Opinion
Civil Action 21-CV-4821
03-11-2022
ORDER
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.
AND NOW, this 11th day of March, 2022, upon consideration of Plaintiff Jawon Hurley Johnson's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1), his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 4), and his pro se Complaint (ECF No. 2), it is ORDERED that:
1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2. Jawon Hurley Johnson, #196246, shall pay the full filing fee of $350 in installments, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this case. The Court directs the Warden of the Lehigh County Prison or other appropriate official to assess an initial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to Johnson's inmate account; or (b) the average monthly balance in Johnson's inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this case. The Warden or other appropriate official shall calculate, collect, and forward the initial payment assessed pursuant to this Order to the Court with a reference to the docket number for this case. In each succeeding month when the amount in Johnson's inmate trust fund account exceeds $10.00, the Warden or other appropriate official shall forward payments to the Clerk of Court equaling 20% of the preceding month's income credited to Johnson's inmate account until the fees are paid. Each payment shall refer to the docket number for this case.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Warden of Lehigh County Prison.
4. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
5. The Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum, as follows:
a. All claims against Defendants Kyle Russell and Janine Donte are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
b. All claims against Defendants Lehigh County Prison and the City of Allentown are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
6. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Lehigh County Prison and the City of Allentown as Defendants.
7. Johnson may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order to reassert the dismissed claims against Defendants Russell and Donte. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Johnson's claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Johnson should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Johnson a blank copy of the Court's form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Johnson may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
This form is available on the Court's website at http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/frmc1983f.pdf.
9. If Johnson does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint, ” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
10. If Johnson fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Johnson intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiffs intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).