Opinion
No. CV 09-5028154
January 5, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Facts
The plaintiff, Vivian Johnson, commenced this action by service of writ, summons and complaint on March 6, 2009, against the defendant, Sears, Roebuck Co. The plaintiff's pro se complaint alleges that the defendant sold her an oil-fired furnace that it failed to properly install or maintain, which caused water damage in her home and caused her emotional and physical harm.
The plaintiff had previously filed an action on similar grounds against the defendant. The court, Wagner, J., granted the defendant's motion to dismiss that action on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff brings the present action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-592 (accidental failure of suit) and § 52-592 (allowance of new action due based on serving wrong defendant).
This action began in federal court. In her federal complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated her human rights, violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, breached a contract, breached a warranty, violated Connecticut's "Lemon Law" and was negligent. On August 29, 2007, Judge Janet Hall of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut issued a fifteen-page decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiff's federal complaint. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck Co., United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Docket No. 3:05-CV-139 (D.Conn. August 27, 2007).
In that decision, Judge Hall found that the defendant had met its burden of showing that the furnace did not cause water leakage in the basement. The defendant relied on the deposition testimony of two technicians who had responded to the water problems in the plaintiff's home. These experts testified that the leakage was likely due to a humidifier or a broken condensate fitting of the air conditioner, which was located above the furnace. In turn, the plaintiff failed to rebut this showing with any evidence indicating that the defendant's improper installation or maintenance of the furnace caused water to leak in the basement. Indeed, the plaintiff admitted in her deposition testimony that the defendant's technicians came to her home to inspect the furnace soon after she complained about it and the technicians found that the furnace worked properly. Based on this evidence, the court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact about whether the defendant was liable for the water damage on any of the counts raised in the plaintiff's complaint, and the court granted judgment as a matter of law.
Subsequently, on May 22, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, finding that the appeal lacked an arguable basis in fact or law.
In her present state court action, the plaintiff seeks recovery under the following statutory and common-law remedies: General Statutes §§ 52-572m(b), 572n(a), and 42a et seq.; violation of express warranty; "breach of warranty, negligence, strict liability and property damages" due to the defendant's improper installation of the furnace; and, violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for discrimination and harassment based on her age and race.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum of law on May 8, 2009, on the ground of res judicata, and the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment on May 27, 2009. The defendant filed a reply brief on May 29, 2009.
On June 23, 2009, the plaintiff filed another motion in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which raised the ground that applying the doctrine of res judicata to the plaintiff's claim would violate the plaintiff's due process rights. The plaintiff claimed to be "mentally and physically ill, and under deep depression, incapable of understanding fully the appeal process, meeting deadlines and responding to the extreme amount of motions that the defense had demanded of the plaintiff" during the course of the federal trial and appeal. The plaintiff filed a third motion in opposition on July 7, 2009, which again raised the issue of due process.
The parties were heard before the court during short calendar on October 13, 2009. During that hearing, the court granted a continuance to allow the plaintiff to obtain an attorney and to permit the defendant to bring in its attorney from the federal action on this matter. The parties returned for argument at short calendar on November 2, 2009. At that short calendar, the plaintiff had obtained the services of counsel. Both the plaintiff's attorney, Eric Rothauser of BoneeWeintraub LLC, and the attorney who represented the defendant in the federal action, and Joseph Trotta, were present. Following short calendar, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment on November 23, 2009, and the defendant filed a reply brief on December 14, 2009.
Discussion
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993); see also Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn.App. 325, 338, 830 A.2d 314, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 928, 837 A.2d 803 (2003).
The court is aware of the plaintiff's various briefs and the basis of her state court action. The doctrine of res judicata, however, restricts this court's ability to retry the issues that Judge Hall fully decided in the prior federal court action.
"The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction . . . If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 706-07, 975 A.2d 636 (2009).
While the court is sympathetic to the plaintiff's contentions, it cannot allow the plaintiff's claims to proceed because the District Court for the District of Connecticut has previously rendered judgment on this action. Res judicata bars both claims that have already been raised and ruled upon in a previous action, and also claims that could have been raised during that action. Here, the plaintiff's claims in her state court action are nearly identical to the ones she raised in federal court. Furthermore, her Title VII claim, which was not raised in federal action, could have been raised previously and relates directly to the facts at issue.
The plaintiff contends, however, that the court may not grant summary judgment on the doctrine of res judicata because she did not have the opportunity to fairly litigate her claims in federal court. She argues that, due to chronic schizophrenia, she was mentally incompetent to represent herself in federal court and was unable to obtain an attorney at that time. As a result, she contends that the District Court had an obligation to conduct a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17(c) hearing to test the plaintiff's competency to bring her suit. She contends that the District Court's failure to inquire into her competence was an abuse of discretion that precludes the bar of res judicata.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17(c) provides in relevant part: "An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "Rule 17(c) requires that when an `incompetent person' is not represented by a full-time guardian, the court `shall appoint a guardian ad litem for [that person] . . . or shall make such other order as it deems proper' to protect the incompetent's interests . . . We read nothing in the rule itself that obligates a district court to monitor a pro se litigant's behavior for signs of mental incompetence. The obligation imposed by the final sentence of Rule 17(c) — the duty to `appoint' or `make such other order' — arises after a determination of incompetency. If a court were presented with evidence from an appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent, or if the court received verifiable evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or her legally incompetent, it likely would be an abuse of the court's discretion not to consider whether Rule 17(c) applied." Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2nd Cir. 2003).
The District Court did not specifically address the issue of the plaintiff's competency in its decision granting summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff argues, however, that the court was obliged to inquire into her competency. In support of her argument, the plaintiff has submitted (1) a letter written by her physician, Robert Swords, to Judge Hall dated December 26, 2006, and (2) a copy of the defendant's motion for independent mental examination of the plaintiff, which the defendant filed during the federal court proceeding on March 6, 2006.
Leaving aside the significant question of whether this court even has jurisdiction to reconsider a federal district court opinion on due process grounds — a question that neither party has addressed — the plaintiff has not established that the District Court deprived her of a fair chance to litigate her claims by not inquiring into her mental competency. In Ferrelli, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a court's duty to conduct a Rule 17(c) hearing arises, inter alia, if the court has "received verifiable evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or her legally incompetent." CT Page 2189 Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, supra, 323 F.3d 201. The plaintiff's evidence does not meet this standard.
First, Robert Swords' letter to Judge Hall did not indicate that the plaintiff suffered from a condition making her legally incompetent; rather, he stated that the plaintiff was "depressed" and that this condition was "due to her stressful living condition that has affected her emotional stability." Swords further urged Judge Hall to issue a decision as soon as possible because "[t]o prolong this situation would be putting my patient at a serious health as well as mental health risk of hospitalization and mental breakdown." Thus, the plaintiff's physician was not asking the court to appoint a guardian ad litem. In fact, he was requesting that the court bring closure to this case for the sake of the plaintiff's health.
Second, while the defendant's motion for independent mental examination of the plaintiff suggests that the plaintiff was displaying obsessive, and possibly dangerous, behavior in the course of the federal proceedings, Judge Hall's apparent decision not to grant the motion would not be an abuse of discretion under Ferrelli. The defendant's suspicion concerning the plaintiff's mental competence would not be sufficient to require a competency hearing because it was not verifiable evidence of incompetence from a medical profession or a judgment of incompetency from a court or public agency.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that she was unably to fairly litigate her federal claims because she could not obtain counsel. Undoubtedly, the plaintiff's case would have benefitted from an attorney's assistance. The plaintiff, however, has provided no legal support for the proposition that, in a civil action such as the present case, a pro se plaintiff's inability to obtain counsel, on its own, merits reconsidering the final judgment of a trial court.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on the ground of res judicata.