Opinion
CIVIL 4:23-CV-1159
10-25-2023
DANIELLE JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. LYCOMING COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH, et al., Defendants.
Mannion, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Danielle Johnson, brought this action against Lycoming County Children and Youth, several of its employees, and a state court judge. (Doc. 1). Johnson's claims stem from an incident in which she allegedly left her 8-month-old child alone in her home, was arrested by police, and ultimately had custody of her children taken from her by the state courts. (Id.). Johnson brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and several state tort claims, and requests that she be reunited with her children and awarded 50 million dollars in damages. (Id.).
Along with this complaint, Johnson filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). This motion for IFP status was granted, and the complaint was deemed filed pending an initial screening review of the complaint. (Doc. 6). The case was then reassigned to the undersigned. For the following reasons, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
After review, we conclude that Johnson's complaint fails as a matter of law. At the outset, the state court judge that Johnson has sued is entitled to immunity from the claims against him. Additionally, Johnson's claims inviting us to overturn state court custody orders are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. Finally, because we conclude that the plaintiff s federal claims fail, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims alleged in the complaint.
At the outset, it is well settled that state judges are entitled to immunity from civil liability for claims arising out of acts taken in their official capacities. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit.” Kwasnik v LeBlon, 228 Fed.Appx. 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). Here, Johnson's complaint asserts that Judge Tira ordered her children removed from her custody. This claim plainly arises out of the judge's role in the judicial process in family court against Johnson. Accordingly, Judge Tira is entitled to absolute immunity from these claims.
In addition, to the extent Johnson invites us to overturn the state court custody order and reunite her with her children, this claim runs afoul of the Younger abstention doctrine and should be dismissed. As the Third Circuit has explained, “ Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Kendal v Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)). The doctrine contemplates three legal requirements that must be met before a court exercises its discretion to abstain: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Kendall, 572 F.3d at 131 (citing Matusow v Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008)). Courts have frequently abstained from hearing claims that necessarily interfere with ongoing state criminal cases. See Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2004); Zahl v Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, the complaint indicates that Johnson is currently involved in state court custody proceedings in Lycoming County, and that her children were ordered removed from her care after Children and Youth determined that the children should be removed from the home. (Doc. 1). Thus, the requirements for Younger abstention-ongoing state proceedings that implicate important state interests and give the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his claims-are met here. Given the paramount importance to the state of the enforcement and resolution of state custody proceedings, we believe that we should exercise our discretion to abstain from these claims involving Johnson's ongoing state custody matters.
Additionally, the complaint appears to assert broad and conclusory claims of race and disability discrimination. However, the complaint does nothing more than allege just that-that the plaintiff believes she was discriminated against because of her disability and her race. She does not allege any further factual support for these claims. In fact, the complaint does not even identify plaintiff's race or a disability. Accordingly, this complaint runs afoul of Rule 8's basic requirement that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Because the complaint contains no more than vague, conclusory allegations, these claims should be dismissed.
Finally, the plaintiff has alleged a host of state law tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and intentional misrepresentation. Because we have concluded that the plaintiff's federal claims fail as a matter of law, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Finally, while we recognize that pro se plaintiffs should generally be permitted to amend their complaints, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), this complaint is materially flawed in a number of ways, and thus, we believe leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 25th day of October 2023.