Opinion
CLAIM NO. E312263
OPINION FILED OCTOBER 3, 1994
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE KENNETH E. BUCKNER, Attorney at Law, Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE GAIL MATTHEWS, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
OPINION AND ORDER
The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on December 21, 1993 In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment on July 10, 1992, and on September 24, 1992. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge's decision must be reversed.
The claimant was employed by the respondent employer as a kitchen supervisor in the dietary department. She suffers from an eye condition called papillitis, with optic atrophy. As a result of this condition, she is partially blind in her left eye, and she experiences depth perception problems. She contends that she sustained an injury on July 10, 1992. According to her testimony, she had completed her shift, and she had exited the building. When she was approximately 10 to 15 feet from the door, she was descending some steps by the back dock, when she misjudged a step and "jarred" her hip area. She testified that she felt some pain in her back and leg, but she did not feel that she had sustained a significant injury. She also contends that a second incident occurred at the same location and in the same manner on September 24, 1992. Like the July 10, 1992, incident, the claimant had completed her shift and was descending the steps outside the building when she misjudged the same step, jarring her left leg, hip, and low back. She contends that she is experiencing back problems which are causally related to these two incidents.
For an employee's injury to be compensable under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law, she must prove that she sustained an injury "arising out of and in the course of employment." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (1987). The phrase "`[a]rising out of the employment' refers to the origin or cause of the accident," so the employee must establish that a causal connection exists between the injury and her employment. Gerber Products v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985). An injury occurs "in the course of employment" when it occurs "within the time and space boundaries of the employment, while the employee is carrying out the employer's purpose, or advancing the employer's interests directly or indirectly." City of El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 Ark. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987).
As a general rule, injuries sustained while an employee is going or coming from work are not compensable. Fisher v. Proksch, 20 Ark. App. 80, 723 S.W.2d 852 (1987); City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W.2d 852 (1982). Such injuries are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment. Mason v. Lauck, 232 Ark. App. 891, 340 S.W.2d 575 (1960); American Red Cross v. Hogan, 13 Ark. App. 194, 681 S.W.2d 417 (1985). The rationale for the going and coming rule is based on the fact that all persons, including employees, are subject to the recognized hazards of travel to and from work. City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W.2d 610 (1982). Consequently, when traveling to and from the regular place of employment, the employee is not exposed to risks attributable to the employment. Instead, the employee is only exposed to risks which are common to all members of the general public.
Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptions to the going and coming rule, and one of these exceptions is the "premises exception." Under the premises exception, an injury sustained while the employee is coming to or returning from his place of employment may be compensable if it occurs after the employee has reached a place so close to the employer's premises as to be considered a part thereof.Davis v. Chemical Construction Co., 232 Ark. 50, 334 S.W.2d 697 (1960); Bales v. Service Club No. 1, Camp Chaffee, 208 Ark. 692, 187 S.W.2d 321 (1945). The premises exception to the going and coming rule recognizes that an employee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave his employer's premises and that an injury suffered within that interval may be found to arise in the course of employment. Davis, supra; Johnson v. Clark, 230 Ark. 275, 322 S.W.2d 72 (1959); Bales, supra. However, exceptions to the going and coming rule, such as the premises exception, merely operate to satisfy the requirement that the injury arise in the course of employment. Consequently, even where the claim falls within the premises exception, the claimant still must show that the injury arose out of the employment. Consequently, the claimant still must show a causal relationship between the employment and the injury by showing that the injury was a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks. Woodward v. White Spot Cafe, 30 Ark. App. 221, 785 S.W.2d 54 (1990); Bagwell v. Falcon Jet Corp., 8 Ark. App. 192, 649 S.W.2d 841 (1983); see also, Wright v. Ben M. Hogan, 250 Ark. 960, 468 S.W.2d 233 (1971). Injuries sustained on parking lots may fall under the premises exception if there is a sufficient causal connection between the a risk of the employment and the injury. Davis, supra; see also, Woodward v. White Spot Cafe, 30 Ark. App. 221, 785 S.W.2d 54 (1990). In determining whether an injury that occurs on or near a parking area falls under the premises exception, relevant factors to consider include the employer's control over the parking area, the connection between the injury and a condition of the employment, and the accessibility of the area to the general public. See, Bagwell v. Falcon Jet Corp., 8 Ark. App. 192, 649 S.W.2d 841 (1983); Wright v. Ben M. Hogan, 250 Ark. 960, 468 S.W.2d 233 (1971); Davis v. Chemical Construction Co., 232 Ark. 50, 334 S.W.2d 697 (1960);Johnson v. Clark, 230 Ark. 275, 322 S.W.2d 72 (1959);Westark Specialties, Inc. v. Lindsey, 259 Ark. 351, 532 S.W.2d 757 (1976).
In the case presently before the Commission, we find that the premises exceptions operates to satisfy the requirement that the injury arise in the course of employment. Although these incidents occurred outside the respondent employer's building, they occurred in an area which is adjacent to the parking area where employees parked. In addition, it appears that this area was under the control of the respondent employer and that it was actually part of the respondent employer's overall complex.
Nevertheless, we find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury arising out of her employment. The facts in this claim are similar to those that were present in Woodard v. White Spot Cafe, supra. In Woodard, the claimant was a dishwasher at a restaurant, and he injured his back in the employer's parking lot, at a location where his employer required him to park. According to his testimony, he felt something pop as he turned to get out of his car. However, he testified that there was nothing different about the way he got out of the car. Although the Court found that the claim falls within the premises exception, it also found that the claimant failed to prove that the injury arose out of his employment because he failed to prove that the injury was a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks. The Court found that the claimant failed to prove any connection between the injury and the employment, other than the fact that it occurred in the employer's parking lot. In doing so, the Court made the following comments:
The appellant in the case at bar was employed as a dishwasher, and there is no evidence that either the circumstances of his employment or the condition of the employer's premises contributed to his back injury. Nor can it be said that the appellant's employment required him to be in a particular place and thus brought him within range of an external force or event which caused his injury: there is no suggestion in the record that the appellant's surroundings had any influence on his injury, and it appears that he could have injured his back in this manner any time and any place that he got out of his automobile.
Likewise, in the present claim, there is no evidence that the circumstances of the claimant's employment or the condition of the employer's premises contributed to her injury, and her employment did not require her to be in a particular place, bringing her within range of an external force or event which caused the injury. Instead, the claimant attributed the incidents to the depth perception difficulties. However, such a misjudgment of a step could have occurred any time she was descending steps at any place. In fact, she admits that a very similar incident did occur in August of 1992, at her brother's house. Therefore, in accord with Woodard, we find that the claimant failed to prove a causal relationship between her employment and the injury.
Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury arising out of her employment. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge's decision must be, and hereby is, reversed. This claim is hereby denied and dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Humphrey dissents.