Opinion
Civil No. L-11-5.
March 4, 2011
MEMORANDUM
Pro se Plaintiff Roosevelt Johnson alleges that his employer, the Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern"), violated the governing collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") by failing to provide him with adequate notice of a pending disciplinary investigation. Now pending is Norfolk Southern's Motion to Dismiss. Docket No. 7. The Motion is fully briefed, and no hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2010). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE the case.
I. Background
Because Johnson's Complaint is brief, the Court will reproduce it in full.
I, Roosevelt Johnson am employed Norfolk Southern Railway Company. My employment is governed by an agreement. In the agreement, Article 31, page 113, states the terms and rules of what the company is to do when contacting an employee for hearing and disciplinary actions. I, Roosevelt Johnson was not notified by the company in the 10 (ten) day period specified by the agreement. I lost 25 (twenty-five) days of wages due to this action being taken against me. I am suing Norfolk Southern Railway Company for their breach of contract, which resulted in 25 (twenty-give) days of lost wages.
Johnson initially filed suit in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County. Norfolk Southern timely removed under federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441; see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987) ("When a plaintiff invokes a right created by a collective bargaining agreement . . . removal is at the defendant's option.").
II. Discussion
Norfolk Southern moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It contends that Johnson's claim is preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (the "RLA"), which provides that where the adjudication of a state law claim requires a court to interpret or apply a collective bargaining agreement, that claim is preempted by the RLA's dispute resolution processes. See 45 U.S.C. § 153(i).
A. Standard
The purpose of a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is to challenge the court's jurisdiction over the subject of the parties' dispute. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a district court "is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). "The district court should grant the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss `only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.'" Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg Potomac R., 945 F.2d at 768).
B. Analysis
1. Disputes Under the RLA
Congress passed the RLA "to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). The RLA establishes a "mandatory arbitral mechanism for `the prompt and orderly settlement' of two classes of disputes." Id. (quoting § 151a).
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements are subject to mandatory arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") or an arbitration panel of coordinate jurisdiction established by the parties. See § 153(i). These disputes are referred to as "minor disputes." See Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53 ("We have defined minor disputes as those involving the interpretation or application of existing labor agreements."). It is well-settled that district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over minor disputes. See, e.g., Conrail v. Ry. Execs. Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1989) (holding that minor dispute concerning inclusion of drug testing in employees' physical examinations was within exclusive jurisdiction of adjustment board); Andrews v. Louisville Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322-24 (1972) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's state law wrongful discharge claim).
2. The Nature of Johnson's Claims
Given the law outlined above, the Court must determine whether Johnson's claim is a minor dispute and, therefore, subject to mandatory arbitration under the RLA. Johnson alleges that Norfolk Southern breached Article 31 of the CBA by failing to provide him with adequate notice of a pending disciplinary investigation. Therefore, his claim requires the court to interpret the CBA and determine whether Norfolk Southern complied with its terms. Such a claim is preempted by the RLA and must be dismissed. See Abrogast v. CSX Corp., 831 F.2d 290 (Table), No. 97-1581, 1987 WL 38662 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 1987) (holding that claim for "disputed entitlement to wages" under CBA was preempted by RLA).
In his opposition brief, Johnsons concedes this defect in his Complaint. He nevertheless argues that the Court must entertain his Complaint because his grievances have fallen upon the deaf ears of both company officials and his union representatives. These allegations might form the basis of a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. The Court would nevertheless dismiss such a claim for several reasons. First, Johnson has not named his union representatives in this suit. Second, a plaintiff alleging breach of the duty of fair representation must first exhaust his administrative remedies, see Radar v. United Transp. Union, 718 F.2d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir. 1983), and there is no allegation that Johnson has done so. Finally, Johnson's claim likely would run afoul of the RLA's six-month statute of limitations. See Triplett v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks Local 308, 801 F.2d 700, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1986).
Although the Court lacks jurisdiction over any action stemming from the facts alleged by Johnson, it takes no position on the merits of his claims. The governing CBA and the RLA provide Johnson with remedies to address this dispute. Because Johnson failed to avail himself of these remedies, his claims must be dismissed.
Despite the informal nature of this memorandum, it is an Order of this Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly.