Summary
dismissing a § 1983 action and finding plaintiff's allegations that the defendants' psychological assessments of him in connection with civil commitment proceedings were wrong did not state a cognizable due process claim since plaintiff had the opportunity to contest the accuracy of defendant's testimony at the civil commitment hearing
Summary of this case from Huftile v. Miccio-FonsecaOpinion
No. C 02-3535 SI (pr)
March 5, 2003
JUDGEMENT
The complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relie: nay be granted and as frivolous insofar as it is time-barred.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Joseph Johnson, Jr., currently housed at the Santa Clara County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson alleges that he has been involuntarily committed pursuant to civil commitment proceedings under California's sexually violent predator law, see Cal. Welf Inst. Code §§ 6600-6609.3. His complaint asserts two claims for relief: (1) defendants' testimony against Johnson in civil commitment proceedings in 1999 and May 2000 violated his right to due process because their psychological assessments of him were wrong, and (2) defendant Mayberg's 1999 letter to the District Attorney recommending that Johnson be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator violated his right to due process because he is not a sexually violent predator. He seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis, The court now reviews Johnson's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, the action is frivolous or malicious, the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief. see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, F87 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The complaint has three defects, the first two of which are fatal to the action. The first problem with Johnson's complaint is that the claims therein are time-barred. The appropriate limitations period for a 5 1983 action is that of the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985);Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). Because California has multiple statutes of limitations for different torts, the court borrows the general or residual statute for personal injury actions o use for a #1983 action, which at the time of the filing of the complaint was a one-year imitations period. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). The court also must give effect to a state's tolling provisions. See generally Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44: 1989). California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1 tolls the statute of limitations when a person is "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life."See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the disability of imprisonment delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. See id.
The one-year limitations period applies to Johnson's case. And he is not entitled to any tolling for the disability of imprisonment under California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1. He emphatically asserts that he is not a prisoner and is not imprisoned on a criminal charge. Johnson has represented to the court that he "ceased being a `Prisoner' at the time he was released on May 23, 1999 on Parole while and when plaintiff was detained by the County oi Santa Clara as a `Civil Detainee' Not a `Prisoner.' Request for Judicial Notice, p. 2; see also Complaint, pp. 1-2 ("plaintiff . . . informs the court that he is not a prisoner"); Complaint, p. 4 (plaintiff was booked into jail on May 10, 1999 to await his civil commitment trial). He thus is not entitled to any tolling under § 352.1. Most of his claims accrued in 1999 and his claim concerning the May 2000 civil commitment proceedings accrued in May 2001. His complaint in this action was not filed until July 24, 2002, and thus was more than a year late. The claims therein are time-barred and the statute of limitations defense is complete and obvious on the face of the complaint and the court's own records. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1984) (sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915);see also Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996) (court may grant a motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations "only if the assertions in the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled").
The second problem with the complaint is that it does not state a claim for a due process violation. Johnson claims that the defendants who testified against him were wrong in their psychological assessments of him. That is not a due process violation. Plaintiff admittedly had a hearing at which the testimony was given, and at which he could have contested the accuracy of the testimony. Johnson's other claim — that defendant Mayberg's letter to the district attorney violated his due process rights because he is in fact not a sexually violent predator also does not state a claim for a due process violation. The third problem with the complaint is that the claim concerning the allegedly false testimony cannot proceed because witnesses are absolutely immune from liability for their testimony in earlier state or federal court proceedings. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-46 (1983) (police officer witness at trial); Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 127 (9th Cir. 1987) (police officer witness at probable cause hearing), cert. denied, 485 U.S.979 (1988); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1989) (social worker preparing affidavit for use at bail revocation proceeding).
The complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and as frivolous insofar as it is time-barred. Johnson's in forma pauperis application is GRANTED. (Docket #4.) Johnson's request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Docket #3.) The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.