Summary
In Johnson, this court stated that the fact that Johnson was an inmate charged with escaping from the penitentiary would become known to the jury during trial; since there was nothing in the record to indicate what impression this might have made on the jurors, this court determined that it could not presume prejudice.
Summary of this case from Stanley v. StateOpinion
No. CR 76-222
Opinion delivered February 28, 1977
CRIMINAL LAW — PREJUDICE — PROOF. — It is not prejudice per se to bring a defendant into the courtroom handcuffed, and the Supreme Court cannot presume prejudice in the absence of any proof.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Randall L. Williams, Judge: affirmed.
James O. Fels, for appellant.
Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by: Gary Isbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
George Johnson was convicted in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County of escaping from the Department of Corrections. The only issue on appeal is Johnson's allegation that he should have been granted a mistrial because he was brought into the courtroom before the jury handcuffed.
Before the trial started, Johnson's attorney notified the trial judge of the fact that Johnson was brought into the courtroom in handcuffs before the jury. There was no hearing held and this simple fact was presented to the judge. The judge ruled that he could find no prejudice and denied the motion for a mistrial.
Normally, a defendant should not be brought into a courtroom handcuffed. However, such an act is not prejudicial se. In this case, the defendant was charged with being an escapee from the penitentiary; he was an inmate at the time of the trial. All of this would become known to the jury during trial. There is nothing in the record to indicate what impression may have been made on the jurors, and on these facts, we cannot presume prejudice. McCoy v. Wainwright, 396 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1968).
In order to justify a new trial, the error must appear to have seriously affected the fairness of the trial. Johnson did not offer any proof of prejudice and we can find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying the motion for mistrial. See Barksdale v. State, 255 Ark. 272, 499 S.W.2d 851 (1973), and Gregory v. United States, 365 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1966).
Affirmed.
We agree. HARRIS, C.J., and FOGLEMAN and ROY, JJ.