Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-1645-D.
March 16, 2005
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and the order of the court dated February 2, 2005, Defendant Melvin Ramos's motion for summary judgment has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for recommendation. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Statement of the Case: On August 2, 2002, Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging retaliation for the exercise of his constitutional rights against various defendants, including Defendant Ramos. On September 6, 2002, the Magistrate Judge propounded interrogatories to Plaintiff, to which Plaintiff replied on October 4, 2002. On March 26, 2003, partially adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, the District Court entered an order stating that all defendants except Defendant Ramos and all claims except Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Ramos had retaliated against him by having him placed in the disciplinary housing unit for eight days would be dismissed. Defendant Ramos filed a motion to dismiss on November 17, 2003, which was denied pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on January 27, 2004. On February 1, 2005, Defendant Ramos filed a motion for summary judgment with a brief and an appendix attached. On February 11, 2005, Plaintiff filed a response. On February 28, 2005, Defendant Ramos filed a reply.
The underlying facts of the case are as follows: On March 9, 2001, Plaintiff initiated administrative action against Defendant Ramos complaining that Defendant Ramos had cheated him out of his pay as a worker in the UNICOR Textile Shop. (Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 9; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire to Pl. at 3). On March 13, 2001, a "drop note" was received by Lt. Martinez, a lieutenant at FCI Seagoville, which indicated a threat against Ramos. (Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 5, Id. at 8; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire to Pl. at 4). The only inmate named in the note is not a party to the instant lawsuit. (Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 8; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire to Pl. at 4). As a result of the investigation surrounding this note, Plaintiff was confined in administrative detention from March 13, 2001 until March 21, 2001. ( See Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 4, 5; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire to Pl. at 4). During that time, an investigation was completed by FBI Special Agent James Kendall and Lt. Dennis Farley. ( See Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 5). This investigation did not result in an incident report being issued against Plaintiff. ( Id. at 4; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire to Pl. at 4).
Findings and Conclusions: To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that judgment should be entered as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). The materiality of facts is determined by substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. An issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not merely rely on his pleadings, but must come forward with competent evidentiary materials that establish a genuine fact issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 US at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). Neither conclusory allegations nor hearsay statements are competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Wallace v. Tex. Tech University, 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).
The court must resolve any factual controversies in favor of the non-moving party. Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, in reviewing all of the evidence, the court must consider it in a light most favorable to Plaintiff's claims, drawing all factual inferences and making all credibility determinations in his favor. However, summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., supra, 477 U.S. at 322.
"The elements of a claim under a retaliation theory are the plaintiff's invocation of a specific constitutional right, the defendant's intent to retaliate against the plaintiff for his or her exercise of that right, a retaliatory adverse act, and causation, i.e., but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident would not have occurred." Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). "Mere conclusionary allegations of retaliation will not be enough to withstand a proper motion for dismissal of the claim." Jones v. Greniger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999). As noted in the Magistrate Judge's prior recommendation filed December 17, 2003, the District Court implicitly found that Plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action under a retaliation theory with respect to the incident in question.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Ramos conspired with the author of the "drop note" to have Plaintiff placed in administrative detention in retaliation for his use of the administrative grievance system to complain about Defendant Ramos's pay calculations. ( See Pl.'s Compl. at 4 ¶ 9). Defendant Ramos in his declaration states that he first saw the "drop note" on March 14, 2001 and that he was not involved in the decision to place Plaintiff in administrative detention. (Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2). Defendant has further presented the declaration of Lt. Martinez stating that Plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit on March 13, 2001 to determine his involvement, if any, in the anonymous reporting of an alleged threat against Ramos, and that while such placement was not specifically recalled, such an action was consistent with the duties of Lt. Martinez's position. (Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 4).
Plaintiff asserts that a genuine issue of material facts exists because the documents provided by Defendant Ramos do not show how Plaintiff's name came to be connected with the investigation of the threat against Ramos. In his unsworn response to Ramos's motion, Johnson speculates that since his name did not appear in the "drop note" ( See Def. Ramos's Appx. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 8) it must have been Ramos who caused him to be a subject of the internal investigation and his placement in administrative detention. ( See Pl. Johnson's Reply to Def. Ramos's Mot. for Summ. J. Made Pursuant to Local Rule 56.3). However, the issue here is whether Plaintiff has provided specific evidence upon which a fact finder could find in his favor on each element of retaliation. Plaintiff has provided no competent evidence of Defendant Ramos's retaliatory motive, that Plaintiff's transfer to administrative detention was a retaliatory act, rather than motivated by legitimate penological interests or of causation. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, supra, 110 F.3d at 310. His subjective suggestions are insufficient to defeat Defendant Ramos's motion for summary judgment. See Wallace, supra, 80 F.3d at 1047; Eason, supra, 73 F.3d at 1325. RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons it is recommended that Defendant Ramos's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Copies of this recommendation shall be mailed to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendant Ramos.