Opinion
Civil Action No. 97-5803.
August 3, 1999
James Langton, Esq., Rahway, N.J., Attorney for Plaintiff.
Peter G. O' Malley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Newark, N.J., Attorney for Defendant.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This action comes before the Court on the application of Lisa S. Johnson pursuant to sections 216(I) and 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 1383(c)(3), seeking review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental social security income benefits. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a forty-year old female. After finishing high school, she attended a specialized business school. Since 1981 plaintiff has worked a variety of jobs such as saleswoman, receptionist, and secretary. In 1992, plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. Sahar with Epstein Barr Virus and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. In August 1992 Ms. Johnson began treatment with Charles Webber, M.D. After medical treatment, plaintiff's symptoms subsided. Feeling better, she returned to work in December 1992. She continued her treatment with Dr. Webber until February 1993.In March 1993, the plaintiff sustained an injury to her thumb. This injury was unrelated to Plaintiff's episode with EBV and CFS. The injury required surgery and, as a result, plaintiff was required to take an extended leave of absence from her job. She was subsequently fired.
In February 1994, Plaintiff contacted Dr. Webber and claimed that her symptoms were recurring. However, she never visited Dr. Webber. Instead, Plaintiff requested that Dr. Webber send her the medical records from his office. Plaintiff terminated her relationship with Dr. Webber. Plaintiff then began visiting George Cuchural, M.D. in June of 1994. In a report authored by Dr. Cuchural, dated August 10, 1994, he indicated that he had examined Plaintiff once. Dr. Cuchural maintained that Plaintiff's mobility was severely limited: Plaintiff was limited to "light exertional" work. He listed her diagnosis as "unknown." There is no record of Plaintiff's medical test results other than Dr. Cuchural's medcial conclusions, nor is there any indication that he had reviewed any of her medical records from Dr. Webber's office.
On September 21, 1994, Dr. Cuchural changed his diagnosis of Plaintiff. He stated that she was unable to work and that her inability to work would continue "indefinitely." However, Dr. Cuchural did not re-examine Plaintiff between the date of his initial diagnosis and the date of his new report. Dr. Cuchural did not provide any medical reasons for his change in opinion of Plaintiff's condition.
Plaintiff claimed to be receiving treatment from Susan Levine, M.D. In a report dated August 1995, Dr. Levine stated that she believed that Plaintiff should be granted "total and permanent disability." Dr. Levine provided no medical evidence supporting her conclusions. Record of Proceedings at 15, Johnson v. Apfel, February 5, 1998 (No. 97-5803) (hereinafter "Rec.").
Plaintiff alleged that she suffered from dysthymia. She was diagnosed in February, 1994 by Aldonia Swamy, M.D., and began treatment shortly thereafter. According to the doctor's progress notes, Plaintiff felt better. Plaintiff then moved her household from New York to Boston. There is no evidence of any further psychological treatment for this illness.
A psychological disorder characterized by a chronically depressed mood; a very mild form of depression.
Plaintiff was examined by another psychologist, Alan Gordon, Ed.D., in September, 1994. Plaintiff had been taking medicine for her insomnia. Plaintiff stated to Dr. Gordon that she had no problem sleeping since she began taking her medication. Dr. Gordon diagnosed her condition as "severe." However, no psychological therapy sessions were recommended and Plaintiff was not under any psychological treatment at the time of her hearing.
The ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony concerning her alleged impairments inconsistent with her past lifestyle activities. Plaintiff continued to look for employment while applying for disability benefits. She moved her household and got married while alleging virtually paralyzing fatigue. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff's testimony did not "illuminate any manner in which she is limited in her ability to perform work functions." Plaintiff was subsequently found to retain the residual functional capacity to return to past work. Thus she was found not to be disabled within the meaning of the Act.
DISCUSSION
When assessing an impairment, the ALJ must make a sequential
evaluation of the following:
1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be "disabled" regardless of medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b);
2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be "disabled."20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c);
3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the twelve-month durational requirement and "which meets or equals" a listed impairment in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, a finding of "disabled" will be made without further consideration of vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d);
4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made. 20 C.F.R. § 404.152(e); and
5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity ("RFC") must be considered to determine if their work can be performed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Therefore, Plaintiff must not only have a medically determinable impairment, but it must cause functional limitations that preclude Plaintiff from doing any kind of work that exists in the national economy.
In the instant case, the ALJ made the following findings of fact in her April 24, 1996 decision:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on February 26, 1993, the date the claimant stated she became unable to work, and has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through at least December 31, 1999.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 26, 1994.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has Epstein Barr Virus and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, impairments which are severe but which do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant's statements concerning her impairments and their impact on her ability to work are not entirely credible in light of the claimant's own description of her activities and life style and the degree of medical treatment required.
5. The claimant lacks the residual functional capacity to stand or walk for prolonged periods, or lift heavy weights
6. In her past work as a telemarketer, a retail sales person, or a travel and hotel sales representative, the claimant was not required to perform tasks beyond her residual functional capacity.
7. The claimant's past relevant work (as cited in Finding #6 above) did not require the performance of work functions precluded by her medically determinable impairments.
8. The claimant's impairments do not prevent her from performing her past relevant work.
9. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision.
(Rec. 18-19)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. More specifically, plaintiff presents three issues for appeal: 1) the ALJ purposefully omitted relevant medical and psychological evidence that would have supported Plaintiff's claim for disability; 2) the ALJ did not adequately explain the Court's rejection of the examining doctors' medical opinions; and 3) the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff possesses the residual functional capacity to perform her past work activity is not supported by substantial evidence.
According to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), made applicable to SSI cases by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), this Court may review the factual findings of the Commissioner to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for such findings. If substantial evidence exists, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive. See Early v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1002, 1006 (3d Cir. 1984). This Court, therefore, does not conduct a de novo review, but rather, affords considerable deference to the Commissioner's findings of fact. See id; 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); 1383(c)(3).
When the record, read as a whole, contains evidence allowing a reasonable mind to accept the Commissioner's conclusions, and where the evidence is susceptible to more than one conclusion, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Therefore this Court must review the record and the ALJ's findings and conclusion within the narrow confines of its limited scope of review.
In reaching the findings in a disability benefits proceeding, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence, and where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusions that must be upheld. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. Welfare, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975).
In Social Security disability cases, it is for the Commissioner, not the reviewing Court, to determine what weight to give particular items of evidence. See id. Therefore, this Court's inquiry is limited to examining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence. See id.
The Supreme Court has defined the term "substantial evidence," in the context of Social Security cases, as "more than a mere scintilla and . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Peralles, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);see also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704, reh'g denied, 650 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1981). The fact that the record as a whole might support a different conclusion is immaterial. This Court is required to uphold the Commissioner's decision so long as that decision is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff states that Dr. Gordon's psychological evaluation, which the ALJ found credible, ought to have been sufficient to allow her to qualify for disability insurance. However the record, including Dr. Gordon's testimony, must be evaluated as a whole. Plaintiff was not under any psychiatric care at the time of the hearing, nor did Dr. Gordon prescribe any further treatment in 1994. While the ALJ found the report "credible," it does not necessarily follow that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act. The report alone does not support Plaintiff's claim of disability. Moreover, even if Dr. Gordon's report could reasonably support a finding of disability, this is insufficient to challenge the ALJ's decision because the ALJ's decision is supported by other substantial evidence.
One must also keep in mind that in 1995, Plaintiff pursued a relationship, planned a wedding, was married, and proceeded to look for work, while at the same time seeking disability benefits. As the ALJ has pointed out "there is an inherent contradiction in alleging virtually paralyzing fatigue yet enumerating a hectic schedule of job seeking, moving, and wedding planning." (Rec. 17). This Court agrees.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to evaluate properly the opinions of the various physicians and psychologists. After being treated for EBV and CFS in 1992, Plaintiff returned to work. Plaintiff did not seek medical attention again until 1994. Plaintiff visited Dr. Cuchural once. He allegedly performed medical tests on Plaintiff. However, Dr. Cuchural did not provide any indication that he had reviewed Plaintiff's test results. Without any medical reason, Dr. Cuchural stated that Plaintiff was able to perform only "light exertional" work. Dr. Cuchural later amended his diagnosis of Plaintiff's physical limitations, without providing any medical reason. He stated that Plaintiff was unable to work "indefinitely."
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide reasons for rejecting the physicians' testimony. However, as stated in the ALJ's opinion, neither Dr. Cuchural nor Dr. Levine provided any medical reasons to support their conclusions.
Dr. Cuchural provided no indication that he examined Plaintiff for a second time, nor did he provide reasoning for Plaintiff's changed physical capabilities. Similarly, Dr. Levine provided a medical assessment of Plaintiff without any supporting medical evidence. It is settled that an ALJ may disregard a physician's medical conclusions if these conclusions are not supported by any medical reasons, tests, or other objective medical evidence. Purported medical opinions, absent medical evidence in support of the opinion will not do. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
Plaintiff also asserts that the psychologists' reports were improperly disregarded. This Court does not agree. Though Dr. Gordon stated that he believed her condition to be "severe," her condition is not such that she cannot "do her previous work . . . nor engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . ." 42 U.S.C.A. sections 423(c)(2)(B)(d) 1382(c)(3)(B). There exists no objective evidence indicating that Plaintiff is unable to return to her previous work as a telemarketer, a retail sales person, or a travel sales representative. Therefore, the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and on the basis of the record as a whole, this Court finds that the Commissioner's determination that plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and SSI under the Social Security Act should be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.
__________________________ Nicholas H. Politan U.S.D.J.