Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12623 No. 6672
08-15-2018
ROBERT DEWAN JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Marjorie A. Mock, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. John Darnall, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-16-27 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Alex M. Swiderski, Judge. Appearances: Marjorie A. Mock, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. John Darnall, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard, Judge. Judge ALLARD.
Robert Dewan Johnson was convicted of driving under the influence. Prior to trial, Johnson moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawful. The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the traffic stop was justified by the community caretaker doctrine. Johnson now appeals that decision. Because we agree with the district court that there was sufficient justification for the traffic stop, we affirm Johnson's conviction.
AS 28.35.030(a)(1).
Relevant facts and analysis
Johnson's vehicle was stopped by Anchorage Police Officer Cody Musgrave. At the evidentiary hearing on Johnson's motion to suppress, Musgrave testified that he was driving on Ingra Street approaching downtown Anchorage around one o'clock in the morning when he observed Johnson's vehicle moving very slowly. Musgrave estimated that Johnson was driving less than 15 mph in a 35-mph zone.
It was early January; the road was wet, but it was free of ice. Officer Musgrave testified that he saw no explanation for the slow driving and he had not seen any drivers having difficulty with the road conditions that night. Musgrave therefore pulled behind Johnson's vehicle and followed it for one block. During this time, Johnson's vehicle continued at the same slow speed, despite the presence of a marked police car behind the vehicle. Musgrave then activated his lights and pulled Johnson over to determine why Johnson was driving so slowly and whether he required assistance. According to Musgrave, he stopped the vehicle because he was concerned that the driver might be impaired, suffering from a health issue, or simply distracted — all of which could create risks for the driver or for other drivers. Musgrave acknowledged that there were no other cars in the immediate vicinity when he stopped Johnson, but he testified that there were other cars in the general area and they were close to downtown Anchorage. Based on Officer Musgrave's testimony, which the court found credible, the trial court held that the stop was justified by the community caretaker doctrine.
See Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9, 11 (Alaska App. 1986) (explaining that when the State relies on the community caretaker doctrine to support a Fourth Amendment search or seizure, the State must prove both (1) that the officer subjectively believed that police assistance was required or requested, and (2) that the circumstances known to the officer objectively justified this conclusion). --------
Having reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that there was sufficient legal justification for the stop. Johnson was driving significantly under the posted speed limit on a major road in Anchorage, and he failed to increase his speed even when followed by a marked police car. Given these circumstances, there was good reason for the officer to conduct a limited traffic stop to ensure that the driver was not impaired or otherwise suffering from a condition that affected his ability to safely drive a motor vehicle.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.