Opinion
Case No. 5:05-cv-47.
March 17, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil action brought by a pro se plaintiff. Plaintiff states that he is "a flesh and blood Sovereign of the Michigan Republic, who denies any corporate existence, is not a surety, nor accommodation party for any real or imagined entity, and is exempt from lien or levy, while acting in a private non-commercial capacity." (Compl., 14). He identifies himself in the complaint in the terms set forth verbatim below:
Plaintiff is Jimmy Dale Johnson©, whose correct and proper Christian English spelling of his name uses both upper and lower case ("Jimmy Dale Johnson©" and NOT all upper case ("JIMMY DALE JOHNSON©". Plaintiff requests to be correctly addressed thusly to avoid identity confusion, and because a corrupted version of a natural individuals name in all upper case letters erroneously addresses a fraudulently presumed persona designata, nom de guerre, misnomer, mistaken identity, or an artificial entity (Maxim of law; Hale vs. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Covington and L. Turnp. Co. vs. Sanford, 17 Sup.Ct. 198; Smyth vs. Ames, 18 Sup.Ct. 418). Plaintiff, Jimmy Dale Johnson©, is an Indigenous and Sovereign, Natural-Born State Citizen.
(Compl., 5).
The court declines to accede to plaintiff's request that it depart from the traditional use of upper case letters in the case caption. The federal courts have repeatedly rejected nonsensical assertions that the use of all upper case letters somehow constitutes fraud or deprives the court of jurisdiction. See United States v. Frech, Nos. 97-6282, 97-6349, 1998 WL 317472 (10th Cir. June 16, 1998) (finding these arguments to be "frivolous," "silly," and "without any basis in law or fact"); see also Norman v. Pontesso, No. 97-1052, 1997 WL 594976, at * 1 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 1997); United States v. Singleton, No. 03 CR 175, 2004 WL 1102322, at * 3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004); United States v. DeClerck, No. 02-40072-01-RDR, 2003 WL 22716919, at * 1 (D. Kan. Sept. 18, 2003); United States v. Furman, 168 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613-14 (E.D. La. 2001).
The court has granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, in light of his indigence. Under the provisions of federal law, PUB. L. No. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the court is required to dismiss any action brought in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action may be dismissed as frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Accordingly, an action is frivolous within the meaning of section 1915(e)(2)(B) when it is based on either an inarguable legal conclusion or fanciful factual allegations. 490 U.S. at 325. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 2005). In applying these standards, the court must read plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and accept plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the court concludes that plaintiff's lawsuit is indisputably meritless. Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and for seeking monetary damages against defendants who are immune from such relief.
Plaintiff named eleven defendants in his complaint: the State of Michigan, Judge Charles F. Filice, Judge Frank J. Deluca, Officer Richard Ballor, Officer Michael Schulte, Prosecuting Attorney Ken Lane, John F. Rehagen, City of Lansing, "City of Lansing Attorney(s) Office," Michigan Bar Association, and the American Bar Association. The exact nature of plaintiff's complaint is difficult to discern, but from the few facts alleged, it is clear that plaintiff is facing criminal prosecution in state court upon charges that on or about November 29, 2004, he resisted and obstructed a police officer and was driving without a license. Plaintiff further objects to related traffic citations and expenses incurred in connection with the towing and storage of his vehicle.
Plaintiff alleges that "Lansing Police Agent" Richard Ballor stopped him on November 29, 2004, because "the license of Plaintiff's property was outdated." Plaintiff informed Officer Ballor that plaintiff "ha[d] an Unalienable Free Right to Travel, and was not involved in any activity of Financial Gain or Commerce." Plaintiff argues that none of his actions on November 29, 2004, constituted "Obstruction of Justice." Plaintiff alleges that when Officer Ballor asked him for his name and driver's license, plaintiff responded as follows:
Plaintiff informed and Demanded, Lansing City Police Agent RICHARD BALLOR # 220, to read the Offer of Contract that was Posted upon the Plaintiff's Private Property, and the Plaintiff's trade-name/trademark Property was copyrighted. And it the Lansing City Police Agent, RICHARD BALLOR # 220, unlawfully, without consent, used the Plaintiff's name upon an instrument for financial gain, he would be bound to the posted Offer of Contract that Agent RICHARD BALLOR # 220, who did read the offer of Contract that was posted on the Plaintiff's Private Property. Plaintiff then produced a Notarized Affidavit of the Plaintiff's trade-name/trademark Copyright Notice that was published nationwide. (Compl., 15, ¶ 3). Plaintiff alleges that after he produced the affidavit, he asked Officer Ballor "if he knew the `11 AM JUR 1ST SERIES 329 SECTION', the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, That he had signed and sworn under Oath to uphold." (Compl., 15, ¶ 4). Plaintiff claims that when Ballor responded that he did not know, plaintiff informed Ballor that plaintiff could file a complaint against him for bearing false witness under penalty of perjury for not knowing what he had signed an oath to uphold. ( Id.) Officer Ballor called for backup. Plaintiff states that he initially was not asked to "step out of his Personal Private Property," and fearing personal injury "stayed seated in his Private Property." When Ballor advised plaintiff that he was under arrest, plaintiff demanded to see an arrest warrant. (Compl., 16, ¶ 7). Plaintiff eventually exited his vehicle when police advised him that if he failed to do so, they would be forced to utilize a stun gun. ( Id., ¶ 8).
Plaintiff disagrees with actions taken by two state-court judges. He disagrees with the actions of Judge Deluca, the presiding judge, during plaintiff's December 8, 2004 arraignment on state criminal charges. Plaintiff is dissatisfied with Judge Charles F. Filce's actions during a pretrial conference conducted on January 7, 2005. Plaintiff asks this court to order that all charges against him be "dropped Immediately with no cost." He asks the court to issue an order compelling the City of Lansing and State of Michigan "to prove that they have Proper Subject-matter Jurisdiction and Proper Jurisdiction over Plaintiff (Jimmy Dale Johnson©) being a NON-14TH Amendment cITIZEN." Plaintiff asks the court to order that all defendants be imprisoned.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-45 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court must decline to interfere with pending state proceedings involving important state interests unless extraordinary circumstances are present. This case does not present extraordinary circumstances. The state proceedings are currently pending, involve important state interests, and afford plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. This court will not interfere with the state-court criminal proceedings against plaintiff.
Plaintiff's complaint seeks millions of dollars in monetary damages. Plaintiff requests $10.5 million for purported copyright or trademark infringement, $500,000.00 dollars for each time his name or any variation of it has appeared in state-court papers or traffic citations. Plaintiff requests an award of an additional $100,000 for the five hours he states he was detained. Finally, plaintiff seeks reimbursement from defendants of $570 for the cost of towing of his "private property" and thirty-nine days' storage charges.
Upon review, the court finds that dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is appropriate. Plaintiff's complaint is frivolous, fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, and seeks monetary damages against defendants immune from such relief.
Plaintiff lacks standing to initiate criminal charges. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Plaintiff's assertion that defendants violated oaths of office fails to state any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Krajicek v. Nichols, No. 98-1878, 1999 WL 991252, at * 2 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999); Irving v. Lorson, No. C-2-02-823, 2002 WL 31844685, at * 4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2002). To state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege deprivation of a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution or laws by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 302 (6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's claims against the State of Michigan are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). States and their departments are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Defendant Lane is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are immune from damage suits for their decisions to initiate or not initiate criminal prosecutions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002). The decision to prosecute or not prosecute, even if malicious, enjoys absolute immunity under this doctrine. See Byrnes v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492-93 (1991). Defendants Filice and Deluca are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A claim that the state-court judge acted "maliciously or corruptly" and in excess of his jurisdiction is insufficient to overcome judicial immunity. See Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, a complaint merely names persons as defendants in the case caption without alleging specific conduct by them, the claims against such defendants are subject to summary dismissal as frivolous. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1994); Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Plaintiff's purported copyright and trademark claims are likewise frivolous. See Aarismaa v. Jordan, No. 98-9082, 1999 WL 461794, at *1 (2d Cir. June 22, 1999); Kelley v. Oregon, No. Civ. 04-167-AA, 2004 WL 957770 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 2004); United States v. DeClerck, 2003 WL 22716919, at * 3.
Upon review, this lawsuit will be dismissed as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for seeking monetary damages against defendants who are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). On the same grounds, the court certifies that any appeal of this decision would be frivolous and brought in bad faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).