Johnson v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp

14 Citing cases

  1. Axtman v. Moore

    534 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1995)   Cited 5 times
    Concluding because all the other evidence before the hearing officer was dated November 10, 1994, it was permissible for the hearing officer to reasonably infer that the report and notice form issued to Axtman was received on November 10, 1994, and not November 10, 1993

    An appeal from an administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend a driver's licence is governed by NDCC ch. 28-32, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. Olson v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 523 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1994). "(A)lthough the analysis of the district court is entitled to respect, our review concerns the findings and decision of the agency and not those of the district court." Johnson v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1995). See also Samdahl v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transp., 518 N.W.2d 714, 716 (N.D. 1994).

  2. State v. Jackson

    691 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 2005)

    We have previously declined to hold it unreasonable, as a matter of law, for an officer to follow a vehicle for a distance before making a stop. See State v. Loh, 2000 ND 188, ¶ 13, 618 N.W.2d 477; Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). We have noted it would be "unwise for us to attempt to craft a bright-line rule limiting the distance an officer may follow a driver, suspected of violating the law, before initiating a stop."

  3. Houn v. North Dakota Department of Transportation

    2000 N.D. 131 (N.D. 2000)   Cited 8 times
    Discussing the hearing officer's factual findings regarding the amount of time necessary to administer alternative types of testing under ideal situations

    Our standard of review defers to the hearing officer's opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility, and we will not disturb the Department's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence. Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't. of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). Resolving underlying factual disputes is the exclusive province of the hearing officer. Id.

  4. Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. N.D. Dep't of Envtl. Quality

    2020 N.D. 145 (N.D. 2020)

    "This standard defers to the [fact-finder's] opportunity to hear the witnesses’ testimony and to judge their credibility[,] and [this Court] will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Voigt , at ¶ 9 (quoting Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995) ). [¶12] Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal from an agency's decision.

  5. Lindstrom v. N.D. Dep't of Transp.

    2019 N.D. 293 (N.D. 2019)

    [¶4] "On review, we determine only whether the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the conclusions of law are sustained by the findings of fact, and whether the agency decision is supported by the conclusions of law." Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1995). In determining whether an agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence "[w]e determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record."

  6. Voigt v. N. Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm'n

    2017 N.D. 76 (N.D. 2017)   Cited 3 times

    " Capital Elec. Coop. , at ¶ 31 (quoting Power Fuels , at 220 ). "This standard defers to the [fact-finder's] opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility[,] and we will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). We have also said that "[a]gency expertise is entitled to appreciable deference if the subject matter is highly technical."

  7. Phipps v. Department of Transp

    2002 N.D. 112 (N.D. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding an ambiguity existed when each party argued for a different, but rational, interpretation of a statute

    This standard defers to the hearing officer's opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility and we will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Johnson v. N.D. Department of Transportation, 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). [¶ 7] When an "appeal involves the interpretation of a statute, a legal question, this Court will affirm the agency's order unless it finds the agency's order is not in accordance with the law."

  8. Knoll v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp

    2002 N.D. 84 (N.D. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    This standard defers to the hearing officer's opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility and we will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). III

  9. State v. Loh

    2000 N.D. 188 (N.D. 2000)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding the officer had not only reasonable suspicion, but also probable cause for a traffic stop when he observed a vehicle weaving and crossing the lane lines

    [¶ 13] We have previously declined to hold unreasonable, as a matter of law, an officer following a suspect driver for nearly five miles before stopping the vehicle. Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). We conceded an officer may show poor judgment in permitting a suspected drunk driver to continue driving once the officer has formed a reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver is violating the law, yet we concluded it would be "equally unwise . . . to craft a bright-line rule limiting the distance an officer may follow a driver, suspected of violating the law, before initiating a stop."Id.

  10. Russell v. Moore

    564 N.W.2d 278 (N.D. 1997)   Cited 1 times
    Acknowledging "when more than one reasonable inference can be made from the evidence, a reviewing court must affirm the inference made by the hearing officer"

    Here, the Department argues the evidence about Russell's time of driving before the accident reasonably supported the hearing officer's finding that Russell's blood was tested within two hours of her driving. We agree. As Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995), made clear, "that some of the evidence in the record supports findings contrary to those of the hearing officer does not alone justify reversal of the agency decision on appeal." [¶ 10] If Russell's only statement to Trooper Schmitt had been "she had just hit a deer," the evidence would hardly support the finding about her time of driving.