Roberts, supra (punctuation and footnote omitted). See Johnson v. State, 245 Ga.App. 690, 691(1), 538 S.E.2d 766 (2000) (jury was authorized to reject defendant's testimony and accept victim's testimony depicting nonconsensual, forcible intercourse); Clark v. State, 197 Ga.App. 318, 320(1), 398 S.E.2d 377 (1990) (despite lack of physical trauma and defendant's claim that sex was consensual, there was sufficient evidence of forcible rape when victim testified that she was forced to submit to intercourse against her will); Littleton, supra (“lack of resistance, induced by fear, is not legally cognizable consent but is force”) (punctuation and citation omitted); OCGA § 16–6–1(a)(1).2. Pye contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury that “a victim's testimony in a case involving rape is sufficient, even without more, to sustain a conviction,” because the trial court failed to “buttress the charge ... with an additional charge regarding the State's required burden of proof.”

Johnson v. State. See Logan v. State.Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 692 (2) ( 538 SE2d 766) (2000).Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 735-736 (1) (a) ( 442 SE2d 883) (1994).

The jury had the right to accept the victim's testimony depicting nonconsensual, forcible intercourse, as satisfying the requirements of OCGA § 16-6-1. Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 691 ( 538 SE2d 766) (2000). We do not disturb the jury's guilty verdict, because evidence presented at trial was sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact of the existence of the essential elements of rape, and thus find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

OCGA § 24-4-8. See Johnson v. State, 245 Ga.App. 690, 691-692(1), 538 S.E.2d 766 (2000); Maloy v. State, 237 Ga.App. 873, 874-875(2), 516 S.E.2d 370 (1999).         During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge with this question: "What is the legal definition of consent in relation to persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs or mentally ill?"

The evidence was legally sufficient. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 691(1) ( 538 S.E.2d 766) (2000). 2.

The purpose of the rape-shield law is to protect the complaining witness from intrusive inquiries into her history of sexual activity with persons other than the defendant, inquiries which could only be intended to support the inference that the victim consented to intercourse with the defendant. Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 692 ( 538 S.E.2d 766) (2000); Hicks v. State, 222 Ga. App. 828, 829 ( 476 S.E.2d 101) (1996); Ford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 395, 396 ( 376 S.E.2d 418) (1988). See Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 Jurimetrics J. 119, 126-129 (1999).

We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the videotape. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80; Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 538 S.E.2d 766) (2000). See Knight v. State, 239 Ga. App. 710, 711-712 (1) ( 521 S.E.2d 851) (1999).

Further, much of Baker's argument centers around alleged conflicts in the children's stories, speculation about possible coaching of the children before the interview, and other issues that address the credibility of the witnesses themselves. Determinations as to the credibility of a witness are a matter solely within the jury's purview, and such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80; Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 538 S.E.2d 766) (2000). 2.