Johnson v. Ozmint

76 Citing cases

  1. Fordham v. McCree

    Case No. 2:18-cv-345-RMG-MGB (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018)

    An inmate's failure to "properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983." Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 815-16 (D.S.C. 2008) (granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to those claims). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff submitted a Step 1 Grievance asking for a snack with his medication, but the grievance was "never returned."

  2. Rivera v. Leonard

    No. 5:15-cv-01191-DCN (D.S.C. Jun. 17, 2016)   Cited 5 times

    Thus, his claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming court's holding that inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he failed to appeal the denial of his grievance to the intermediate or final appeal levels); Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 814 (D.S.C. 2008) (granting summary judgment because "[t]here [was] no evidence that Plaintiff appealed the initial denial of his grievance relating to his cell door being locked" or otherwise properly filed grievances relating to his claims); Sheldon v. Bledsoe, No. 7:06-cv-00049, 2007 WL 806124, at *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2007) (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff "allege[d] no facts and offer[ed] no documentation on which a jury could find in his favor on the issue of whether or not he exhausted administrative remedies as to any of his claims"); Harvey v. City of Philadelphia, 253 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff claimed to have exhausted his administrative remedies but failed to present any evidence to create an issue of fact when defendants presented evidence that he did not pursue his administrative remedies) To the extent that Rivera alleges that prison officials failed to follow established SCDC grievance proced

  3. English v. Andrews

    Civil Action No.: 1:13-cv-2793-RBH (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2014)

    The exhaustion requirement is mandatory and courts have no discretion to waive the requirement. Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 814 (D..S.C. 2008). "Even where exhaustion may be considered futile or inadequate, this requirement cannot be waived."

  4. Faust v. Taylor

    Civil Action No.: 0:07-cv-58-RBH (D.S.C. Jul. 22, 2009)   Cited 1 times

    The exhaustion requirement is mandatory and courts have no discretion to waive the requirement. Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 814 (D.S.C. 2008). "Even where exhaustion may be considered futile or inadequate, this requirement cannot be waived."

  5. Long v. Fox

    Civil Action No.: 4:08-cv-00040-RBH (D.S.C. Jun. 29, 2009)

    Exhaustion pursuant to § 1997e is mandatory and courts have no discretion to waive the requirement. Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F. Supp. 2d 806, 814 (D..S.C. 2008). "Even where exhaustion may be considered futile or inadequate, this requirement cannot be waived."

  6. Johnson v. South Carolina

    C. A. 4:24-3303-JD-TER (D.S.C. Jun. 14, 2024)

    This relief is not available in a civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 481 (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); and Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 823 (D.S.C. 2008)(release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Out of an abundance of caution, while it is unclear whether an action in habeas corpus is ripe, the Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a blank § 2254 form, and if the form is filed, a new, separate action should be commenced.

  7. Wilson v. Murphy

    2:23-cv-00402 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 23, 2024)

    Thus, it is well settled that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a complaint under § 1983, is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who seeks immediate or speedier release from detention. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 823 (D.S.C. 2008) (holding that release from prison is not a result obtainable in a § 1983 action); Cook v. Greenwood, No. 3:20-cv-00011, 2020 WL 3039146, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. May 11, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3036014 (S.D. W.Va. June 5, 2020).

  8. Collins v. Taylor

    Civil Action 2:23-01169-RMG-MGB (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2024)

    An inmate's failure to “properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 815-16 (D.S.C. 2008) (granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to those claims). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion

  9. Goss v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

    C/A 4:24-1032-MGL-TER (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2024)

    To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to obtain his “freedom” or release from prison by asking for “emergency bail” from a state prison sentence in this civil rights action, he cannot. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 481 (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); and Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 823 (D.S.C. 2008) (release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiff has already had a habeas action fully adjudicated in this court.

  10. Hines v. Lanigan

    Civ. 17-2864 (NLH) (MJS) (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2024)

    147 Fed.Appx. 5 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding inmate's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing complaint required dismissal of his § 1983 action even though he subsequently exhausted his administrative remedies); Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 815 (D.S.C. 2008) (“[A]ny grievances that Plaintiff has filed since the filing of this lawsuit would not entitle him to proceed on these claims.”). Therefore, Plaintiff's ADA claim is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust because Plaintiff did not complete the exhaustion process before filing suit.