Opinion
Civil Action 4:18-CV-01714
09-06-2022
ARMONIMASUD JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. SUPERINTENDENT MCGINLEY, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK Chief United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil rights action initiated upon the filing of the complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by pro se Plaintiff Armoni Masud Johnson ("Johnson") on August 29, 2018.(Doc. 1). On April 8, 2020, Johnson filed the operative amended complaint against Defendants: Mailroom Supervisor Tracy Brokenshire, Captain Burns, Superintendent Thomas McGinley, SCI Coal Township, Sergeant Adams, Ruel Hughes, and Lt. Peters., asserting claims for deprivation of legal mail and access to the courts, conspiracy, harassment, and retaliation. (Doc. 34). In the supplement to the amended complaint, filed on November 15, 2021, Johnson asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of legal mail and access to the courts, and conspiracy and retaliation against Defendant Peters. (Doc. 85). Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants McGinley, Burns, Adams, Hughes, and Peters (collectively, "Defendants") (Doc. 106); a motion for summary judgment filed by Johnson (Doc. 121); and Johnson's motion for immediate injunctive relief (Doc. 98).
In the initial complaint, Johnson named Defendants: Superintendent McGinley; Deputy Luscavage; and Major Mirachi. (Doc. 1). In his first amended complaint, Johnson named Defendants Luscavage, McGinley, Mirachi, Nancy Wilson, Blue Shirt Davis, Superior Blue Shirt Hendricks, Lt Belles, Captain Burns, Karen Merritt-Scully, and Debra Carnuccio. (Doc. 24).
On August 21,2020, the Court terminated the following individuals from this action, as they do not appear in Johnson's amended complaint: Luscavage, Mirachi, Wilson, Blue Shirt Davis, Superior Blue Shirt Hendricks, Belles, Burns, Merritt-scully, and Carnuccio. (Doc. 39). Further, on October 18, 2021, Defendant SCI-Coal Township was also terminated from this action. (Doc. 84, at 3).
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 106) be GRANTED, and Johnson's motions (Doc. 98; Doc. 121) be DENIED.
I. Background and Procedural History
This factual background is taken from Defendants' statements of material facts and accompanying exhibits and Johnson's statements of material facts and exhibits. (Doc. 106; Doc. 109; Doc. 121; Doc. 124). Pursuant to Tocal Rule 56.1, Johnson and Defendants have provided a response to each other parties' statement of facts and have provided accompanying exhibits. (Doc. 106; Doc. 113; Doc. 121; Doc. 123). Where the parties dispute facts and support those disputes in the record, as required by Tocal Rule 56.1, those disputes are noted. Pursuant to Tocal Rule 56.1, the Court accepts as true all undisputed material facts supported by the record. Where the record evinces a disputed fact, the Court will take notice.
A. Procedural History
Johnson initiated this action by filing the original complaint in this matter against Defendants McGinley, Burns, and Adams on August 29, 2018. (Doc. 106-1, ¶ 1; Doc. 1). On March 15, 2019, the Court found that the complaint and supplemental documents failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted, and Johnson was granted leave to amend the complaint. (Doc. 28; Doc. 29). On April 9, 2019, Johnson filed an amended complaint naming Defendants Tuscavage, McGinley, Mirachi, Wilson, Blue Shirt Davis, Superior Blue Shirt Hendricks, Bells, Burns, Merritt-scully, and Carnuccio, alluding to a variety of perceived civil rights violations. (Doc. 24). On October 28, 2019, upon conducting its statutorily-mandated screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court found that Johnson's amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and granted Johnson leave to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies set forth in the Memorandum Opinion. (Doc. 28; Doc. 29).
On April 8, 2020, Johnson filed a second amended complaint naming Defendants Adams, Brokenshire, Hughes, McGinley, SCI-Coal Township, and Peters, asserting deprivation of legal mail and access to courts, and conspiracy and retaliation claims regarding an alleged incident on February 27, 2018, where Johnson had an unspecified and undated habeas corpus petition confiscated by Defendant Adams and where he overheard Defendant Peters praise Adams for the confiscation. (Doc. 32; Doc. 34). On August 21, 2020, the Court terminated the following individuals from this action, as they do not appear in Johnson's amended complaint: Deputy Luscavage, Major Mirachi, Nancy Wilson, Blue Shirt Davis, Superior Blue Shirt Hendricks, Lt. Belles, Captain Burns, Karen Merritt-scully, and Debra Carnuccio. (Doc. 39).
On November 6, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 53). On September 18, 2021, the undersigned filed a report and recommendation, recommending that the Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 79). The undersigned recommended that the Court dismiss, with prejudice, all of Johnson's claims against Defendants SCI-Coal Township, Johnson's deprivation of legal mail and access to courts claim, and Johnson's claim of conspiracy. (Doc. 79, at 6, 9, 12, 14). The undersigned also recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied as to Johnson's claims of retaliation against Defendants. (Doc. 79, at 12). Lastly, the undersigned recommended that the Court grant Johnson leave to file a supplement to his amended complaint so as to clarify any adverse action by Defendant Peters in retaliation for Johnson's grievances and to re-allege his claim of conspiracy against Defendant Peters. (Doc. 79, at 14). On October 18, 2021, the District Court adopted the undersigned's recommendations, granting Defendants' motion to dismiss in accordance with the undersigned's recommendations, dismissing SCI-Coal Township from this action and granting Johnson leave to file an amended complaint only with respect to his conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendant Peters, and denying Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Johnson's retaliation claims against remaining. (Doc. 84, at 2).
On November 15, 2021, Johnson filed the supplement to his amended complaint, realleging conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendant Peters and requesting $100,000 as relief for pain and suffering. (Doc. 85). Johnson alleges that he was given a frivolous misconduct by Defendants, but the misconduct occurred on February 28,2018, three (3) days before Johnson filed Grievance No. 724974. (Doc. 85; Doc. 106-1, ¶ 4). Thus, the remaining claims in this action are:
On March 11, 2022, Johnson filed a motion for immediate injunction. (Doc. 98). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on March 28, 2022, as well as a brief in support. (Doc. 106; Doc. 107). Johnson filed briefs in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on April 11, 2022, and April 22, 2022, respectively. (Doc. 109; Doc. 113). On May 20, 2022, Johnson filed a motion to compel. (Doc. 119). On May 23, 2022, Johnson filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as a brief in support, asserting that Defendants failed to respond to interrogatories in a timely manner and that such failure functions as an admission of misconduct in another action, Johnson v. Koehler, et al, No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2014). (Doc. 121; Doc. 122). Defendants filed a reply brief to their motion for summary judgment on May 27, 2022. (Doc. 123). On June 13, 2022, Defendants filed a brief in opposition and a counterstatement of material facts to Johnson's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 124; Doc. 125). On June 14, 2022, Johnson filed a response to Defendants' reply brief to their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 128).
In the motion to compel, Johnson requests that the Court order Defendant McGinley "to return exculpatory evidence that was stolen from [Johnson]." (Doc. 119, at 1). As discussed infra, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and that judgement be entered against Johnson. Accordingly, it is recommended that Johnson's motion to compel be DENIED as MOOT. (Doc. 119).
Johnson's response to Defendants' reply brief to their motion for summary judgment shall be liberally construed as a sur-reply brief. (Doc. 128). As Johnson filed this document without leave of Court and in violation of Local Rule 7.7, which precludes the filing of briefs beyond the brief in support, brief in opposition, and reply brief, it is recommended that the document be STRUCK as it is improper. (Doc. 128).
On July 5, 2022, Johnson filed a "request for 14 day extension of time to respond to Doc. 125 along with request for possible sanctions or please order Defendants' lawyers to forward pages that [are] missing from DOC. 125," and a motion for sanctions. (Doc. 129; Doc. 130). On July 20, 2022, Johnson filed a "motion power to recall mandate & or Rule 60(b) motion to evaluate integrity of this Court/request to be parole via habeas corpus." (Doc. 132). On August 3, 2022, Johnson filed a reply brief to his motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 135). On the same day, Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Johnson's motion for Order (Doc. 132). (Doc. 137). On August 10, 2022, Johnson filed a "motion power to recall mandate & or Rule 60(b) motion to reevaluate integrity of this Court/omnibus cross submission." (Doc. 139).
As noted infra, Johnson filed a reply brief to his motion for summary judgment on August 3, 2022. (Doc. 135). In addition, as discussed infra, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and against Johnson. (Doc. 106). Accordingly, it is recommended that Johnson's motion for extension of time be DENIED as MOOT. (Doc. 129). In addition, it is recommended that Johnson's motion for sanctions be deemed WITHDRAWN for failure to file a brief in support pursuant to Middle District Local Rule 7.5. (Doc. 130).
The motions for summary judgment have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. (Doc. 106; Doc. 107; Doc. 109; Doc. 121; Doc. 122; Doc. 123; Doc. 124; Doc. 125; Doc. 135).
B. Johnson's Grievance History
1. Grievance No. 716025
From September 18,2017, to October 26,2017, Johnson claims that he was away from the Luzerne County Correctional Facility ("LCCF"). (Doc. 124-2, at 4-5). Upon his return to LCCF, Johnson made inquiries into whether he had received any legal mail while he was absent. (Doc. 121, ¶ 2; Doc. 124, ¶ 2). Defendant Brokenshire responded to the request form stating that the prison did not receive any legal mail for Johnson. (Doc. 34-1; Doc. 121, ¶ 3; Doc. 124, ¶ 3). On October 27, 2017, Judge Mariani adopted a report and recommendation in Johnson v. Koehler, et al.,No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. July 31,2014), by Magistrate Judge Carlson to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss and close the action. Johnson v. Koehler, et al, No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2017), ECF No. 45. On October 20, 2017, Johnson received the Order adopting the report and recommendation and closing the civil action. (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 2). On November 11, 2017, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration, informing the Court that he never received the report and recommendation so he was not able to file timely objections. (Doc. 121, ¶ 5; Doc. 124, ¶ 5); Johnson v. Koehler, et al., No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 11, 2017), ECF No. 46. On December 21, 2017, the Court denied Johnson's motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 121, ¶ 5; Doc. 124, ¶ 5); Johnson v. Koehler, et al, No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2017), ECF Nos. 50-51.
The Court takes judicial notice of Johnson v. Koehler, et al., No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. July 31,2014), as it is a matter of public record. See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
On January 1, 2018, Johnson filed Grievance No. 716025, relating to the legal mail denial of the related report and recommendation. (Doc. 121, ¶ 6; Doc. 124, ¶ 6; Doc. 124-2, at 5-8). Defendant Burns provided the Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 716025 on January 18, 2018. (Doc. 121, ¶ 7; Doc. 124, ¶ 7; Doc. 124-2, at 4). Denying the grievance, Burns explains that if the institution received any mail for Johnson while he was away, "it most likely would have been returned to sender noting that you were temporarily absent," and that "Policy DC-ADM 803, Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications, Section 3, A.6 (a), clearly states that you must notify the Mailroom that you will be going temporarily absent." (Doc. 124-2, at 4). On January 24,2018, Johnson appealed the denial to the Facility Manager, arguing that it is "irrelevant whether inmate notified facility of being on writ. The facility still ha[s] to sign for inmates legal mail whether they hold it or return to sender; it should be traceable." (Doc. 121, ¶ 8; Doc. 124, ¶ 8; Doc. 124-2, at 3). On January 25, 2018, the Facility Manager upheld the initial review response, finding that Burns's response addressed all concerns at the initial level, nothing in Johnson's appeal warrants a different response, and the Mailroom Supervisor verified that Johnson did not adhere to Policy DC-ADM 803. (Doc. 121, ¶ 8; Doc. 124, ¶ 8; Doc. 124-2, at 2). Johnson did not appeal Grievance No. 716025 to final review. (Doc. 124-2, at 2-8; Doc. 124-6, at 2-4).
2. Grievance Nos. 724974 and 724981
On February 27,2018, Johnson requested that Defendant Adams return a third party's habeas corpus petition back to the third party. (Doc. 121, ¶ 11; Doc. 124, ¶ 11). Defendant Adams confiscated the petition and issued Johnson a confiscation slip. (Doc. 121, ¶ 12). Later that day, an incident occurred between Johnson and Defendant Hughes, which resulted in Hughes filing inmate Misconduct B818718 against Johnson for his assault on her person. (Doc. 121, ¶ 15; Doc. 124, ¶ 15; Doc. 124-4, at 8-9). Defendant Peters escorted Johnson to the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") and the hearing examiner sanctioned Johnson to sixty (60) days' disciplinary custody time and loss of his prison job for misconduct B818719. (Doc. 121, ¶ 17; Doc. 124, ¶ 17; Doc. 124-4, at 10). Johnson was released back to general population on or about April 29, 2018. (Doc. 121, ¶17; Doc. 124, ¶17; Doc. 124-1, at 2).
Defendants contend that Adams confiscated the paperwork from Johnson as contraband pursuant to DC-ADM 815. (Doc. 124, ¶ 11); See Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, DC-ADM 815, Personal Property, State Issued Items, & Commissary/Outside Purchases, https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/815%20Personal%2 0Property%20State%20Issued%20Items%20and%20Commissary%20-%20Outside%20Purc hases.pdf (last accessed Aug. 11, 2022).
On February 28, 2018, Johnson filed Grievance No. 724974 and Grievance No. 724981. (Doc. 106-1, ¶ 3; Doc. 106-2, at 8; Doc. 124-3, at 6; Doc. 124-4, at 6). In the initial filing of Grievance No. 724974, Johnson describes an incident that took place on February 27, 2018, where Johnson received Misconduct B818718 for assaulting Defendant Hughes. (Doc. 106-2, at 8). Johnson avers that earlier that day, he overheard Defendants Adams and Hughes conspiring to transfer Johnson to the RHU, and then, later that same day, he received the misconduct, which he claims is a "fabrication and false report to conspire with Sergeant Adams. . . and to retaliate on [Johnson] for wanting to write a grievance" about the alleged conversation that happened earlier between Defendants Adams and Hughes. (Doc. 106-2, at 8). Grievance No. 724974 does not name any Defendants apart from Adams, Hughes, and Peters. (Doc. 106-2, at 8). As relief in Grievance No. 724974, Johnson requests "compensation for being placed in RHU and frivolous misconduct to be dismissed." (Doc. 106-2, at 8). Grievance No. 724981 describes an incident in which Defendant Adams confiscated legal work belonging to a third party. (Doc. 124-3, at 6). Johnson does not request relief in Grievance No. 724981. (Doc. 124-3, at 6).
On March 13, 2018, Johnson appealed Misconduct B818718, asserting that the procedures employed were contrary to law, Department directives, or regulations and that the findings of fact were insufficient to support the decision. (Doc. 106-2, at 6). On March 15, 2018, Peters provided the Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 724981, denying the grievance and finding that the grievance was frivolous and without merit because Johnson was in possession of the property of another inmate and Adams had the authority to confiscate the disputed material. (Doc. 124-3, at 7). On March 21, 2018, Peters provided the Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 724974, denying the grievance and finding that Johnson was escorted to the RHU because he was issued a misconduct for assault and that Johnson may appeal the misconduct if he disagrees with it or thinks it was fabricated. (Doc. 106-2, at 7). On March 26, 2018, the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services upheld the hearing examiner's decision that Johnson was guilty of Misconduct B818718, finding that "all procedures employed were within the constraints of law, Department Directives, and regulations, as well as the evidence to be sufficient to support the decision and the discipline to be in accordance with DC ADM 801." (Doc. 106-2, at 5). Johnson has not appealed Misconduct B818718 to the final level of appeal. (Doc. 124-5, at 5).
On April 4, 2018, the Facility Manager upheld Peters' initial denial of Grievance No. 724981, finding that "[a]ny property of one inmate that is in the possession of another inmate is considered contraband and will be confiscated." (Doc. 124-3, at 2). On April 9, 2018, the Facility Manager upheld Peter's initial denial of Grievance No. 724974, finding that "[i]n accordance with DC-AND 801, [Johnson was] provided due process via misconduct hearing and afforded appeal rights, which [he] took advantage of." (Doc. 106-2, at 1). Johnson did not appeal Grievance No. 724974 or Grievance No. 724981 to final review. (Doc. 106-1, ¶ 5; Doc. 106-3, at 1-2; Doc. 124-6, at 2-4).
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations, answers to interrogatories, or the like to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 Fed.Appx. 384, 389 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) ("[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment."); Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd. v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[The plaintiffs] testimony. . . amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant's burden of proof on summary judgment.").
The guidelines governing summary judgment are identical when addressing cross-motions for summary judgment. See Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527F.3d299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). When confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment, "[t]he court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." Schlegel v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 269 F.Supp.2d 612, 615 n.l (E.D. Pa. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998)). "Each movant must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists; if both parties fail to carry their respective burdens, the court must deny [both] motions." Quarks v. Palakovich, 736 F.Supp.2d 941, 946 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1023 (3d Cir. 2008)). However, a federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell, 206F.3dat278.
III. Discussion
As noted above, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The undersigned will address each motion in turn.
A. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
In Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that the undisputed facts in the record do not support Johnson's claims because: (1) his claims are in violation of the statute of limitations; (2) he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (3) he cannot link any of the alleged retaliatory actions to one of the remaining Defendants; and (4) the operative complaint includes no allegations against Defendants McGinley, Brokenshire, and Burn. (Doc. 107, at 7). In opposition, Johnson contends that the amended complaint (Doc. 34) is still the operative complaint, such that the statute of limitations does not bar his claims, because the undersigned "recommended that complaint be served on, but recommended that amendment to complaint can only be made to defendant Lt. Peters." (Doc. 109, at 2).
At the onset, the undersigned finds that the operative complaint is this matter is both the amended complaint and the supplement to the amended complaint. (Doc. 34; Doc. 85). As explained supra, on April 8, 2020, Johnson filed the amended complaint naming Defendants Brokenshire, Burns, McGinley, SCI-Coal Township, Adams, Hughes, and Peters, and asserting claims for deprivation of legal mail and access to the courts pertaining to Grievance No. 716025, and conspiracy, harassment, and retaliation claims pertaining to Grievance Nos. 724974 and 724981. (Doc. 34). On October 18, 2021, the Court adopted the undersigned's report and recommendation: (1) granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint as to the entirety of Johnson's claims against SCI-Coal Township, First Amendment access-to-courts claim, conspiracy claims, ad claim of retaliation against Peters; (2) denying Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Johnson's retaliation claims against Defendants; and (3) granting Johnson leave to file a supplement to the amended complaint to re-allege his claim of retaliation and conspiracy against Peters. (Doc. 84). On November 15, 2021, Johnson filed a supplement to the amended complaint, amending his claims of retaliation and conspiracy against Peters. (Doc. 85). Therefore, based on the record before the Court, the undersigned finds that the operative complaint ("Complaint") is the amended complaint in conjunction with the supplement to the amended complaint. (Doc. 34; Doc. 85).
1. Statute of Limitations
Defendants assert that "[s]ince the allegation against DOC Defendants concerns an incident on February 27, 2018, which was filed in the operative complaint filed on November 15,2021, the Statute of Limitations is violated." (Doc. 107, at 7-8). Thus, Defendants contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because Johnson's claims in the Complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and do not relate back to the claims in the original complaint. (Doc. 107, at 8). In opposition, Johnson argues that he has not abandoned his claims against Defendants. (Doc. 109, at 2; Doc. 113, at 1-5).
Federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations in § 1983 actions. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). As relevant here, Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524; Little v. Lycoming Cty., 912 F.Supp. 809, 814 (M.D. Pa. 1996). The question of when a cause of action accrues, however, is a question of federal law. Sabella v. Troutner, No. 3:CV-05-0427, 2006 WL 229053, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006) (citing Smith v. Wambaugh, 887 F.Supp. 752, 755 (M.D. Pa. 1995)). "[U]nder federal law. . . 'the limitations period begins to run from the time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.'" Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Here, liberally construing Johnson's pleadings, the actions giving rise to the original complaint occurred on October 30, 2017, and thereafter, when Johnson filed Grievance No. 716025 on January 1, 2018, alleging that Defendants' deprivation of his legal mail led to the Court dismissing civil action Johnson v. Koehler, et al, No. 3:14-CV-01490 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2014). (Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 121, ¶ 6; Doc. 124, ¶ 6; Doc. 124-2, at 5-8). Johnson filed his initial complaint on August 29,2018, within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 1); see 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 5524; Little, 912 F.Supp. at 814. In the original complaint, Johnson only names Defendants McGinley, Luscavage, and Mirachi, and refers to an enclosed complaint "against [thirteen] defendants. . . employed at [SCI Coal Township]," indicating that he will file suit against four more defendants "at a later date." (Doc. 1, at 2). However, Johnson failed to attach the purported enclosure to his pleading. The original complaint does not assert any facts that would relate to Johnson's claims of retaliation, harassment, and conspiracy in the Complaint arising from false disciplinary reports against Defendants, which allegedly arose on February 27, 2018. (Doc. 1; Doc. 34-2, at 1-2; Doc. 85, at 1). Johnson does not assert claims regarding Grievance Nos. 724974 and 724981 or identify remaining Defendants Burns, Adams, Hughes, and Peters until he filed the Complaint on April 8, 2020, beyond the two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 34; Doc. 85); see 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 5524; Little, 912 F.Supp. at 814. As such, to withstand summary judgment, Johnson's operative complaint must comply with the doctrine of relation back under Rule 15(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 5524; Little, 912 F.Supp. at 814.
Under Rule 15(c)(1), an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relations back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
"The function of Rule 15(a), which provides generally for the amendment of pleadings, is to enable a party to assert matters that were overlooked or were unknown at the time the party interposed the original complaint." 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1473 (3d ed. 2019). Rule 15(a) embodies the federal courts' policy of liberal pleading amendment by ensuring that an inadvertent error in, or omission from, an original pleading will not preclude a party from securing relief on the merits of his claim. Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006). In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity. Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017); Wright & Miller, supra, § 1476. Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading. See W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013). It has long been the rule then that where a party's status determines a statute's applicability, it is his status at the time of the amendment and not at the time of the original filing that determines whether a statutory precondition to suit has been satisfied. See, e.g., Mo., K&T Railway Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 575 (1913) (amended petition related back to commencement of action and cured initially improper pleading); New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1503 (3d Cir. 1996) (subject matter jurisdiction must be reassessed as of the filing of the amended complaint). However, when the original pleading has been superseded, an amended or supplemental complaint still may relate back to the filing date of the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); see T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, Del, 913 F.3d 311, 327 (3d Cir. 2019) ("case law and secondary sources have long instructed that once a supplemental complaint is granted, it is treated like an amended complaint for purposes of relation back.").
"If the amendment relates back to the date of the filing of the original complaint, the amended complaint is treated, for statute of limitations purposes, as if it had been filed at that time." Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Con., 266 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2001)). Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), "relation back depends on the existence of a common 'core of operative facts' uniting the original and newly asserted claims." Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). Therefore, "amendments relate back if they 'restate the original claim with greater particularity or amplify the factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, transaction or occurrence in the preceding pleading.'" Anderson v. Bondex Intern., Inc., 552 Fed.Appx. 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004)). An amended complaint, however, "does not relate back . . . when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650.
Here, the undersigned finds that the original complaint does not aver any facts that would relate to Johnson's claims in the Complaint of retaliation, harassment, and conspiracy arising from false disciplinary reports against Defendants, which allegedly arose on February 27, 2018. (Doc. 1; Doc. 34-2, at 1-2; Doc. 85, at 1). Although Johnson's deprivation of legal mail and access to court claim arises out of the same facts and conduct vaguely set forth in the original complaint as to Defendant McGinley (Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 34-1, at 1), the Court dismissed Johnson's deprivation of legal mail and access to court claim with prejudice on October 18. 2021. (Doc. 84, at 3). There is no evidence in the record that Defendants knew or should have known of this action when the original complaint was filed or before the statute of limitations had run on Johnson's retaliation and conspiracy claims. Moreover, Johnson does not so contend. Furthermore, Johnson does not argue that an exception to the statute of limitations applies in this case and erroneously contends that the statute of limitations does not apply to this action. (Doc. 109, at 2; Doc. 113, at 1-5). As the facts relating to the retaliation and conspiracy claims against Defendants are factually distinct and seemingly did not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the deprivation of legal mail claim alleged in the original complaint, those claims cannot relate back to the initial complaint. (Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 34-2, at 1-2; Doc. 85, at 1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also Dillard v. Talamantes, No. 1:15-CV-974, 2018 WL 1518565, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018) (granting summary judgment as to claims that did not relate back to original complaint). Therefore, Johnson's retaliation and conspiracy claims raised in the Complaint are plainly barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED as Johnson's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 106).
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Even if Johnson's retaliation and conspiracy claims against all Defendants were not barred under the statute of limitations, the undersigned finds that dismissal of this action is proper as Johnson failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants assert that because Johnson failed to appeal the relevant grievances to final review, Johnson failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the Complaint is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 107, at 9). Johnson does not contest that he failed to appeal Grievance Nos. 724974, and 724981 to final review. (Doc. 113, at 1). Instead, Johnson contends that he "appealed most grievances to final review inside the facility giving all defendants the opportunity to answer [Johnson's] grievances & [Johnson] grieved out side of the facility to final review . . . ." (Doc. 113, at 1).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 ("PLRA") requires prisoners to present their claims through an administrative grievance process prior to seeking redress in federal court. Specifically, the Act provides that: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§ 1983], or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). In accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must comply with exhaustion requirements with respect to any claim that arises in the prison setting, regardless of the relief sought. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) ("[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong"); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) ("[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues").
By its terms this exhaustion requirement only applies to "such administrative remedies as are available." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, as the statute's language makes clear, if remedies are available, the exhaustion of these available administrative remedies prior to filing suit is mandatory. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1853 (2016) ("That mandatory language means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust"); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is beyond the power of this court - or any other - to excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on the ground of futility, inadequacy or any other basis") (quoting Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F.Supp.2d 884, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). An inmate who fails to exhaust available administrative remedies is subsequently barred from litigating that claim in federal court. See Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2000).
Moreover, the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is one of "proper exhaustion." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the available grievance system will result in a claim being deemed procedurally defaulted. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90; Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004). An inmate cannot circumvent the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by failing to properly exhaust the prison's administrative review process, or by waiting until such remedies are no longer available to him. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95. However, the Supreme Court has recently recognized a narrow exception to the exhaustion requirement built into the statutory language of the PLRA; a prisoner need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a claim if the remedies are not available to the inmate. See Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1853; see also Berry v. Klem, 283 Fed.Appx. 1, 4-5 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[W]e made clear ... that the PLRA requires exhaustion of all available remedies, not all remedies."). Likewise, where an inmate "fail[s] to receive even a response to the grievances addressing . . . incidents, much less a decision as to those grievances, the [administrative remedy] process [i]s unavailable to him." Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2013).
In this regard, case law recognizes a clear "reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate's] failure to exhaust as the statute requires." Davis v. Warman, 49 Fed.Appx. 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate's failure to exhaust will only be excused "under certain limited circumstances." Harris v. Armstrong, 149 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005). In Ross, the Supreme Court of the United States articulated three circumstances where a prison's administrative procedures are "unavailable" to inmates. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that administrative remedies are not available where: (1) the administrative procedure operates "as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates"; (2) the administrative scheme is "so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use"; and (3) "prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1859-60 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at, 738, 741 n.6). As to the second circumstance, the Supreme Court instructed that "[w]hen rules are so confusing that no reasonable prisoner can use them, then they are no longer available." Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1860 (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court further noted that "Congress has determined that the inmate should err on the side of exhaustion" where "an administrative process is susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations," however, where a remedy becomes "essentially 'unknowable'-so that no ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands - then it is also unavailable." Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1860; see also Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoner with failure to protect claim was entitled to rely on instruction by prison officials to wait for outcome of internal security investigation before filing grievance); Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that exhaustion requirement was met where Office of Professional Responsibility fully examined merits of excessive force claim and correctional officers impeded filing of grievance).
Further, proper exhaustion is a prerequisite to litigation. A prisoner may not satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by exhausting administrative remedies after initiating suit in federal court. See Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 2003) ("If exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing, dismissal is mandatory"); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201,209 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Whatever the parameters of 'substantial compliance' [with a prison's grievance procedures], it does not encompass ... the filing of a suit before administrative exhaustion, however late, has been completed") (citations omitted).
In Pennsylvania, the Department of Corrections ("DOC") has established a comprehensive administrative grievance procedure, DC-ADM 804, available at https://www.cor.pa.gov/About% 20Us/Documents/DOC% 20Policies/804% 20Inmate% 20Grievances.pdf; see Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232. Under that procedure, a prisoner must first submit a timely written grievance for review by the Facility Manager or Regional Grievance Coordinator within fifteen (15) days from the date of the incident. DC-ADM 804 provides that the grievance must include "a statement of the facts relevant to the claim," "shall identify individuals directly involved in the events," and "shall specifically state any claims he wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations, court orders, or other law." A response should be received within ten (10) business days. Next, the prisoner must submit a timely written appeal to an intermediate review level within ten (10) working days. Again, a response should be received within ten (10) working days. Finally, the inmate must submit a timely appeal to the Central Office Review Committee, also known as the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals ("SOIGA"), within fifteen (15) working days, and the inmate should receive a final determination in writing within thirty (30) days. See also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997), affd, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (discussing the exhaustion process for Pennsylvania state prisoners under an older version of DC-ADM 804).
"Proper exhaustion in Pennsylvania requires completion of a three-part procedure; initial review, appeal, and final review." Garcia v. Kimmell, 381 Fed.Appx. 211,213n.l (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232). Again, compliance with the DOCs administrative grievance process is mandatory prior to bringing suit in federal court, and the failure to do so will result in that suit being subject to dismissal pursuant to the clear terms of the PLRA. Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73. It is not a plaintiffs burden to affirmatively plead exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 217 ("failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints."). Instead, the failure to exhaust must be asserted and proven by the defendants. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). However, "once the defendant has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him." Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268, citing Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3dl249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2011).
Upon review of the record, the undersigned finds that Johnson did not fully and properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. Defendants have properly raised the matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to Johnson's claims. (Doc. 109, at 8-9). Johnson filed two grievances relating to the allegations in the Complaint. On February 28, 2018, Johnson filed Grievance No. 724974 and Grievance No. 724981. (Doc. 106-1, ¶ 3; Doc. 106-2, at 8; Doc. 124-3, at 6; Doc. 124-4, at 6). In the initial filing of Grievance No. 724974, Johnson describes an incident that took place on February 27, 2018, which allegedly involved a "fabrication and false report to conspire with Sergeant Adams. . . and to retaliate on [Johnson] for wanting to write a grievance" about the alleged conversation that happened earlier between Defendants Adams and Hughes. (Doc. 106-2, at 8). Grievance No. 724981 describes an incident in which Defendant Adams confiscated legal work belonging to a third party. (Doc. 124-3, at 6).
On March 15, 2018, Peters provided the Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 724981, denying the grievance and finding that the grievance was frivolous and without merit because Johnson was in possession of the property of another inmate and Adams had the authority to confiscate the disputed material. (Doc. 124-3, at 7). On March 21, 2018, Peters provided the Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 724974, denying the grievance and finding that Johnson was escorted to the RHU because he was issued a misconduct for assault and that Johnson may appeal the misconduct if he disagrees with it or thinks it was fabricated. (Doc. 106-2, at 7). On April 4, 2018, the Facility Manager upheld Peters' initial denial of Grievance No. 724981, finding that "[a]ny property of one inmate that is in the possession of another inmate is considered contraband and will be confiscated." (Doc. 124-3, at 2). On April 9, 2018, the Facility Manager upheld Peter's initial denial of Grievance No. 724974, finding that "[i]n accordance with DC-AND 801, [Johnson was] provided due process via misconduct hearing and afforded appeal rights, which [he] took advantage of." (Doc. 106-2, at 1). It is undisputed that Johnson has failed to appeal the relevant Grievance Nos. 724974, and 724981, to final review before the SOIGA before he filed the original complaint in August 29, 2018. (Doc. 106-3, at 1-2;. Doc. 124-2, at 2-8; Doc. 124-6, at 2-4).
The PLRA requires full and proper exhaustion prior to the initiation of Johnson's claims in federal court. See Oriakhi v. United States, 165 Fed.Appx. 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006); Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 718 (E.D. Pa. 2017). The Court is not permitted to "excuse compliance" with the exhaustion requirement, "whether on the ground of futility, inadequacy or any other basis." Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73. Therefore, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden and the burden shifts to Johnson to show that administrative remedies were unavailable to him. Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268.
Johnson does not contest the timeline presented by the undisputed evidence, which demonstrates that he failed to appeal the relevant grievances to final review. Instead, Johnson argues that "for years it has been a pattern [and] practice of defendants DOC in general policy enforcers retaliating on inmates for each other for the most minor of things. (Doc. 113, ¶ 4). In support of his assertion, Johnson attaches unrelated grievances to demonstrate that Defendants fail to timely respond to grievances, however, Johnson does not explain how these grievances are related to the present action. (Doc. 113-2, at 1-4). Furthermore, he claims:
[Johnson] appealed most grievances to final review inside the facility giving all defendants the opportunity to answer [Johnson's] grievances [and Johnson] grieved outside the facility to final review, but they never answered most of the time, plus [Johnson] ha[s] been stripped from ordinary firmness from exercising 1st amendment rights when placed in RHU or [and] when out going mail ha[s] been intercepted or incoming mail ha[s] not been delivered to [Johnson] or when cell was searched [and] legal work began missing [and] legal mail left disorganized....(Doc. 113, ¶5).
The Supreme Court has identified "three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books," is not "available" because it is "not capable of use to obtain relief." Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. They are (1) when "it operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates"; (2) when it is "so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use," such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when "prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. The Third Circuit clarified that, "[t]o defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense, an inmate must show (1) that the threat was sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and (2) that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate." Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 269-70.
Johnson asserts baldly that grievance procedures were unavailable to him, but he fails to describe any circumstances demonstrating this unavailability, and the record does not support such a proposition. Johnson offers no evidence to suggest that the actions of any prison officials directly or affirmatively caused him to procedurally default on his grievances. A review of the record does not reveal any affirmative misconduct by prison officials designed to impede or prevent Johnson's efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. Furthermore, Johnson's belief that the pursuit of satisfying the administrative remedy was futile or needless does not excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Fonseca v. Berdanier, No. CV 3:19-1427, 2021 WL 916202, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2021). The record is void of any evidence which demonstrates that the actions of any prison officials caused Johnson to fail to properly exhaust his grievance by appealing Grievance Nos. 724974, and 724981 to final review. "If anything, the record demonstrates that [Johnson] abandoned the administrative review process in an attempt to air his grievances with prison officials in this Court, which is exactly what the exhaustion requirement is designed to prevent from occurring." Rambert v. Shawley, No. 2:21-CV-424,2022 WL 100105, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11,2022). Therefore, upon review of the evidence and the parties' arguments, the undersigned finds that Defendants proved their affirmative defense that Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' summary judgment (Doc. 106) be GRANTED in favor of Defendants and Johnson's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
3. Defendants' Remaining Arguments
Because the undersigned finds that Johnson's claims in the Complaint are time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations and fail to establish exhaustion of administrative remedies, a discussion as to the merits of Defendants' remaining arguments raised in their motion for summary judgment need not be undertaken. (Doc. 106); see Marrow v. Lawler, No. 1:19-CV-1690, 2021 WL 1906406, at *9 n.2 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2021), affd, No. 21-2063, 2022 WL 795426 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2022) (declining to address remaining arguments where plaintiffs failed to exhaust and Eighth Amendment claims lack merit); DeShields v. Dep't of Com, No. L19-CV-198, 2020 WL 1271657, at *5 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2020) (declining to address defendants' alternative argument for summary judgment as plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies).
B. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgement
Johnson's motion for summary judgment summarizes this action and contends that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. (Doc. 121, at 2-4; Doc. 122, at 3). Thus, Johnson contends that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. (Doc. 121, at 4; Doc. 122, at 3). However, as discussed supra, the undersigned finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Johnson's claims are time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations and fail to establish exhaustion of administrative remedies. Moore v. Giorla, 302 F.Supp.3d 700, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (denying plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment where statute of limitations bars his claims). Accordingly, it is recommended that Johnson's motion for summary judgment be DENIED. (Doc. 121).
C. Johnson's Motion for Immediate Injunctive Relief
Johnson seeks an immediate injunction seeking parole or, alternatively, that this Court order Defendants McGinley and "blue shirt Davis" "to cease and desist abuse against [Johnson], give [Johnson] job back if not ordered to be released on parole, and dismiss any and all frivolous misconduct reports that have been brought against [Johnson] as retaliation and or harassment 3-1-2022 and entrapment 3-8-2022 that can cause [Johnson] irreparable future harm." (Doc. 99, at 5).
Four factors govern a district court's decision in considering a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. See Grill v. Aversa, 908 F.Supp.2d 573, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994); SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Such relief is extraordinary in nature and should be issued in only limited circumstances. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). As a threshold matter, it is a movant's burden to show that the "preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm." Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Therefore, "upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny." Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). In order to satisfy this standard, the party moving for a preliminary injunction must carry its burden of demonstrating both: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) the existence of irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989).
To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, a movant must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1980). The district court must examine the legal principles controlling the claim and the potential defenses available to the opposing party. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2000). A mere possibility that the claim might be defeated does not preclude a finding of probable success if the evidence clearly satisfies the essential prerequisites of the cause of action. High-mark, Inc., 276F.3datl73.
Next, "[a] preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent future irreparable harm." Fishery. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140,168 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (emphasis in original). A preliminary injunction "may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury." Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409F.2d614,618(3dCir. 1969). "[T]he irreparable harm must be actual and imminent, not merely speculative." Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch., 182 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Moreover, "[t]he 'requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable-not merely serious or substantial,' and it 'must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.'" ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for injunctive relief is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued. If the record does not support a finding of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1123 (3d Cir. 1987); see Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,
extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are further instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity ... in tailoring any preliminary relief. § 3626(a)(2).
A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must "be viewed with great caution" because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the "intractable problems of prison administration." Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, it is well-settled that "[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits." Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, where the requested preliminary injunction "is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy." Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582.
Here, Johnson is challenging the filing of misconduct reports against him for possession of contraband and the termination of his employment in the SCI-Coal Township kitchen. (Doc. 99, at 1-4). Johnson seeks immediate release on parole or, alternatively, an order directing SCI-Coal Township staff to cease and desist retaliatory behavior and reinstate Johnson's employment. (Doc. 99, at 5). However, Johnson cannot show that he is entitled to the requested relief. Based on Johnson's failure to prevail on the merits of the instant civil rights action, Johnson has not satisfied his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Rule 65. Specifically, the undersigned found that Johnson's retaliation and conspiracy claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that Johnson failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Moreover, CO. Davis is no longer a defendant in this action, and granting proactive relief against a non-party runs afoul of the "general rule that a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it." Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see Robertson v. Samuels, No. 3:13 CV-2500, 2014 WL 347007, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014) (finding that plaintiffs attempt to enjoin nonparties weighed against plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits). Therefore, the undersigned cannot conclude that Johnson will likely prevail on the merits.
Second, Davis does not assert allegations of harm that are "actual and imminent." See Angstadt, 182 F.Supp.2d at 437. "[A] plaintiff seeking an injunction must show that he is under threat of suffering 'injury in fact' that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Marcavage v. Nat'l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 862 (3d Cir. 2012); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 1987). Although Johnson alleges that false reports of misconduct have been filed against him to "paint a bad picture" to the Parole Board, this allegation of harm is speculative. There is no suggestion in the record of any retribution - past, present, threatened, or otherwise. Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (" [Injunctions will not be issued merely to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of the parties. Nor will an injunction be issued to restrain one from doing what he is not attempting and does not intend to do."). Johnson merely states that the alleged instances of retaliation, harassment, and entrapment cause him "irreparable future harm," without any further explanation. (Doc. 99, at 1-4).
Further, the relief Johnson seeks is either not available to him or does not necessitate the Court's intervention at this time. For example, Johnson asks to be returned to his job in the kitchen, but prisoners have no entitlement to a specific job, or even to any job. (Doc. 99, at 5); see James v. Quintan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989). To the extent that Johnson seeks his release on parole, the motion shall be denied because Johnson is presently pursuing said relief in the habeas corpus action that is currently pending before this Court. See Johnson v. McGinley, 3:21-CV-01280 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2021); see also Razzoli v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:04-CV-2494, 2005 WL 2591843, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2005) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where petitioner requested relief on parole). It is well-settled that "[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits." Anderson, 125 F.3d at 156. Where the "[inmate-]plaintiffs request for immediate relief in his motion for preliminary injunction necessarily seeks resolution of one of the ultimate issues presented in [the] . . . Complaint, . . . [the] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a preliminary injunction, because the ultimate issue presented will be decided either by this Court, upon consideration of Defendants' motion to dismiss, or at trial." Meade v. Spaulding, No. 3:16-CV-2212, 2017 WL 3425181, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017) (quoting Messner v. Bunner, No. 07-CV-112, 2009 WL 1406986, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2009)). Thus, Johnson's motion for immediate injunctive relief does not satisfy the requirement for a showing of irreparable harm.
Lastly, Johnson does not discuss harm to the nonmoving party or the public interest in his motion or supporting filings, despite bearing the burden of persuasion on all factors the court considers when deciding a request for injunctive relief. U.S. v. Bell, 238 F.Supp.2d 696, 699 (M.D. Pa. 2003). Given the Supreme Court's instruction that "federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment," injunctive relief at this stage would not be in the public interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). Regarding Johnson's request for a Court Order directing Defendants to refrain from retaliatory behavior and dismiss frivolous misconduct reports, federal courts typically do not interfere with the business of running federal prisons, so granting these motions would violate societal norms. (Doc. 99, at 5); see Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482. Although parole is a threat that may connect some allegations contained in the motion to Johnson's habeas corpus action, the mere fact that certain individual incidents may affect Johnson's parole status does not necessitate the Court's intervention. Given the Supreme Court's instruction that "federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment," injunctive relief at this stage would not be in the public interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482.
In sum, an assessment of the factors that govern the issuance of such relief under Rule 65 weighs against Johnson. Johnson fails to carry his burden on every factor because he failed to assert facts showing his likelihood of success on the merits, the presence of immediate, irreparable harm resulting from a denial of the relief, the interests of the opposing parties, and the public's interest. See Grill, 908 F.Supp.2d at 591. In addition, the relief sought in this motion is not available to Johnson at this time because inmates do not have entitlement to a specific job, the requested injunctive relief involves persons who are not before this Court, and Johnson's request for parole is currently pending before this Court as the subject of his habeas corpus petition. See Johnson v. McGinley, 3:21-CV-01280 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2021). Accordingly, it is recommended that Johnson's motion for immediate injunctive relief be denied. (Doc. 98).
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 106) be GRANTED, and judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and against Johnson;
2. Johnson's motion for immediate injunctive relief (Doc. 98); motion for summary judgment (Doc. 121); "motion power to recall mandate & or Rule 60(b) motion to evaluate integrity of this Court/request to be parole via habeas corpus" (Doc. 132); and "motion power to recall mandate & or Rule 60(b) motion to reevaluate integrity of this Court/omnibus cross submission" (Doc. 139) be DENIED;
3. Johnson's motion to compel (Doc. 119); and motion for extension of time (Doc. 129) be DENIED as MOOT;
4. Johnson's response to Defendants' reply brief to their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 128) be STRUCK as it is improper;
5. Johnson's motion for sanctions (Doc. 130) be deemed WITHDRAWN; and
6. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this action.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated September 6,2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.