Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-CV-01280
05-06-2022
ARMONI MASUD JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. THOMAS MCGINLEY, Superintendent, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are twos motion for immediate injunctive relief filed by pro se Petitioner Armoni Masud Johnson (“Johnson”) on March 11, 2022, and March 15, 2022, respectively. (Doc. 22; Doc. 24). Johnson initiated this action by filing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against Defendants Superintendent Thomas McGinley and the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office (collectively, “Defendants”) on July 8, 2021. (Doc. 1). Johnson is an inmate of the State Correction Institute at Coal Township (“SCI-Coal Township”) in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Johnson's motions be denied.(Doc. 22; Doc. 24).
Due to his pro se status, the Court will liberally construe Johnson's arguments and address the motions for injunctive relief as one motion. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
I. Background and Procedural History
On October 11, 2013, Johnson was sentenced to 5 years, 6 months to 13 years of incarceration for violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) (aggravated assault, serious bodily injury), and sentenced to 5 years, 6 months to 13 years of incarceration, to be served concurrently, for violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4) (aggravated assault, deadly weapon). (Doc. 16, at 16). On April 28, 2016, Johnson was sentenced to 1 year, 6 months to 7 years, 6 months of incarceration, to be served consecutively, for violating 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) (manufacture, deliver, or possession with intent, controlled substance), and sentenced to 1 year, 4 months to 7 years, 6 months of incarceration, to be served consecutively, for violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 751 (criminal use of communication facility). (Doc 16, at 16). Johnson was initially denied parole on October 13, 2020, and upon reconsideration on July 8, 2021. (Doc. 16, at 20, 23).
The Board's decision to deny parole listed the following reasons: “your institutional behavior, including reported misconducts;” “the negative recommendation made by the [DOC];” “your prior unsatisfactory parole supervision history;” and “the negative recommendation made by the prosecuting attorney.” (Doc. 1-1, at 2).
The Board's decision to deny parole listed the following reasons: “your risk and needs assessment indicating your level of risk to the community;” “reports, evaluations and assessments/level of risk indicates your risk to the community;” “your failure to demonstrate motivation for success;” “your minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed;” and “your refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed.” (Doc. 1-1, at 4).
On July 21, 2021, Johnson initiated this action by filing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against Defendants, challenging the Pennsylvania Parole Board's decision to deny parole on July 8, 2021. (Doc. 1). Johnson claims that the Board's decision to deny parole was an act of retaliation for Johnson's exercise of his appellate rights in relation to underlying criminal cases. (Doc. 1, at 5). Further, Johnson asserts that the decision to deny parole violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1, at 6-8). On September 3, 2021, Johnson signed an electron form, stating that he chose to have the Court rule on his petition as filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and understood that he may be forever barred from presenting in federal court any claim not presented in the petition. (Doc. 5). Defendants filed a response to the petition on December 1, 2021. (Doc. 16).
On January 1, 2022, Johnson filed an “omnibus motion to compel justice, ” claiming that he was found guilty without a trial and retaliated against “for attempting to exercise federally protected constitutional rights and the proof provided of institutional and systemic discrimination and modern day enslavement by the government.” (Doc. 20, at 1). Construing the motion as an additional petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court denied Johnson's motion on March 2, 2022, because Johnson failed to proffer additional facts or request relief different from his original habeas petition. (Doc. 21, at 2).
On March 11, 2022, Johnson filed the motion for immediate injunctive relief, as well as a brief in support. (Doc. 22; Doc. 23). On March 15, 2022, Johnson filed another motion for injunctive relief, as well as a supplement to the first motion for immediate injunctive relief. (Doc. 24; Doc. 25). On March 23, 2022, Johnson filed the motion for reconsideration, as well as a brief in support. (Doc. 26; Doc. 27). The motions are ripe for review.
In the motion, Johnson requests reconsideration of the Order denying his “omnibus motion to compel justice.” (Doc. 26; Doc. 27). A motion for reconsideration “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); accord Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. LouAnn, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). To be sure, Johnson contends that this Court has erred in many respects, but his motion fails because it does not meet the basic requirements for reconsideration. In support of the motion, Johnson refers to civil action No. 4:18-CV-01714, which involves causes of action Johnson has brought against non-parties in this action, to argue that the alleged retaliatory behavior by “blue shirt Davis” on March 1, 2022, mandates the Court's intervention. (Doc. 27, at 1-2). Johnson requests “whatever relief that this court deem appropriate at this time.” (Doc. 27, at 2). This proffer of evidence does not alter the Court's consideration on the merits of Johnson's “omnibus motion to compel justice.” (Doc. 21). Although Johnson attaches the initial review response to his grievance filed in relation to the March 1, 2022, incident, this proffer of evidence is not related to the subject of Johnson's instant habeas petition. (Doc. 27, at 3). Johnson's request for parole shall be addressed when the Court rules on his habeas petition. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration will be denied by separate order. (Doc. 26).
II. Preliminary Injunction Standard
Four factors govern a district court's decision in considering a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Grill v. Aversa, 908 F.Supp.2d 573, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994); SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Such relief is extraordinary in nature and should be issued in only limited circumstances. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). As a threshold matter, it is a movant's burden to show that the “preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Therefore, “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). In order to satisfy this standard, the party moving for a preliminary injunction must carry its burden of demonstrating both: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) the existence of irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989).
To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, a movant must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1980). The district court must examine the legal principles controlling the claim and the potential defenses available to the opposing party. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2000). A mere possibility that the claim might be defeated does not preclude a finding of probable success if the evidence clearly satisfies the essential prerequisites of the cause of action. Highmark, Inc., 276 F.3d at 173.
Next, “[a] preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent future irreparable harm.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis in original). A preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). “[T]he irreparable harm must be actual and imminent, not merely speculative.” Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch., 182 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable-not merely serious or substantial,' and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.'” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for injunctive relief is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued. If the record does not support a finding of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1123 (3d Cir. 1987); see Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are further instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity ... in tailoring any preliminary relief.
§ 3626(a)(2).
A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, it is well-settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, where the requested preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but ... at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582.
III. Discussion
A. Motions for Preliminary Injunction
Johnson's motions for preliminary injunctive relief are based on two new allegations of alleged retaliation and entrapment. (Doc. 23; Doc. 25). First, on March 1, 2022, Johnson was allegedly fired from his job in the SCI-Coal Township kitchen pending the hearing for a misconduct report filed by “blue shirt Davis, ” or Correctional Officer Davis (“C.O. Davis”). (Doc. 23, at 2; Doc. 25, at 5). Further, Johnson avers that C.O. Davis fabricated a false misconduct report in an effort to get Johnson fired. (Doc. 23, at 2-3). Second, on March 8, 2022, Johnson asserts that an unknown inmate handed Johnson an electric cigarette and “notes, ” which he later discovered were tickets for gambling, and asked Johnson to give those “notes” to another inmate. (Doc. 23, at 3; Doc. 25, at 1). Johnson states that once he discovered that the “notes” were gambling tickets, the hearing examiner immediately confiscated them and filed a misconduct report. (Doc. 23, at 3-4; Doc. 25, at 1-2). Johnson submits that he had no knowledge that the “notes” were gambling tickets and that “confidential informants working for Defendants placed contraband (gambling tickets) in [Johnson's] hand in order to entrap [Johnson].” (Doc. 23, at 4; Doc. 25, at 2). In addition, Johnson asserts that his legal mail is being withheld by Defendants as retaliation. (Doc. 28, at 1).
Johnson requests immediate injunctive relief in the form of the Court granting parole or, alternatively, the Court issuing an Order that directs the following:
[D]efendants of civil action #4:18-CV-0714 superintendent McGinley and blue shirt Davis to cease and desist abuse against [Johnson], give [Johnson] job back if not ordered to be released on parole, and dismiss any and all frivolous misconduct reports that have been brought against [Johnson] as retaliation and/or harassment 3-1-2022 and entrapment 3-8-2022 that can cause [Johnson] irreparable future harm.(Doc. 23, at 5). Johnson asserts that he has been “targeted, set up, [and] entrapped in violation of the [Eighth A]mendment rights to be free from calculated harassment [and] cruel [and] unusual punishment.” (Doc. 25, at 2). In addition, Johnson avers that the described instances of “calculated harassment” were intended to “set [Johnson] up, ” “charge [Johnson] with misconduct, ” and retaliate against Johnson “for exercising protected activity.” (Doc. 25, at 2). Further, Johnson claims that while seeking parole, Defendants began writing false misconduct reports against Johnson “to attempt to paint a bad picture against [Johnson].” (Doc. 25, at 3).
At the onset, Johnson's motion should be denied because his complaints and requested relief may not be raised in a federal habeas proceeding. Prisoners may only use “habeas corpus . . . remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement - either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); see also Bonadonna v. United States, 446 Fed.Appx. 407, 409 (3d Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has explained that if a prisoner is challenging a condition of confinement or “attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release ... [, ] habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).
Here, Johnson is challenging the filing of misconduct reports against him for possession of contraband and the termination of his employment in the SCI-Coal Township kitchen. (Doc. 23, at 1-5; Doc. 25, at 1-3). Johnson seeks immediate release on parole or, alternatively, an order directing SCI-Coal Township staff to cease and desist retaliatory behavior and reinstate Johnson's employment. (Doc. 23, at 5). Thus, Johnson is challenging the conditions of his confinement, not the fact or duration of his sentence. Johnson makes no allegation that the misconduct reports or termination of employment are inconsistent with his sentencing judgment, and he makes no allegation that the reinstatement of employment or dismissal of misconduct reports would shorten his confinement. Instead, Johnson suggests that the frivolous misconduct reports and lack of employment may impede his ability to be granted release on parole by the Parole Board. (Doc. 25, at 3). Accordingly, Johnson's motions must be denied. (Doc. 22; Doc. 24); see, e.g., Lewis v. Phelps, No. 08-CV-447, 2010 WL 3907626, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2010) (denying habeas petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction as it related to the conditions of his imprisonment because “his allegations are not properly raised in this federal habeas proceeding”). If Johnson desires to pursue his complaints, then he must proceed through a civil rights action after exhausting his administrative remedies through the prison's grievance process. See, e.g., Bedenfield v. Lewisburg, 393 Fed.Appx. 32, 33 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Alternatively, even if the Court were to consider Johnson's motion under the standard for granting motions for injunctive relief, Johnson cannot show that he would be entitled to the requested relief. Johnson claims he was retaliated against when Defendants violated his right “to be free from calculated harassment [and] cruel [and] unusual punishment” by firing him from his job and threatening his chances of parole. (Doc, 23, at 1-5; Doc. 25, at 1-3). While all of these actions may lead to the conclusion of retaliation, Johnson has not satisfied his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Rule 65. Thus, Johnson's motion for immediate injunctive relief must be denied.
First, Johnson fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Johnson simply provides conclusory statements that Defendants are violating his constitutional rights and fails to proffer sufficient information or evidence to cause the Court to conclude that Johnson will likely prevail on the merits. See Snee v. Barone, 359 Fed.Appx. 281, 284 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief where prisoner failed to establish likelihood of success on the merits of alleged infringement of his constitutional rights). To state a retaliation claim, a petitioner must allege that: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) “he suffered some ‘adverse action' at the hands of the prison officials”; and (3) “his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or motivating factor' in the decision” to take that action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); see Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds, Williams v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 844 Fed.Appx. 469 (3d Cir. 2021). The inquiry into whether an alleged “adverse action” is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights is an objective inquiry, and presents a question of fact. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 376.
In this case, Johnson fails to demonstrate that he will likely prevail on the merits of his retaliation claim as he fails to put forth any evidence that the “substantial or motivating factor” in C.O Davis's decision to file a misconduct report was to retaliate against Johnson for filing the instant lawsuit. Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Although Johnson alleges that false reports of misconduct have been filed against him to “paint a bad picture” to the Parole Board, there is evidence that Johnson refused to obey orders by SCI-Coal Township staff and was fired from his position for such behavior. (Doc. 25, at 10). There is also evidence the hearing officer filed a misconduct report after Johnson refused to hand over contraband in his possession. (Doc. 25, at 10). Further, Johnson's motion describes instances without any connection to his claims in the underlying action or explanation outlining how those facts support his claims. Moreover, C.O. Davis is not a defendant in this action. The only defendants in this case are Superintendent Thomas McGinley and the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, neither of which are named in the motion for immediate injunctive relief. (Doc. 22; Doc. 24). It is difficult to imagine why C.O. Davis would retaliate against Johnson for bringing this action or his subsequent motion for injunctive relief. Stile v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No.16-CV-3832, 2017 WL 2656646, at *5 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where complaint did not name individual who purportedly took adverse action). Johnson seeks not only to enjoin the named Defendants, but also seeks proactive relief which would affect the actions of other prison officials who are not parties to the instant lawsuit. (Doc. 23, at 5; Doc. 25, at 1-3; Doc. 28, at 1-2). This runs afoul of the “general rule that a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see Robertson v. Samuels, No. 3:13-CV-2500, 2014 WL 347007, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014) (finding that plaintiff's attempt to enjoin non-parties weighed against plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits). Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Johnson will likely prevail on the merits.
Second, Davis does not assert allegations of harm that are “actual and imminent.” “[A] plaintiff seeking an injunction must show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact' that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Marcavage v. Nat'l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 862 (3d Cir. 2012); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 1987). Although Johnson alleges that false reports of misconduct have been filed against him to “paint a bad picture” to the Parole Board, this allegation of harm is speculative. There is no suggestion in the record of any retribution -past, present, threatened, or otherwise. Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[I]njunctions will not be issued merely to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of the parties. Nor will an injunction be issued to restrain one from doing what he is not attempting and does not intend to do.”). Johnson merely states that the alleged instances of retaliation, harassment, and entrapment cause him “irreparable future harm, ” without any further explanation. (Doc. 23, at 5; Doc. 25, at 3).
Further, the relief Johnson seeks is either not available to him or does not necessitate the Court's intervention at this time. For example, Johnson asks to be returned to his job in the kitchen, but prisoners have no entitlement to a specific job, or even to any job. James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989). To the extent that Johnson seeks his release on parole, the motion shall be denied because Johnson is presently pursuing said relief in the habeas corpus action that is currently pending before this Court. (Doc. 1; Doc. 23, at 5; Doc. 25, at 2-3); see Razzoli v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:04-CV-2494, 2005 WL 2591843, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2005) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where petitioner requested relief on parole). It is well-settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson, 125 F.3d at 156.
Where the “[inmate-]plaintiff's request for immediate relief in his motion for preliminary injunction necessarily seeks resolution of one of the ultimate issues presented in [the] ... Complaint, ... [the] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a preliminary injunction, because the ultimate issue presented will be decided either by this Court, upon consideration of Defendants' motion to dismiss, or at trial.” Meade v. Spaulding, No. 3:16-CV-2212, 2017 WL 3425181, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017) (quoting Messner v. Bunner, No. 07-CV-112, 2009 WL 1406986, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2009)). Thus, Johnson's claim does not satisfy the requirement for a showing of irreparable harm.
Lastly, Johnson does not discuss harm to the nonmoving party or the public interest in his motion or supporting filings, despite bearing the burden of persuasion on all factors the court considers when deciding a request for injunctive relief. U.S. v. Bell, 238 F.Supp.2d 696, 699 (M.D. Pa. 2003). Given the Supreme Court's instruction that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment, ” injunctive relief at this stage would not be in the public interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). Regarding Johnson's request for a Court Order directing Defendants to refrain from retaliatory behavior and dismiss frivolous misconduct reports, federal courts typically do not interfere with the business of running federal prisons, so granting these motions would violate societal norms. Although parole is a threat that may connect some allegations contained in the motion to the habeas petition, the mere fact that certain individual incidents may affect Johnson's parole status does not necessitate the Court's intervention. Given the Supreme Court's instruction that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment, ” injunctive relief at this stage would not be in the public interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482.
In sum, an assessment of the factors that govern the issuance of such relief under Rule 65 weighs against Johnson. Johnson fails to carry his burden on every factor because he failed to assert facts showing of his likelihood of success on the merits, the presence of immediate, irreparable harm resulting from a denial of the relief, the interests of the opposing parties, and the public's interest. See Grill, 908 F.Supp.2d at 591. In addition, the relief sought in this motion is not available to Johnson at this time because inmates do not have entitlement to a specific job, the requested injunctive relief involves persons who are not before this Court, and Johnson's request for parole is currently pending before this Court as the subject of his habeas petition. As such, Johnson's motions for immediate injunctive relief should be denied. (Doc. 22; Doc. 24).
B. Request to Amend
In support of his motion for preliminary injunction, Johnson states that he seeks to amend his complaint. (Doc. 25, at 3). Johnson filed the original petition on July 21, 2021, within the applicable one-year statute of limitations, for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). In his initial petition, Johnson alleged that the Pennsylvania Parole Board's decision to deny parole on July 8, 2021, was an act of retaliation for Johnson's exercise of his appellate rights in relation to underlying criminal cases. (Doc. 1, at 5). Further, Johnson alleged that the decision to deny parole violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1, at 6-8). On March 15, 2022, in a supplement to the motion for preliminary injunction, Johnson requested to amend his complaint - approximately seven and a half months after filing his initial habeas petition. (Doc. 25, at 3). Johnson does not indicate what allegations would be added to his amended petition, but it seems that Johnson would add the new allegations of retaliation. (Doc. 25, at 3).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to motions to amend habeas petitions. United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1999). Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). A court should deny leave to amend only in limited circumstances, such as where “(1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.” Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2003). “In determining whether a claim would be futile, the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as [it] applies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, an attempt to amend a complaint is futile when “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Here, Johnson does not explain why he should be granted leave to amend his petition or how these new allegations of retaliation relate back to the Parole Board's denial of parole on July 1, 2021, which is the subject of this petition. Without such explanation, the Court is unable to determine whether an amendment of the petition seven and a half months after it was initially filed would be futile. Therefore, Johnson's request to amend shall be denied. (Doc. 25, at 3).
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Johnson's motions for injunctive relief (Doc. 22; Doc. 24) be DENIED.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.