Opinion
23-CV-481 JLS (AHG)
07-29-2024
JAMES JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, Commissioner, Social Security Administration; ERIC V. BENHAM, Administrate Law Judge; LAURA MIDDLETON, Administrative Appeals Judge; MS. KAWANO (full name and title to be ascertained); and DOES 4 to 100, Defendants.
ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER (ECF NO. 66)
Hon. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge
Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff James Johnson's Objections (“Objs.,” ECF No. 66) to (1) the Court's May 6, 2024, Order Referring Matter to Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation (“Referral Order,” ECF No. 52); and (2) Magistrate Judge Goddard's July 17, 2024, Order Denying Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Briefing Schedule and Setting Briefing Schedule (“MJ Order,” ECF No. 65). For the reasons below, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objections.
The Court incorporates the description of this action's background contained in its May 6, 2024 Order (“Screening Order,” ECF No. 51) and sets forth below only those details relevant to the instant Objections.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action against the Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on March 16, 2023. See ECF No. 1. Two weeks later, Plaintiff declined to consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction. See ECF No. 11. On September 6, 2023, this case was transferred-over Plaintiff's objection, see ECF No. 30-to the undersigned due to commonalities between this matter and a previously filed case. ECF No. 31.
See Johnson v. Saul, 20-CV-747 JLS (AHG).
On May 6, 2024, the Court issued two Orders. In the Screening Order, the Court reviewed Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF Nos. 46, 46-1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See generally Screening Order. The Court found the SAC adequately stated a 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) claim for judicial review of the Commisioner's final decision regarding his Title II benefits. Id. at 24. The Court dismissed, however, all other claims raised in the SAC (the “Dismissed Claims”) without leave to amend for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Meanwhile, in the Referral Order, the Court referred all matters arising in this case to Magistrate Judge Goddard for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1. See generally Referral Order.
The SAC was filed in two parts; the first 84 pages (SAC ¶¶ 1-407) are contained in ECF No. 46, while pages 85 to 169 (SAC ¶¶ 408-976) can be found in ECF No. 46-1. As the internal page and paragraph numbers provided by Plaintiff flow seamlessly from the first document to the second, the Court will refer to both filings collectively as the SAC.
On July 8, 2024, the Commissioner filed a Motion for Voluntary Remand (“Remand Mot.,” ECF No. 61), seeking to have Plaintiff's case remanded to the SSA for further proceedings. The same day, Judge Goddard issued a briefing schedule on the Remand Motion, requiring a response from Plaintiff by August 6 and a reply from the Commissioner on August 16. See ECF No. 62. Judge Goddard also noted that, should one prove necessary, a hearing on the Remand Motion would be conducted on August 30. Id. at 1-2.
On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Bifurcate Claims (“Mot. to Bifurcate,” ECF No. 63) and an Ex Parte Motion (“Mot. to Shorten Time,” ECF No. 64) seeking an accelerated briefing schedule. Judge Goddard denied the Motion to Shorten Time for lack of good cause. See MJ Order at 2. Finding it efficient to address the two motions at the same time, Judge Goddard ordered the Parties to submit their briefs regarding the Motion to Bifurcate by the same deadlines set for the Remand Motion. Id.
The instant Objections followed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff objects to both the Referral Order and the MJ Order. The Court will handle each objection in turn.
I. The Referral Order
Plaintiff first objects to Judge Goddard “issuing any orders in this case,” including those that touch on the Motion to Bifurcate. Objs. at 5, 7. Plaintiff argues that, because he declined to consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction, the Court erred by referring matters arising in this case to Judge Goddard. See id. at 3.
Plaintiff is mistaken. Yes, absent the parties' consent, a magistrate judge may not “rule on dispositive matters and enter judgment.” CPC Pat. Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 34 F.4th 801, 804 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022). But, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, “a magistrate judge's jurisdiction over any pretrial nondispositive matters . . . is not contingent on litigant consent.” Anderson v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 351 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor is consent needed before a district court can refer dispositive matters for report and recommendation. See Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2015) (“As to any dispositive matter, the magistrate judge is authorized, absent consent, only to issue a report and recommendation to the district judge ....”); Active Way Int'l Ltd. v. Smith Elec. Vehicles Corp., No. 17-MC-80118-EMC, 2018 WL 551602, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018) (“It is precisely when the parties do not consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction that the magistrate judge must prepare a report and recommendation on dispositive motion.” (emphasis added)).
For these reasons, Plaintiff's objection to Judge Goddard's role in this case is OVERRULED.
II. The MJ Order
Plaintiff also objects to Judge Goddard's decision to deny his Motion to Shorten Time. Pursuant to Rule 72(a), a party may object to a non-dispositive pre-trial order of a magistrate judge within fourteen days after service of the order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). As Plaintiff's objection is timely, the Court must “modify or set aside any part of the [MJ Order] that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Id. As relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c)(1) enables a party to, “for good cause,” apply ex parte for a court order setting an expedited briefing schedule. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(c)(1)(C). Whether to grant such an application is a matter of the court's discretion. See United States v. Taulbee, 476 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1973); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(1).
Here, Judge Goddard's decision to deny the Motion to Shorten Time was neither “clearly erroneous” nor “contrary to law.” In said motion, Plaintiff sought an abbreviated briefing schedule for his Motion to Bifurcate because he feared missing his deadline to appeal the Court's decision regarding the Dismissed Claims. See Mot. to Shorten Time at 2-3. But even assuming such a looming deadline can constitute good cause under Rule 6(c)(1), Plaintiff's concerns are not warranted. An “order dismissing some, but not all, claims before trial” is generally not a final appealable order. M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012). So, Plaintiff's window to appeal the Court's Screening Order has not yet opened, let alone begun to close.
As the Court sees no reason to disturb Judge Goddard's sound ruling, Plaintiff's objections to the MJ Order are OVERRULED.
As Plaintiff's remaining arguments are unrelated to the instant Objections (e.g., attacking the low-number order that transferred this case to the undersigned) or are premature (e.g., targeting Judge Goddard's approach to the Motion to Bifurcate, though Judge Goddard has not yet addressed the merits of said motion), the Court declines to reach them.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objections (ECF No. 66).
IT IS SO ORDERED.