An appeal from an administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend a driver's licence is governed by NDCC ch. 28-32, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. Olson v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 523 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1994). "(A)lthough the analysis of the district court is entitled to respect, our review concerns the findings and decision of the agency and not those of the district court." Johnson v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1995). See also Samdahl v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transp., 518 N.W.2d 714, 716 (N.D. 1994).

We have previously declined to hold it unreasonable, as a matter of law, for an officer to follow a vehicle for a distance before making a stop. See State v. Loh, 2000 ND 188, ¶ 13, 618 N.W.2d 477; Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). We have noted it would be "unwise for us to attempt to craft a bright-line rule limiting the distance an officer may follow a driver, suspected of violating the law, before initiating a stop."

Our standard of review defers to the hearing officer's opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility, and we will not disturb the Department's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence. Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't. of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). Resolving underlying factual disputes is the exclusive province of the hearing officer. Id.

"This standard defers to the [fact-finder's] opportunity to hear the witnesses’ testimony and to judge their credibility[,] and [this Court] will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Voigt , at ¶ 9 (quoting Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995) ). [¶12] Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal from an agency's decision.

[¶4] "On review, we determine only whether the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the conclusions of law are sustained by the findings of fact, and whether the agency decision is supported by the conclusions of law." Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1995). In determining whether an agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence "[w]e determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record."

" Capital Elec. Coop. , at ¶ 31 (quoting Power Fuels , at 220 ). "This standard defers to the [fact-finder's] opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility[,] and we will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). We have also said that "[a]gency expertise is entitled to appreciable deference if the subject matter is highly technical."

This standard defers to the hearing officer's opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility and we will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Johnson v. N.D. Department of Transportation, 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). [¶ 7] When an "appeal involves the interpretation of a statute, a legal question, this Court will affirm the agency's order unless it finds the agency's order is not in accordance with the law."

This standard defers to the hearing officer's opportunity to hear the witnesses' testimony and to judge their credibility and we will not disturb the agency's findings unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence." Johnson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). III

[¶ 13] We have previously declined to hold unreasonable, as a matter of law, an officer following a suspect driver for nearly five miles before stopping the vehicle. Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995). We conceded an officer may show poor judgment in permitting a suspected drunk driver to continue driving once the officer has formed a reasonable and articulable suspicion the driver is violating the law, yet we concluded it would be "equally unwise . . . to craft a bright-line rule limiting the distance an officer may follow a driver, suspected of violating the law, before initiating a stop."Id.

Here, the Department argues the evidence about Russell's time of driving before the accident reasonably supported the hearing officer's finding that Russell's blood was tested within two hours of her driving. We agree. As Johnson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1995), made clear, "that some of the evidence in the record supports findings contrary to those of the hearing officer does not alone justify reversal of the agency decision on appeal." [¶ 10] If Russell's only statement to Trooper Schmitt had been "she had just hit a deer," the evidence would hardly support the finding about her time of driving.