BELL, Chief Judge. This appeal from a revocation of probation is controlled adversely to the appellant by Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818 ( 108 S.E.2d 313) and by many cases which have applied Johnson such as Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516 ( 130 S.E.2d 790); Scott v. State, 131 Ga. App. 504 ( 206 S.E.2d 137) and Clackler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 738 ( 204 S.E.2d 472). It would indeed be ridiculous to hold (as appellant would have us do) that where an act on which the revocation is based is a felony, that it is erroneous for the hearing judge to have based the revocation on that accusation unless the accused shall have first been tried and found guilty of the criminal charge. To hold that would be to elevate a felony to a legal status more respectable than an ordinary and reasonable condition expressed in a probationary sentence, the violation of which would not constitute even a misdemeanor.
"Probation is granted as a privilege, and not as a matter of right; and the revocation of the probation is punishment for the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the first instance." Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 396 ( 67 S.E.2d 124). Probation of sentence ". . . comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime . . ." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 ( 55 SC 818, 79 LE 1566). "The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain.
However, the Georgia law with respect to revocation of probation now seems to be clear. An earlier case enunciating the same principle is that of Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313): "A hearing of this character is not a trial on a criminal charge, but is a hearing to determine judicially whether the conduct of the defendant during the probation period has conformed to the course outlined in the order of probation. If the act which violated the probation should happen to be a criminal one, it does not thereby change the character of the hearing.
"The only question before us is whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to authorize the revocation of a probationary sentence under Code Ann. § 27-2713. "`(Probation is granted as a privilege, and not as a matter of right; and the revocation of the probation is punishment for the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the first instance.)' Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 396 ( 67 S.E.2d 124). Probation of sentence `... comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime...' Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 ( 55 SC 818, 79 LE 1566). `The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain.' Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 ( 53 SC 154, 77 LE 266). "This does not mean that the probationer can be made the victim of whim or caprice. Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 328 ( 133 S.E. 843); Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 24 ( 47 S.E.2d 678); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223, supra.
A revocation hearing is not a criminal trial. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313); Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 784, 785 (1) ( 252 S.E.2d 696). Therefore, the trial court could not err in denying a Brady motion for discovery with reference to the charge of shoplifting.
Whorley v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 215 Va. 740 ( 214 S.E.2d 447) (1975). Compare Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818 ( 108 S.E.2d 313) (1959). 3.
What is at issue in a probation revocation hearing "is punishment for the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the first instance.... At the hearing to determine whether or not the probation should be revoked, the defendant was not on trial to determine whether or not he was guilty [of the subsequently charged crime]." Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313) (1959). "The exercise of ... discretion in declining to revoke probation should not be viewed as, and is in no way an adjudication of, the allegations sufficient to constitute an acquittal in a criminal prosecution or any form of final judgment which would act as a bar to a subsequent prosecution."
Appellant admitted that he understood the supervisor's explanation and understood that he needed appropriate permission to enter the Pataula Judicial Circuit. He felt, however, that the trip to Early County on April 9, 1984 was an emergency justifying his entry without even seeking permission. "`Probation is granted as a privilege, and not as a matter of right; and the revocation of the probation is punishment for the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the first instance.' Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 ( 108 S.E.2d 313) [(1959)]." Geiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 800, 801 ( 232 S.E.2d 109) (1976).
Thus, in such proceeding it is unnecessary that the evidence support the findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 591, 593 ( 269 S.E.2d 86); Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818 ( 108 S.E.2d 313). As stated in Baltimore v. State, 165 Ga. App. 741 (2) ( 302 S.E.2d 427): "There is no merit in the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in applying a constitutionally defective `slight evidence' standard of proof in determining whether defendant had violated the conditions of the probation." Accord, Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526 ( 242 S.E.2d 53); State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380 (2) ( 283 S.E.2d 463).
A probation hearing is not a trial on a criminal charge, but a hearing to determine whether a defendant's conduct has conformed to the terms of the probation. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818 ( 108 S.E.2d 313) (1959). A probation revocation will not be set aside unless the trial court abuses its discretion.