on January 4,2024. ECF No. 1 -1. In the Petition, Petitioner attacks his state court conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at Docket No. CP-02-CR-53-2016. The Petition was submitted along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which remains pending. ECF No. 1.
As Petitioner acknowledges in the Petition, he also has a habeas proceeding under Section 2254 in this Court at Civil Action No. 23-881, in which he attacks his conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at Docket No. CP-02-CR-53-2016. Civil Action No. 23-881 was initiated on May 26, 2023. A motion to dismiss is pending in that case. No. 23-881, ECF No. 28.
In light of Petitioner's earlier-filed federal habeas petition at Civil Action No. 23-881 attacking the same criminal conviction as in this action, Petitioner was ordered on January 10, 2024 to show cause why the instant case should not be dismissed his failure to comply with Rule 2(c) -of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which requires a petitioner to raise each and every claim attacking a conviction in a single petition. ECF No. 2 at 1-2. Along with that Order, Petitioner was mailed a copy of this Court's form habeas petition under Section 2254, and instructed that if he wished to file an amended habeas petition, he should seek leave to do so in Civil Action No. 23-881. Id. at 2. On January 23,2024, Petitioner filed an amended petition in Civil Action No. 23-881 on the very same form that was mailed to him on January 10,2024, which remains the operative petition in that case. No. 23-881 at 26.
As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Petitioner has not responded to the Order to Show Cause in the present matter. The only filing by Petitioner in this case was correspondence received on July 1, 2024, in which Petitioner asked for his maximum sentence date to be decreased to December 22, 2025. ECF No. 3 at 1. Nothing in that correspondence was responsive to the Order to Show Cause.
A district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a litigant's failure to prosecute or to comply with an order of court. Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429 (3d Cir. 1990). “Under our jurisprudence, the sanction of dismissal is reserved for those cases where the plaintiff has caused delay or engaged in contumacious conduct. Even then, it is also necessary for the district court to consider whether the ends of justice would be better served by a lesser sanction.” Id.
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set forth six factors to be weighed when considering whether dismissal of a case as a sanction for failure to prosecute or to obey pretrial orders. They are: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. These factors must be balanced in determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction, although not all need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Application of the Poulis factors is appropriate in the context of habeas cases as well as to civil rights actions. Harlacher v. Pennsylvania, 3:CV-10-0267, 2010 WL 1462494, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1445552 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010) (applying Poulis to a habeas case). Consideration of the factors listed above is as follows.
(1) The extent of the party's personal responsibility
Petitioner is proceeding in this matter pro se, and is alone responsible for prosecuting this case and complying with orders of this Court.
(2) Prejudice to the adversary
Respondents have not been served the habeas petition in this matter. Instead, the litigation of Petitioner's federal habeas attack on his state court convictions at Docket No. CP-02-CR-53-2016 has been proceeding at Civil Action No. 23-881. Thus, there is no indication that any Respondent has been prejudiced unfairly by Petitioner's conduct.
(3) A history of dilatoriness
Petitioner has refused to respond to the Order to Show Cause in this matter. This is sufficient evidence, in this Court's view, to indicate that Petitioner does not intend to proceed with this case in a timely manner.
(4) Whether the party's conduct was willful or in bad faith
There is no indication on the record that Petitioner's conduct is the result of any “excusable neglect,” Poulis, supra. The conclusion that Petitioner's failure is willful is inescapable.
(5) Alternative sanctions
Petitioner currently is proceeding pro se, and there is no indication on the record that the imposition of costs or fees likely would be an effective sanction.
(6) Meritoriousness of the case
Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a petitioner to plead “all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner” within a single habeas petition. “[A] habeas petition raising claims that could have been prosecuted in an earlier habeas proceeding may be deemed an abuse of the writ and summarily dismissed accordingly.” Franklin v. Warden, No. 22-CV-2224, 2022 WL 17156795, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17128930 (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2022). Additionally, “although pro se litigants have a right of access to the courts, that right does not encompass the filing of frivolous, malicious, or duplicative lawsuits.” Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
There is no indication that Petitioner could not have proceeded with any claims for relief in his earlier-filed federal habeas petition at Civil Action No. 23-881. Indeed, to the extent that Petitioner wished to file additional claims, he was granted leave to do so in that case. No. 23-881, ECF Nos. 26 and 27. Accordingly, any attempt to proceed in the present, duplicative matter should be summarily dismissed.
Because five of the six Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal, dismissal is appropriate under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute. A certificate of appealability should be denied, because jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that this duplicative case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dismissal should be without prejudice to Petitioner's claims for federal habeas relief in Johnson v. Superintendent of SCI Huntingdon, which currently is pending at Civil Action No. 23-881. It is further recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.