Normal impeachment applies when the defendant makes broad statements which open the door for impeachment. Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1995) (citing Quinn v. State, 479 So.2d 706, 708-09 (Miss. 1985); Pierce v. State, 401 So.2d 730 (Miss.
The determination of relevance and admissibility is within the discretion of trial court. Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1995). It cannot be said that the circuit court erred in disallowing evidence not relevant to the charges against Brown.
“Reversal is proper only where such discretion has been abused and a substantial right of a party has been affected.” Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss.1995). Absent an exception, “[g]enerally, evidence of any crime other than the one for which the defendant is being tried is not admissible.”
¶ 8. The State relies upon Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499 (Miss. 1995), for the premise that Robinson was required to request a limiting instruction. However, Johnson involved evidence admitted under Rules 404(b) and 611(b), or "normal impeachment" testimony within the proper scope of cross-examination. Johnson, 666 So.2d at 503-04.
When Henderson's testimony on the stand was different from Minor's version of the facts, the State was properly allowed to impeach Henderson with Minor's testimony. See Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1995) ("`Where an accused, on direct examination, seeks to exculpate himself, such testimony is subject to normal impeachment via cross-examination . . .'") (quoting Stewart v. State, 596 So.2d 851, 853 (Miss. 1992)).
In response to questions by his own attorney on direct examination, Kiker testified that he was not a violent man, nor had any intentions of ever hurting Renee. These broad statements opened the door for impeachment. Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1995) (citing Quinn v. State, 479 So.2d 706, 708-09 (Miss. 1985); Pierce v. State, 401 So.2d 730, 733 (Miss.
Determinations of relevance and admissibility of evidence rest within the discretion of the trial court. McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 243 (¶ 15) (Miss. 1997); Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1995); Baine v. State, 606 So.2d 1076, 1078 (Miss. 1992); Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.
This Court finds that Investigator Sledge's testimony was limited to rebutting Walker's testimony and was not an improper comment on Walker's silence. It is clear from the transcript that Walker's comments regarding his refusal to give the police a statement were generated by Walker, not by the State. SeeJohnson v. State , 666 So. 2d 499, 503 (Miss. 1995) ("[W]here the State ‘initiate[s] the matter by eliciting from the defendant the response it later [seeks] to impeach by showing the defendant's prior criminal ... activities,’ the impeachment is impermissible and cause for reversal and remand." (alterations in original) (quoting Quinn v. State , 479 So. 2d 706, 708 (Miss.
That said, trial courts should rule on motions in limine as early as practicable, which often is before the defendant elects whether to testify or remain silent. See United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) ("remindfing]" trial courts "that advance planning helps both parties and the court"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S.Ct. 706, 62 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980); United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that a trial court "should, when feasible, make reasonable efforts to accommodate a defendant by ruling in advance on the admissibility of a criminal record so that he can make an informed decision whether or not to testify"); Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 502 (Miss. 1995) (stating that early rulings on motions in limine are preferred "unless delay is absolutely necessary to a fair presentation of the issue"); see abo State v. Cole, 142 N.H. 519, 703 A.2d 658, 660 (N.H. 1997) (noting that, "although not absolutely required, trial courts should rule on the admissibility of prior convictions as impeachment evidence as early as practicable"); State v. McClure, 298 Or. 336, 692 P.2d 579, 583 (1984) (commenting that "it is not realistic or necessary for a defendant to have to wait until he is on the stand to find out whether he will be impeached with prior crime evidence," and noting that, although there may be circumstances in which the court may have reason to defer the ruling, "this should be a rare occurrence"). Many are the times when a trial court can and, therefore, should decide a motion in limine involving a Rule 5-609 issue before the defendant makes the election.
This Court will reverse the ruling of a trial court only where such discretion has been abused and a substantial right of a party has been affected. Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 503 ( Miss. 1995)(citing M.R.E. 103(a)). ¶ 15.