Opinion
No. 24091.
Decided October 6, 1969. Rehearing denied October 27, 1969.
From judgment of juvenile court declaring that child of unwed mother was dependent or neglected, that child lacked proper parental care, and that mother's parental rights be terminated thus freeing child for adoption, mother brought error.
Affirmed.
1. PARENT AND CHILD — Juvenile Court — Evidence — Unwed Mother — Immature — Lack of Responsibility — Lack of Support. Where total impact of evidence before juvenile court revealed that unwed mother was immature; that she lacked sense of responsibility or appreciation regarding child care; that she was without means of support from family or employment; and that she was limited in employment opportunities, held, evidence fully supports juvenile judge's conclusionary comment that he "cannot conceive the return of said child to the respondent mother in the foreseeable future."
2. INFANTS — Children's Code — Purpose — Care — Guidance — Welfare — Society. One of the declared purposes of the Colorado Children's Code is to secure for each child, who is brought within the provisions of this enactment "such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society."
3. Children's Code — Liberal Construction. The statute directs that the provisions of the Colorado Children's Code must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purposes.
4. PARENT AND CHILD — Juvenile Court — Basis — Finding — Dependency — Health — Jeopardy — Termination — Parental Rights — Propriety — Children's Code. Where basis of juvenile court's finding that child was dependent or neglected was court's supported apprehension and awareness that health and welfare of child of teen-aged, unwed mother was jeopardized and would in future be seriously endangered in custody of mother, held, under such circumstances, court's action terminating parental rights thereby freeing child for adoption was not only proper but was the only course of action which could be justified under the Colorado Children's Code.
5. INFANTS — Evidence — Support — Finding — Juvenile Court — Lack of Proper Parental Care — Unwed Mother — Limitations. Totality of evidence supports finding and order of juvenile court that evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that infant child lacked proper parental care because of unwed mother's apparent limitations and because of her actions and omissions.
6. COURTS — Termination of Parental Rights — Juvenile — Unwed Mother — Omissions — Fact Finder. In proceeding seeking to terminate parental rights of unwed mother because of her apparent limitations and because of her actions and omissions, juvenile court was the fact finder.
7. APPEAL AND ERROR — Finding — Trial Court — Evidence — Insufficiency — Matter of Law. Supreme Court will not disturb finding of trial court unless the evidence is patently insufficient as a matter of law.
8. INFANTS — Children's Code — Hearing — Adjudicatory — Dispositional — Coextensive — Prior Notice. Reviewing court holds that clear meaning and import of pertinent provisions of Children's Code makes allowance that in proper cases adjudicatory hearing and dispositional hearing may be separate hearings; but also in a proper case — providing prior notice thereof be given — the dispositional hearing may be had coextensively with the adjudicatory hearing.
9. PARENT AND CHILD — Hearing — Adjudicatory — Dispositional — Coextensive — Parental Rights — Termination — Adoption — Evidence — Disposition. When adjudicatory hearing and dispositional hearing are held coextensively to determine whether parental rights should be terminated and child freed for adoption, there must be presented at hearing evidence relating to factors which court must consider before it can make a proper disposition.
10. Evidence — Court — Determination — Best Interest — Termination of Parental Rights — Adoption. Record reflects that there was presented at hearing ample evidence on a variety of factors upon which juvenile court could determine that best interests of infant child required termination of parental rights and consequent freeing of child for adoption under supervision of Denver Welfare Department.
11. Paramount Consideration — Juvenile Court — Best Interests of Child — History — Custody — Termination — Evidence — Neglect. Paramount consideration before court in proceeding to terminate parental rights and to free child for adoption is the best interests of the child, with due consideration being given to past history of child while in custody of mother and the evidence which supported court's declaration that child lacked parental care and was, therefore, a dependent neglected child.
12. Custody — Primary — Best Interest of Child. The primary and controlling issue in a custody proceeding is the determination of what will serve the best interest of the child.
13. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Custody — Mother — Due Process — Notice — Hearing — Termination of Parental Rights. In custody proceeding to determine whether natural mother's parental rights should be terminated and child freed for adoption, record supports finding that mother's constitutional rights relating to due process were not violated: she was given adequate notice that juvenile court would determine at hearing whether her parental rights should be terminated, and was also afforded full opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence on this particular issue.
Error to the Juvenile Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Ted Rubin, Judge.
James Rode, Richard F. Hennessey, Bruce Myr Flossic, for plaintiff in error.
Max P. Zall, City Attorney, Frank A. Elzi, Assistant, Robert A. Powell, Assistant, for defendants in error.
As authorized by 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22-1-4(1) of the recently enacted Colorado Children's Code, a petition was filed in the juvenile court in Denver alleging that W. J., an infant child, lacked proper parental care because of the actions or omission of Nancy Johnson, the child's teen-aged, unwed mother. The summons, which was served on Nancy Johnson, with a copy of the petition, notified her that at the hearing on the petition, the court would also determine whether her parental rights should be terminated to free the child for adoption. Prior to the hearing, the Denver Welfare Department had placed the child in a foster home where the child has apparently remained during the pendency of this writ of error.
Having expressed the desire at the hearing and before to keep the child, Nancy Johnson now seeks reversal of the judgment of the juvenile court which declared that the child was dependent or neglected; that the child lacked proper parental care; and that Nancy Johnson's parental rights were terminated, thus freeing the child for adoption.
Nancy Johnson was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and the hearing on the petition in the juvenile court. In support of her writ of error, it is contended that the evidence before the juvenile court was insufficient to support the finding of dependency, neglect and lack of parental care. We are also urged to reverse the court's judgment terminating Nancy Johnson's parental rights on the claim that this disposition is proper only after a separate dispositional hearing, which was not afforded in this case. In this regard, it is also claimed that her constitutional rights of due process were thus violated.
From our examination of the record in this case, we have concluded that the assignments of error are without merit and we, therefore, affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
I.
The juvenile court found on the issue of dependency or neglect that the testimony and evidence before the court proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Nancy Johnson failed to provide proper parental care for the child because of her actions or omissions and because of her apparent limitations.
It is unnecessary to detail the evidence. The total impact of all the evidence before the juvenile court reveals that Nancy Johnson is immature; that she lacks a sense of responsibility or appreciation regarding child care; that she is without any means of support from family or employment; and that she is limited in employment opportunities. The evidence fully supports the juvenile judge's conclusionary comment that he "cannot conceive the return of said child to the respondent mother in the foreseeable future."
[2,3] One of the declared purposes of the Colorado Children's Code is to secure for each child, who is brought within the provisions of this enactment "such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interest of society." See 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22-1-2 which also directs that the provisions of the Colorado Children's Code shall be liberally construed in order to carry out its purposes.
It is obvious that the juvenile judge's determinations were guided by what would best serve the welfare of the infant child and the interest of society. The clear basis of the juvenile court's finding that the child was dependent or neglected was the juvenile court's supported apprehension and awareness that the health and welfare of the child was jeopardized and would in the future be seriously endangered in the custody of Nancy Johnson. On this premise, the juvenile court's action was not only proper but was the only course of action which could be justified under the Colorado Children's Code.
[5-7] 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22-3-6(1) requires a finding by the juvenile court after the adjudication hearing that the allegations of the petition "are supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." The juvenile court made such a finding. Most of the evidence presented in support of the petition was undisputed and the totality of all the evidence clearly supports the finding and order of the juvenile court that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the infant child lacked proper parental care because of Nancy Johnson's apparent limitations and because of her actions and omissions. The juvenile court was the fact finder. In accordance with the rule so often expressed by this court, we will not disturb such a finding unless the evidence is patently insufficient as a matter of law. The evidence here cannot be so characterized. Andersen-Randolph Co., Inc. v. Taylor, 146 Colo. 170, 361 P.2d 142.
II.
It is argued that the juvenile court failed to conduct any dispositional hearing and therefore, its judgment terminating Nancy Johnson's parental rights was not only contrary to the provisions of the Colorado Children's Code but violated the due process clause under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22-3-9 states:
"Dispositional hearing. — (1) After making an order of adjudication, the court shall hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition best serving the interest of the child and the public." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, 22-1-3(21) provides:
"'Dispositional hearing' means a hearing to determine what order of disposition should be made concerning a child adjudicated as delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected or dependent, as defined in this section. Such hearing may be part of the proceeding which includes the adjudicatory hearing, or it may be held at a time subsequent to the adjudicatory hearing." (Emphasis added.)
[8,9] First of all, we hold that the clear meaning and import of the foregoing quoted provisions of the Colorado Children's Code provides in proper cases that the adjudicatory hearing and the dispositional hearing may be separate hearings, but that also, in a proper case, providing prior notice thereof is given, the dispositional hearing may be had co-extensively with the adjudicatory hearing as was done here. When the latter alternative is followed, it is necessary, of course, that there be presented at the hearing, evidence relating to factors which the court must consider before it can make a proper disposition.
[10-12] The record here reveals that there was presented at the hearing ample evidence on a variety of factors upon which the juvenile court could determine that the best interest of the infant child required a termination of parental rights and the consequent freeing of the child for adoption under the supervision of the Denver Welfare Department. Based upon these factors, the paramount consideration before the court is the best interest of the child with due consideration being given to the past history of the child while in the custody of the mother and the evidence which supported the court's declaration that the child lacked proper parental care and was, therefore, a dependent and neglected child. The primary and controlling issue is the determination of what will serve the best interests of the child. This is the rule which has consistently prevailed in Colorado and elsewhere in child custody cases. See Averch v. Averch, 104 Colo. 365, 90 P.2d 962. It applies with greater reason, and was clearly meant to apply in proceedings under the Colorado Children's Code, where a child has been declared dependent and neglected, and where the same evidence and other evidence is presented at the same hearing which amply supports the disposition that parental rights be terminated. This hearing, in our view, was conducted in compliance with the declared purposes and requirements of the Colorado Children's Code.
The secondary issue of whether Nancy Johnson's constitutional rights relating to due process have been violated, involves only the question of whether she was given adequate notice that the juvenile court would determine at the hearing whether her parental rights should be terminated; and if given notice, was she afforded an opportunity to be heard on this issue. An affirmative answer to both of these questions is supported by the record before this court.
1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22-3-3(1) provides that after the filing of a petition, the court shall issue a summons which shall also contain a statement, when appropriate, that the termination of parental rights is a possible remedy under the proceedings. The summons which was served in this case on Nancy Johnson complied with the above statute. After notifying her of the date and time of the hearing, it notified her that at such hearing, the court will determine whether her parental rights should be terminated to free the child for adoption. As was stated previously, Nancy Johnson was represented in the juvenile court at all stages of the proceedings by counsel, who, it must be presumed, had full knowledge of the notification that the juvenile court would at the hearing determine whether Nancy Johnson's parental rights should be terminated. It also appears clear from the record that Nancy Johnson was given full opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence on the issue concerning the possible termination of her parental rights. The record shows that at the hearing, no evidence or testimony, other than her own, was offered in her behalf. Nancy Johnson's testimony did not seriously dispute any of the evidence before the juvenile court. The only effect of her testimony was to advise the court of her belief that she could care for the child if she was provided with "a place" of her own. Otherwise, her testimony was silent or ineffective as to most of the evidence presented on behalf of the People.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DAY, MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE GROVES concur.