Johnson v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. Rogers v. State

    No. A23A0848 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2023)

    Because outgoing text messages are considered a party's "own statement," the same are generally admissible as admissions by a party opponent. See Glispie, 300 Ga. at 131 (1); see also Johnson v. State, 347 Ga.App. 831, 842 (2) (b) (i) (821 S.E.2d 76) (2018). Similarly, some incoming text messages "may be admissible to provide context to outgoing text messages that are admissible as admissions."

  2. McClure v. State

    361 Ga. App. 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Gates , 298 Ga. at 326 (2), 781 S.E.2d 772 ; accord Slaton v. State , 303 Ga. 651, 658 (8), 814 S.E.2d 344 (2018) ; see also Jones v. State , 339 Ga. App. 95, 102-103 (2), 791 S.E.2d 625 (2016) (out-of-court statements offered not for their truth, but rather to place the defendant's statements in context, are not hearsay). In that vein, incoming text messages to a criminal defendant's cell phone may be admissible to provide context to the defendant's outgoing text messages that are admissible as party admissions under OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (A), where the incoming messages are "non-assertive statements that are incapable of being true or false" or "indisputably false."Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831, 843 (2) (b) (ii), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only). OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) provides, in relevant part, that the hearsay rule does not exclude an "admission," which is defined as "a statement offered against a party which is: (A) The party's own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity; [or] (B) A statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth."

  3. Bully v. State

    357 Ga. App. 663 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    The State argued that the wife's statements provided context for Bully's own half of the conversation and that they were, therefore, admissible. In Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831, 840 (2), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018), the appellant argued that text messages from his cell phone should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. This Court held that although the outgoing messages were admissible under Glispie , a blanket admission of the incoming messages on the grounds that they provide context for the appellant's statements was erroneous.

  4. Champ v. State

    310 Ga. 832 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that a defendant has the right to be present at a bench conference during which a prospective juror is discussed and removed

    Second, careful counsel may choose to put on the record in open court what occurred at a bench conference not attended by the defendant or make clear whether the defendant was waiving his right to be present at bench conferences. See, e.g., Heath v. State , 349 Ga. App. 84, 91 (3), 825 S.E.2d 474 (2019) ("Third, Heath's counsel explicitly put on the record [in open court] that ‘at the conference (they) had agreed to strike for cause jurors number 3 and 10.’ "); Ramirez v. State , 345 Ga. App. 611, 616 (2), 814 S.E.2d 751 (2018) (defense counsel stated on the record that he explained the right to be present and that his client agreed to discussing the content of the bench conferences at counsel's table); Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831, 839 (1) (b), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018) (defense counsel stated on the record that defendant did not waive his right to be present by not being present at bench conferences); Williamson v. State , 207 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1), 428 S.E.2d 628 (1993) (defense counsel announced on the record that defendant waived his right to be present). And in the interest of avoiding a re-trial, we have encouraged the trial court and prosecutors to put on the record what occurred at bench conferences or confirm that the defendant waived the right to be present.

  5. Bryan v. State

    903 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Bryan does not assert that the content of the text messages should have been excluded as another layer of hearsay even if the extraction report itself was not hearsay. See, e.g., Johnson v.State, 347 Ga. App. 831, 842 (2) (b), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018). [10] Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."

  6. In re A. A.

    362 Ga. App. 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)

    Indeed, an investigator with the Hall County Sheriff's Office testified that he executed a search warrant at [her and her fiancé’s] residence, and he seized both of their cell phones.").SeeNicholson v. State , 307 Ga. 466, 475 (5), 837 S.E.2d 362 (2019) (holding that messages were sufficiently authenticated when "[t]he State used a search warrant to obtain the records from AT&T, which also provided a verification of authenticity"); Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831, 841-42 (2) (a), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018) (holding that testimony by mobile-service-provider's records custodian sufficiently authenticated text messages). In considering A. A.’s argument, our analysis necessarily begins with OCGA § 24-9-901 (a), which provides that:

  7. Pruitt v. State

    354 Ga. App. 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    Because a defendant’s presence at bench conferences dealing with such topics bears no relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge, his right to be present is not violated by his absence from such bench conferences. Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831, 832 (1), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted). Pruitt contends that he was improperly excluded from four bench conferences that occurred at trial.

  8. Nix v. State

    354 Ga. App. 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 10 times
    Affirming conviction where State presented evidence of possession tying defendant to a flash drive containing child pornography where, among other things, the flash drive was found in Nix's garage in a fanny pack, and his cell phone was found in a similar fanny pack in the same location

    Therefore, the continuing witness rule did not apply, and the text messages should have been sent back with the jury for their review during deliberations. See Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831, 843-844 (3), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018) (physical precedent only) (text messages between defendant and others about a robbery made at the time of the robbery were original documentary evidence of the robbery and were not subject to the continuing witness rule). Nevertheless, an erroneous continuing witness ruling is not grounds for reversal if it is "highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment."

  9. Chartier v. Wagner (In re Mary Margaret Chartier Revocable Living Tr.)

    No. 344346 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2019)

    Initially, we agree that the text messages, as electronically stored information, qualify as "documents" for purposes of discovery, and therefore were subject to Wagner's discovery request for production of documents. MCR 2.302(B)(1); MCR 2.310(B)(1)(a); see also Johnson v State, 347 Ga App 831, 844; 821 SE2d 76, 87 (2018) (text messages by the defendant constituted original documentary evidence of the defendant's communications). However, the probate court had discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy for the Chartiers' failure to produce this evidence.

  10. Johnson v. State

    348 Ga. App. 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that "in the absence of an objection, a prosecutor's evidentiary proffers to the trial court during a hearing will be treated on appeal as the equivalent of evidence"

    ter alia , a police officer testified that he observed another officer recover and download the messages taken from a cell phone found on the defendant, which messages he printed out); Cotton , 297 Ga. at 259-60 (3), 773 S.E.2d 242 (holding that Facebook messages were properly authenticated as being sent by the defendant when his mother testified that he went by a nickname associated with the account and also used it as an alias on YouTube, and the mother confirmed that she recognized conversations she had with the defendant from accounts that she had used); Burgess , 292 Ga. at 823-24 (4), 742 S.E.2d 464 (holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate a printout from the defendant’s MySpace profile page when witnesses testified that he used a nickname associated with the page and a police officer testified that he compared known photographs of the defendant with images depicted on the printout and determined that they were images of the defendant); see also Johnson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 831 (2) (a), 821 S.E.2d 76 (2018) (physical precedent only) (holding that text messages were properly authenticated through the custodian of the phone records who worked for the phone-service provider); United States v. Lewisbey , 843 F.3d 653, 658 (B) (1) (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the government presented more than enough evidence to authenticate certain text messages found on the defendant’s phone when, as here, the phone was confiscated by police at the time of his arrest and when the "properties" section of the phone indicated that it was his, as did the contacts directory, which included his mother and attorney); Carr , 607 F. App'x at 876 (III) (A) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting text messages when, inter alia , the custodian of the company that kept records of the text messages authenticated them as records kept in the ordinary course of business); United States v. Lanzon , 639 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Federal Rule of Evid