On the second appeal of this case (involving the cross complaint), this court reversed the trial court again, holding there were issues of fact to be submitted to a jury. Johnson v. Monumental Properties, 141 Ga. App. 151 (1) ( 232 S.E.2d 644). On the last hearing of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson, awarding her $1,500 special damages and $750 punitive damages. During the trial, counsel for Ms. Johnson placed himself on the stand as a witness to testify as to the complexity of the appellate processes and apparently to show the value of his services as an attorney.

The appellee doctor claims as damages: lost income for time spent in defending the medical malpractice lawsuit; lost income spent in trying to prevent the lawsuit; expenses of paying a secretary to prepare correspondence to prevent and defend the lawsuit; increased medical malpractice premiums; incurrence of higher rating with malpractice insurance carriers; damage to professional reputation in the community; and emotional strain, embarrassment, loss of sleep and anxiety for having been charged with negligence and with having caused the death of a patient. However, we have established that attorney fees and other expenses incurred in defending the lawsuit are not recoverable special damages ( Troup County Elec. Corp., supra; Osburn v. Norris, 165 Ga. App. 118 ( 299 S.E.2d 170); Johnson v. Monumental Properties, 141 Ga. App. 151 ( 232 S.E.2d 644); Dixie Broad-casting Corp., supra). Emotional strain, embarrassment, loss of sleep, anxiety, humiliation, and damage to reputation or being held up to public scorn and ridicule are not recoverable special damages ( Troup County Elec. Corp., supra; Greer v. State Farm Fire c. Co., 139 Ga. App. 74, 78 ( 227 S.E.2d 881); Price v. Fidelity Trust Co., 74 Ga. App. 836 ( 41 S.E.2d 614); Dixie Broadcasting Corp., supra; Pike v. First Nat. Bank, Rome, 99 Ga. App. 598, 606 ( 109 S.E.2d 620). Likewise, lost income for time spent defending the malpractice suit and trying to prevent the suit are not recoverable as special damages for, like attorney fees and other expenses, loss of time is a factor which necessarily results in all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of action.

For appellant to prevail against appellee's motion for summary judgment, a genuine issue of fact as to each of the above elements had to have existed. Appellant contends that his attorney fees and expenses incurred to avoid the seizure of his property were recoverable as special damages under the authority of Slater v. Kimbro, 91 Ga. 217 ( 18 S.E. 296 (1892), and Johnson v. Monumental Properties, 141 Ga. App. 151 ( 232 S.E.2d 644) (1977). His reliance upon those cases is misplaced, however, because both of those cases involved expenses incurred in avoiding eviction from leased premises.

Since appellant made no claim for damages cognizable in an action for malicious use of process, we find no error in the court's grant of appellee's motion for summary judgment. Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Owen, 193 Ga. 23 ( 17 S.E.2d 76) (1941); Johnson v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 151, 152 ( 232 S.E.2d 644) (1977). 2. Appellant's notice of appeal states: "Notice is hereby given that the defendant in the above-styled case, Southeast Ceramics, Inc., appeals to the Court of Appeals of Georgia from the Order and Judgment of the Honorable Claude D. Shaw, dated March 7, 1979 and filed March 8, 1979 which sustained the plaintiff's Motion for Complete Summary Judgment as to defendant's Counterclaim and in dismissing the Counterclaim ..."

Although there must be malice and want of probable cause at the inception of the action, all of the circumstances surrounding the original action, whether occurring before or after its initiation, may be used to support reasonable inferences that malice or want of probable cause existed from the beginning. Johnson v. Monumental Properties, 141 Ga. App. 151 ( 232 S.E.2d 644). 4. After the charge to the jury, the foreman sent a note to the court stating that: "It has come to light that last night one juror looked up references in a text of law.

The deposition of Gravitt, a credit coordinator with Ford Motor Credit Company, who was formerly a collection coordinator, was read into the record. He testified as to plaintiff's account which had been assigned to him for handling, that the day after the repossession the records of Ford Motor Credit Company showed that all sums due from plaintiff had been paid, but that he made no offer to return plaintiff's automobile or inform him of the error made in repossessing plaintiff's automobile. From the fact that Ford Motor Credit Company continued to withhold plaintiff's automobile after learning of its error in crediting payment of $2,167 to the wrong account and receiving the two monthly payments totaling $332.04, the jury was authorized to infer that the repossession was malicious from the time it was carried out on October 29, 1969. Compare Johnson v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 151 (1) ( 232 S.E.2d 644). 4. "Attorney's fees as expenses of litigation are not punitive or vindictive damages, but stand alone, are regulated by Code § 20-1404, and the jury may allow them if the defendant has acted in bad faith in the transaction out of which the cause of action arose.