The Condras appeal from the trial court's entry of its judgment thereon. 1. Ms. Condra contends that the trial court erred in granting Atlanta Orthopaedic's motion in limine based on Johnson v. River-dale Anesthesia Assoc, 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002), which held that a standard of care expert in a medical malpractice case is not subject to "cross-examination" about the manner in which the expert would have treated the condition at issue. The Condras claim that OCGA ยง 24-9-67.1 (f) "overrules" Johnson because that statute instructs Georgia courts to draw upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U. S. 579 (113 SC 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993) and its progeny to insure "that, in all civil cases, the courts of the State of Georgia not be viewed as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other states."
The jury ultimately returned a defense verdict, and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Condra, supra, 292 Ga. App. at 281. 1. Regarding the personal practices testimony of defendants' experts, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to exclude such testimony by relying on the controlling authority of Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assocs., 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002). In Johnson, a majority of this Court held that testimony regarding a medical expert's personal practices was inadmissible both as substantive evidence regarding the applicable standard of care and as impeachment evidence.
[Cit.]" Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc., 249 Ga. App. 152, 154 (2) ( 547 SE2d 347) (2001), aff'd on other grounds in Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc., 275 Ga. 240 ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002). We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to exclude Weatherill's testimony in its entirety.
Hawkins v. Greenberg, 166 Ga. App. 574 (1a) ( 304 S.E.2d 922) (1983). See also Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc., 275 Ga. 240, 241 (fn. 2) ( 563 S.E.2d 431) (2002). Medical malpractice being a civil cause of action, a plaintiff must prove liability (i.e., duty, negligence, proximate cause) by a preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying defendant's motion."), overruled in part, on other grounds by Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc. , 275 Ga. 240, 242 (1) n.8, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002).Roberts v. Forte Hotels , 227 Ga. App. 471, 475 (3), 489 S.E.2d 540 (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In our initial decision, we relied upon established precedent holding that testimony concerning what course of treatment an expert physician personally would have followed is irrelevant and inadmissible in a medical malpractice action. See Griffin, 295 Ga. App. at 390-391 (2), citing Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc., 275 Ga. 240, 241-242 (1), 242-243 (2), 243 (3) ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002). But in the recent case of Condra, 285 Ga. at 669-672, the Supreme Court of Georgia overruled this line of precedent and held that evidence of a physician's personal practices was admissible on cross-examination as substantive evidence and to impeach the expert's opinion as to the applicable standard of care.
Under established precedent, testimony concerning what course of treatment an expert physician personally would have followed is irrelevant in a medical malpractice action and is inadmissible either to directly establish the applicable standard of care or to impeach the expert's testimony concerning what standard of care should apply. See Johnson v.Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc., 275 Ga. 240, 241-242 (1), 242-243 (2), 243 (3) ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002); Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, 292 Ga. App. 276, 278-279 (1), 279 (2) ( 664 SE2d 281) (2008), cert. granted, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 910 (Case No. S08G1833, Oct. 6, 2008). Similarly, we do not see how Dr. Hunt's testimony concerning the general course of treatment he follows for his own patients would be relevant to impeach his testimony concerning whether penicillin would have specifically prevented Ms. Griffin's unique infection in this case.
This same standard of review applies to a trial court's grant of a motion in limine excluding irrelevant evidence. Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assocs., 275 Ga. 240, 242 (1) ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in denying Murphy's motion for additional discovery.
The conjunctive phrasing of the words "care" and "skill" in the charge comes directly from OCGA ยง 51-1-27, and has been employed repeatedly by our appellate courts in defining the requisite standard of proof in a medical malpractice action. See, e.g., Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc., 275 Ga. 240, 241-242 (1) ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002) (to establish medical malpractice, it is axiomatic that evidence "must show a violation of the degree of care and skill required of a physician") (punctuation and footnote omitted); Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga. App. 371, 372 (1) ( 551 SE2d 777) (2001) (in medical malpractice claim plaintiff must show doctor breached duty by failing "to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care") (citation omitted); Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga. App. 653, 655 ( 307 SE2d 123) (1983) (to overcome presumption, patient must offer expert medical testimony that defendant-doctor failed to exercise requisite "degree of care and skill") (citations omitted). Moreover, "[i]t is well established that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error."
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow this line of questioning. See, e.g., Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc, 275 Ga. 240, 243 (3) ( 563 SE2d 431) (2002) (trial court properly prohibited cross-examination on irrelevant matters). 3. McCondichie claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on the issue of any environmental contamination of the property.