I believe that the proper course in this particular case is to find that the error was not harmless and to reverse. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508(3), 570 S.E.2d 292 (2002) (reversible error where there was no Rule 31.1 notice, trial court did not conduct hearing regarding admissibility of prior crimes in compliance with Rule 31.3(B), and it was highly improbable that the error did not contribute to the verdict); Williams, 261 Ga. at 642–643, 409 S.E.2d 649 (failure by the trial court to make the essential preliminary determination as to whether the State was introducing similar transaction evidence for the appropriate purpose required reversal of conviction); see also Ragan v. State, 264 Ga. 190(2), (3), 442 S.E.2d 750 (1994) (failure to give notice and make the affirmative showings at a Rule 31.3(B) hearing required reversal). For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
On April 17, 2000, a jury convicted Johnson for the charges of felony murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and Johnson appealed. In Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508 ( 570 SE2d 292) (2002), we reversed Johnson's conviction due to the introduction of improper character evidence at trial. Thereafter, Johnson was re-tried on the charges of felony murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
Moreover, since the State redacted from the documents any reference to the reason for the incarceration, contrary to appellant's assertion, this is not a case where the State improperly introduced a previous conviction for the sole purpose of impugning the defendant's character. See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508 (3) ( 570 SE2d 292) (2002). 3. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss two jurors for cause after they articulated their bias against individuals who had previously used aliases or had been incarcerated.
Under such circumstances, a bifurcated trial is not required. George v. State, 276 Ga. 564 (3) ( 580 SE2d 238) (2003); Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508 (2) ( 570 SE2d 292) (2002); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 138 (2) ( 454 SE2d 482) (1995). It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the requested relief.
”Smallwood cites Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 510(3), 570 S.E.2d 292 (2002), to show that the admitted character evidence violated his right to a fair trial. But in that case the State entered three certified copies of the defendant's prior convictions into evidence, which seems much more prejudicial than a mention of the word ‘parole’.
Statements that Hutchins participated in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain prescription narcotics and to resell them in a street-level drug operation was objectionable as it was improper character evidence. See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 510(3), 570 S.E.2d 292 (2002) (The trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior independent crimes when the defendant had not placed his character in issue and when the prior crimes had not been admitted as similar transactions.); Doyal v. State, 287 Ga.App. 667, 669(2), 653 S.E.2d 52 (2007) (The trial court erred in admitting an officer's testimony that he had received complaints that the defendant was selling methamphetamine as that evidence improperly placed the defendant's character in issue.).
Based on this assumption, the statement was clearly objectionable as improper character evidence. See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 510(3), 570 S.E.2d 292 (2002) (“to protect an accused and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, we have long embraced the fundamental principle that the general character of an accused is inadmissible unless the accused chooses to put his character in issue”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Jackson's trial counsel, therefore, performed deficiently when he failed to object to that portion of the audio-video recording when it was played at trial.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 510-511 (3) ( 570 SE2d 292) (2002). While it is true that the appellate courts do not undertake to weigh evidence, we must, however, look to see if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict.
Zucker's statements regarding Pelowski's criminal record were inherently prejudicial, and, as a result of their admission, Pelowski's convictions must be reversed. See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 511 (3) ( 570 SE2d 292) (2002). Id. at 510 (3).
The evidence was extremely prejudicial and the evidence of Smith's guilt was not overwhelming. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial. See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 510-511 (3) ( 570 SE2d 292) (2002). Evidence favorable to the defense included testimony that Smith had previously been to Peden's apartment complex, that Smith told Burns on one occasion that he was with Peden and Milledge, and that Milledge kept a shoe box of cocaine and money at Peden's apartment.