Byrd also filed a response to Judge Stewart's petition, in which he argued that a writ of mandamus was not appropriate because, he said, the State has another adequate remedy at law in that it may use civil collection procedures to collect the unpaid restitution; that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly found that the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to summon Byrd to court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his alleged failure to pay full restitution in a case for which he was no longer incarcerated or on probation; that the proper manner to attempt to collect the restitution following the termination of probation would be the same manner as for a civil judgment, see § 12-17-225.6, Ala. Code 1975; that the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the restitution order more than 30 days from the date the order was entered; and that Dixon and Johnson v. State, 17 So. 3d 261 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that, for the reasons expressed in Dixon, the trial court was without jurisdiction to hold the appellant in contempt and to sentence her to community corrections for failure to pay court-ordered moneys) support his claim that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the later restitution orders in this case because Byrd had completed his sentence of imprisonment and probation. Byrd also challenges the arguments in the amicus brief of the attorney general, asserting that the cases cited in the amicus brief do not support the conclusion that the trial court in this case had continuing jurisdiction to enter the later orders. Section 12-1-7(3), Ala. Code 1975, provides that every court has the power "to compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process and to orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding therein.