It is true that OCGA § 17–8–57 is violated when “the court's comment assumes certain things as facts and intimates to the jury what the judge believes the evidence to be.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 222 Ga.App. 722, 727(6), 475 S.E.2d 918 (1996). “Courts of this State have always recognized, however, that a statement by a trial court concerning a fact that is uncontested or is not in dispute does not constitute a violation of this statute.”

But this evidence, like the other similar transaction evidence, shows a lustful disposition toward preteen and teenaged girls, and for that reason, it was properly admissible. See Johnson v. State, 222 Ga.App. 722, 724(2), 475 S.E.2d 918 (1996) (photographs illustrated lustful disposition and propensity for sexual activity involving children). The admission of the photographs and the testimony about them also was no abuse of discretion.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Ney v. State, 227 Ga. App. 496, 499(4) ( 489 S.E.2d 509) (1997).Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 728(9) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996).Ney, supra.

See OCGA § 16-6-4(c) (defining aggravated child molestation). See Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 727-728(9) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). (b) According to Frazier, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call his brother, who could have provided an alibi for the similar transaction.

" The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 725(3) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). 2.

Nickerson's claim was presented to and ruled upon by the trial court, whose finding of effectiveness must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 728 (9) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Nickerson must show both deficient performance and actual prejudice.

See id. See Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 729 (11) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). See Peeples v. State., 234 Ga. App. 454, 457-58 (4) ( 507 S.E.2d 197) (1998).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Turner] must show both that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficiency so prejudiced his defense that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the trial would have been different but for that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). [Turner] must establish both the performance and the prejudice components of the Strickland test. Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 728 (9) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). "A conviction will not be reversed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel unless counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Knight] must show both that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficiency so prejudiced his defense that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the trial would have been different but for that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington . . . [Knight] must establish both the performance and the prejudice components of the Strickland test.Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 728 (9) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). The trial court's determination that an accused has not been denied effective assistance of counsel will be affirmed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.

[Willingham] must establish both the performance and the prejudice components of the Strickland test." Johnson v. State, 222 Ga. App. 722, 728 (9) ( 475 S.E.2d 918) (1996). To succeed in his claim, [Willingham] "must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct."