Johnson v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Biggs v. State

    281 Ga. 627 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 32 times
    Explaining that a defendant's right to procedural due process is violated when the trial court fails to sua sponte hold a competency hearing after information that raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competence becomes known to the court before or during trial

    Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 469 (6), n. 2 ( 405 SE2d 483) (1991). Focusing on the similarities, not the differences, between the charged crimes and the prior offense, see Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345 (6) ( 541 SE2d 357) (2001), the evidence showed that in both crimes Biggs knocked on the victim's door and forced his way into the apartment; both victims were shot in their homes at close range; both crimes involved the use of a handgun; both crimes showed a propensity to resort to deadly force with little or no provocation; and in both crimes Biggs fled on foot. Because this evidence was sufficient to establish the required similarity between the charged crimes and the 1989 shooting offense, the trial court's allowance of the evidence was not clearly erroneous.

  2. Brite v. State

    608 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    See Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20 ( 262 SE2d 789) (1980); Charo v. State, 206 Ga.App. 297 (3) ( 424 SE2d 900) (1992) (four or five years not too remote). Focusing on the similarities, not the differences, between the charged crimes and the prior independent offense, see Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345 (6) ( 541 SE2d 357) (2001), the State's evidence showed that both crimes were revenge or "grudge" killings; both victims were shot in the head at point blank range; Brite used cunning and stealth to lure both victims to the location where he killed them; both killings involved the use of a handgun; and both show a propensity to resort to deadly force with little or no provocation. Thus, we conclude that the State demonstrated sufficient similarity between the charged crimes and the Harris murder and the trial court did not err by admitting the similar transaction evidence.

  3. Everritt v. State

    277 Ga. 457 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 11 times
    Discussing legal responsibility of a criminal defendant for "natural and probable " or "reasonably foreseeable" collateral acts of a co-conspirator

    The case was docketed in this Court on February 26, 2003, and orally argued on June 17, 2003. Viewing the evidence in a light to uphold the verdict, as we are bound to do, see Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345 541 S.E.2d 357 (2001), we find the following: Everritt owned and operated a service station in Shellman, Georgia. Because he was experiencing financial problems, Everritt hired James McDuffie to burn down the station, which was insured. Everritt was to pay McDuffie $5,000 for his services out of the insurance proceeds.

  4. Yancey v. State

    275 Ga. 550 (Ga. 2002)   Cited 35 times
    Explaining that former OCGA § 24–3–1(b), the so-called “necessity exception,” had been interpreted “as creating a residual exception to the hearsay rule”

    Pearson, supra note 4, at 24 (suggesting that a waiver analysis should apply in marital privilege cases). See Smith, 266 Ga. at 830-831 (holding harmless error to admit burn victim's statements to arson investigators); McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. 188 ( 429 S.E.2d 655) (1993) (admitting murder victim's statements about her husband's prior kidnapping of her); see also Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345, 347 ( 541 S.E.2d 357) (2001) (admitting statements to police by victim of defendant's prior act). See Holmes v. State, 271 Ga. 138, 140 ( 516 S.E.2d 61) (1999) (admitting statements of two men who participated in fight and identified defendant as the shooter).

  5. Hayes v. State

    275 Ga. 173 (Ga. 2002)   Cited 2 times

    This crime was proven by eyewitness testimony and by statements of the victim that were admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule, including statements made to a police officer during the course of investigating the crime.Peterson, 274 Ga. at 169; Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 865, 870 ( 548 S.E.2d 278) (2001); Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345, 347-48 ( 541 S.E.2d 357) (2001). Finally, because the evidence of Hayes's guilt on the June 27 battery and August 3 murder was overwhelming, because those separate but connected crimes were properly joined together in this trial, and because each of the separate crimes was more damaging to Hayes with regard to the connected crime than any of the prior difficulty evidence, we conclude that even if the evidence offered to prove the prior difficulties was inadmissible hearsay, any error in admitting the hearsay was harmless.

  6. Jackson v. State

    574 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)

    274 Ga. 156, 162(8) ( 549 S.E.2d 359) (2001). See Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345, 347-348(5) ( 541 S.E.2d 357) (2001). See Quijano v. State, 271 Ga. 181, 185-186 ( 516 S.E.2d 81) (1999).

  7. Ginn v. State

    251 Ga. App. 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 18 times
    Affirming defendant's conviction for criminal trespass based upon evidence that defendant damaged the family's keyboard during a dispute with his wife

    See Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 608 (4) ( 351 S.E.2d 448) (1987). See Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345, 347-348 (5) ( 541 S.E.2d 357) (2001). 2.