A generic term, embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth, and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Johnson v. MacDonald, 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150. "Bad faith" and "fraud" are synonymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc. Elements of a cause of action for "fraud" include false representation of a present or past fact made by defendant, action in reliance thereupon by plaintiff, and damage resulting to plaintiff from such misrepresentation.

¶ 11 This Court has often said that fraud is a generic term embracing the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise so one can get advantage over another by false suggestion or suppression of the truth. Morris v. McLendon, 1933 OK 619, ¶ 8, 167 Okla. 68, 27 P.2d 811, 812;Johnson v. McDonald, 1934 OK 743, 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150;Singleton v. LePak, 1967 OK 37, ¶ 13, 425 P.2d 974, 978. When fraud is alleged, every fact or circumstance from which a legal inference of fraud may be drawn is admissible. Berry v. Stevens, 1934 OK 167, ¶ 16, 168 Okla. 124, 31 P.2d 950, 955;Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1988 OK 93, ¶ 33, 760 P.2d 174, 179.

¶11 This Court has often said that fraud is a generic term embracing the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise so one can get advantage over another by false suggestion or suppression of the truth. Morris v. McLendon, 1933 OK 619, ¶8, 27 P.2d 811, 812; Johnson v. McDonald, 1934 OK 743, 39 P.2d 150; Singleton v. LePak, 1967 OK 37, ¶13, 425 P.2d 974, 978. When fraud is alleged, every fact or circumstance from which a legal inference of fraud may be drawn is admissible. Berry v. Stevens, 1934 OK 167, ¶16, 31 P.2d 950, 955; Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1988 OK 93, ¶33, 760 P.2d 174, 179.

, In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Communications otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege are not protected if the communications are made in furtherance of a crime, fraud, or other misconduct."); Cooksey v. Hilton Int'l Co., 863 F. Supp. 150, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]orts moored in fraud can trigger the crime-fraud exception."); Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1990) (same); Volcanic Gardens Mgmt. Co., 847 S.W.2d 343, 347 ("'Fraud' is sometimes defined as '[a] generic term, embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth, and includes all surprise, trick, cunning dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated." (quoting Johnson v. McDonald, 39 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1934))); International Tel. Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of Florida, 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D.Fla. 1973) ("The privilege may be overcome, not only where fraud or crime is involved, but also where there are other substantial abuses of the attorney-client relationship."). While West Virginia has never expressly defined the scope of our fraud exception, in State v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 770 (1882), this Court made clear that civil fraud may defeat the attorney-client privilege.

. . . "Bad Faith" and "fraud" are synonymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc. See, also, Johnson v. McDonald, 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150 (1934). The garnishee was not required to allege the elements for a cause of action in fraud and deceit.

" Bigpond v. Mutaloke, 187 Okla. 611, 105 P.2d 408. See also Bloch v. Morgan, 116 Okla. 199, 244 P. 176; Johnson v. McDonald, et al., 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150. In 23 Am.Jur. 753, it is said:

Hood v. Wood, 61 Okla. 294, 161 P. 210; Martinson v. Hamil, supra; McAtee v. Garred, supra, and Greene v. Humphrey, Okla., 274 P.2d 535. Where fraud is properly alleged by one party, a question of fact is thereby raised, necessitating a determination thereon by the trier of facts. Johnson v. McDonald, 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150. It is error to render judgment on the pleadings, where by the pleadings there is raised an issue of fact, upon which a valid judgment might be rendered.

II. A judge in a contest of this kind by prejudice or any other motive will not be permitted to render a decision obviously untrue and unfair and be supported by the Court on the theory that a rule makes the decision of the judge final without regard to right and honesty of purpose. Choctaw Cotton Oil Co. v. Williams, 66 Okla. 245, 168 P. 792; Cribbins v. Markwood (Va.), 67 Am. Dec. 775; Holt v. King, 54 W. Va. 441, 47 S.E. 362; Johnson v. McDonald, 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150; Perry v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 137 N.C. 402, 49 S.E. 889; Anno. 67 A.L.R. 423. III. A court of equity will refuse to interpret a release given the appellant from personal injuries and property damage which might occur in the hazardous sport of automobile racing as a prerequisite to entering the race as a release from the duty to award, and liability for, prizes and premiums offered to the winner.

No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Johnson v. McDonald et al., 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150; Bloch v. Morgan, 116 Okla. 199, 244 P. 176; Bigpond v. Mutaloke, 187 Okla. 611, 105 P.2d 408. It is further contended by plaintiff that the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish certain material allegations necessary to constitute fraud. It is argued that the evidence is insufficient to show that the alleged representation made was false, or, if false, was known by plaintiff to be false or that such representation was made by him recklessly and without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; nor does the evidence show that it was made with the intention that it should be acted upon by defendant.

In First State Bank of Canute v. Thomas, 201 Okla. 325, 205 P.2d 866, we said: "This court has adopted what is sometimes termed `the modern view' of fraud, and has held in many instances that fraud is a `generic' term and embraces all unfair ways by which another is cheated or unlawfully imposed upon. Under these decisions, the term `fraud' may include certain elements of duress, undue influence, threats and intimidation. Bigpond v. Mutaloke et al., 187 Okla. 611, 105 P.2d 408; Johnson v. McDonald et al., 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150." In Hill v. Hill, 197 Okla. 697, 174 P.2d 232, we said that the trial court's discretion in awarding alimony in a divorce action should be controlling, and its conclusions should not be disturbed unless clearly against the weight of the evidence, or unless there had been some abuse of discretion.