Opinion
3:24-CV-478-CCB-MGG
06-12-2024
CHRISTOPHER M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. GIRE STONE, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Christopher M. Johnson, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In the complaint, which Johnson signed under penalty of perjury, he claims that he filed a grievance, but he will not be able to complete the process because he is scheduled to be released on June 13, 2024. ECF 1 at 4. Johnson's assertion that he cannot complete the grievances process if released is inaccurate. The Indiana Department of Correction's grievance policy states the following:
An offender may pursue or originate a grievance at a facility from which they have been transferred or released from supervision only under the following conditions:
A. If a grievance was initiated prior to the offender's transfer or release, the offender may exhaust the administrative remedies available through the grievance process at the former facility.See Ind. Dep't of Corr. Policy & Admin. Proc., Offender Grievance Process, No. 00-02-301 (eff. Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/00-02-301-Offender-Grievance-Process-9-1-2020.pdfOffender-Grievance-Process. Because Johnson has initiated the grievance as an inmate, he is permitted to exhaust the administrative remedies at that facility.
In the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress mandated that prisoners are prohibited from bringing an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is designed to provide the prison with notice of a problem and give them an opportunity to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). Exhaustion is required even if the prisoner believes the grievance process will not work for him. “[T]here is no futility exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 808-809 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that exhaustion is necessary even “if the prisoner believes that exhaustion is futile. The sole objective of § 1997e(a) is to permit the prison's administrative process to run its course before litigation begins.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Johnson's mistaken belief that his imminent release will preclude him from exhausting administrative remedies does not excuse him from the exhaustion requirement.
The Seventh Circuit has taken a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Thus, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “By its plain terms, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit; a sue first, exhaust later approach is not acceptable.” Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original).
“Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, “a plaintiff can plead himself out of court. If he alleges facts that show he isn't entitled to a judgment, he's out of luck.” Early v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The complaint here shows that Johnson did not exhaust his administrative remedies before he filed suit, and therefore the case will be dismissed. See Schillinger v. Kiley, No. 21-2535, 2022 WL 4075590, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (unpublished) (“Although failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, a district court may dismiss a complaint at screening if the complaint, and any documents subject to judicial notice, establish the defense so plainly as to make the suit frivolous.”).
Though it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.”). Such is the case here.
It is legally frivolous to file a case that must be dismissed. For these reasons, this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
SO ORDERED.