To answer this question, an appellate court focuses on three factors: (a) evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior; (2) the defendant's demeanor at trial; and (3) prior medical opinion regarding the defendant's competence to stand trial. Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 516 (2) ( 433 S.E.2d 717) (1993); see Loggins v. State, 225 Ga. App. 713, 716 (5) ( 484 S.E.2d 758) (1997); White, supra, 202 Ga. App. at 425. The defendant bears the burden of proving incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.
" (Citations omitted.) Johnson v. State , 209 Ga. App. 514, 516 (2), 433 S.E.2d 717 (1993). Here, Riley contends that his confusion over whether the trial court granted a mistrial or a new trial shows that he did not understand the proceedings.
Such an analysis focuses on what the trial court did in light of what it knew at the time of the trial or plea hearing." Johnson v. State , 209 Ga. App. 514, 516 (2), 433 S.E.2d 717 (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). "None of these three factors raised a bona fide doubt about [Stodghill’s] ability to understand the proceedings, and thus the trial court was not required to conduct a competency hearing.
Such an analysis focuses on what the trial court did in light of what it knew at the time of the trial or plea hearing." Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 516 (2), 433 S.E.2d 717 (1993) (citation omitted).None of these three factors raised a bona fide doubt about Jones' ability to understand the proceedings and thus the trial court was not required to conduct a competency hearing.
(Citations omitted.) Flesche v. State, 254 Ga. App. 3, 4-5 (1) ( 561 SE2d 160) (2002), citing Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 516 (2) ( 433 SE2d 717) (1993). The record does not show that Haygood engaged in any irrational behavior, either before or during the trial.
See Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 85(2)(e) ( 402 S.E.2d 41) (1991) (preliminary evaluation may be conducted by a psychiatrist or "some other competent mental health expert") (citation omitted). See Bright, supra at 273-274; Christenson, supra at 82-83(2)(c); Perkins, supra at 297; Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 516(2) ( 433 S.E.2d 717) (1993); Callaway, supra at 510-511. 3. LaCount contends that the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, arguing that his character was impermissibly placed into evidence during the state's examination of the deputy sheriff who had taken the set of his fingerprints used in the comparison with the fingerprint lifted from the scene.
The psychiatrist who evaluated Gay found his responses to her questions "suggestive of malingering." Gay's purported symptoms, notwithstanding the efficacy of the psychiatrist's report, were insufficient to raise bona fide doubts about Gay's competence. Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 515 (2) ( 433 S.E.2d 717) (1993). 5. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to permit the jury to find all the essential elements of the crimes charged.
At trial, "[t]he party asserting a common law marriage must prove its existence to a preponderance of the evidence." Dixon v. State, 217 Ga. App. 267, 268 (1) ( 456 S.E.2d 758); cf., Brantley v. State, 262 Ga. 786, 792 (7) (d) ( 427 S.E.2d 758) (not unconstitutional to place burden of proving insanity or mental illness on defendant); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 516 (2) ( 433 S.E.2d 717) (burden upon defendant to show incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence). "If the evidence is in conflict as to the existence of a marriage, two procedures have been used to determine whether a marriage exists.
The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514 (1) ( 433 S.E.2d 717) (1993). 2.
See Lackey v. State, 615 So.2d 145, 151-152 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992); McCarlo v. State, 677 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Alaska App. 1984); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1369(f) (West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8-111(2) (1986); Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986); Flowers v. State, 353 So.2d 1259, 1270 (Fla.App. 1978); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 514, 516, 433 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 704-404 and 704-411 (1993); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, § 5/104-11(c) (1992); Montano v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1053, 1057-1058 (Ind.App. 1995); State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 35 (Iowa App. 1993); State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 72, 115 So. 370, 372 (1927); Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 365, 384 A.2d 91, 98 (1978); Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 573-574, 651 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1995); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 20.01 (1995); Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186, 191 (Miss. 1987); State v. Zorzy, 136 N. H. 710, 714-715, 622 A.2d 1217, 1219 (1993); State v. Lambert, 275 N.J. Super. 125, 129, 645 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1994); State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327, 721 P.2d 392, 395 (1986); People v. Santos, 43 A.D.2d 73, 75, 349 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (1973); State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.37 (1993); State v. Nance, 466 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-10A-6.1 (1988); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 89, 135 S.W. 327, 329 (1911)