Opinion
No. 1-957 / 01-0402.
Filed April 24, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, MICHAEL J. MOON, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals a district court order denying a postsecondary educational subsidy for her child born out of wedlock. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Leslie Babich of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt Renzo, Des Moines, for appellant.
Benjamin Doran of Doran, Anderson Baltimore, Boone, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Plaintiff appeals a district court order denying a postsecondary educational subsidy for her child born out of wedlock. She also requests an award of appellate attorney fees. We reverse and remand.
Debbie Johnson and Michael Louis were never married. They are the biological parents of Jared Michael Johnson, who was born November 3, 1982. Jared has lived with Debbie since birth. Michael's paternity and child support obligation were initially established in 1984. Later increases occurred, and at the time of trial Michael was paying $496.58 per month in child support and one-half of all uncovered medical expenses. Michael's child support obligation continued only until Jared's eighteenth birthday, which occurred prior to his graduation from high school.
Debbie filed a modification application on May 22, 2000, seeking an extension of Michael's child support obligation until Jared's graduation from high school. She also filed a request for a postsecondary educational subsidy and a request for attorney fees and court costs. Her request for an extension of Michael's original child support obligation was granted. However, Debbie's request for a postsecondary educational subsidy was denied. She was awarded $1500 in attorney fees, and Michael was ordered to pay court costs. Debbie appeals.
Debbie alleges the district court erred in denying her request for a postsecondary educational subsidy. It is clear the district court denied this request solely for the reason that Jared was born out of wedlock and that Iowa Code section 600B.25(1) does not specifically provide for a postsecondary educational subsidy. The district court stated, in part, as follows:
There is no provision, however, for post-secondary education subsidies for Jared similar to those for children whose parents have divorced, pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) (2000).[]
Specifically, the district court was relying on Iowa Code § 600B.25(1). Said code section provides in part:
Upon a finding of paternity pursuant to section 600B.24, the court shall establish the father's monthly support payment and the amount of the support debt accrued or accruing pursuant to section 598.21, subsection 4, until the child reaches majority or until the child finishes high school, if after majority.
A child born out of wedlock stands in the same position with respect to post-secondary education subsidies as the child of married parents who have not had their marriage dissolved. At common law, a parent's obligation to support his or her child ended when the child became of age. Just as there is no statutory requirement that married parents pay post-secondary education expenses for their children, there is no such requirement for unmarried parents. It will, therefore, be the task of the legislature to create an obligation for biological parents who never married to pay post-secondary subsidies for their children.
(Citations omitted.)
The district court is correct in its conclusion that Iowa Code section 600B.25(1) does not specifically provide for postsecondary educational subsidies. We disagree, however, with the district court's further conclusion that we must wait for legislative action to correct this inequity. Restricting a child from receiving benefits to which other children are entitled, on the basis of illegitimacy, violates equal protection. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 1511, 20 L.Ed.2d 436, 439 (1968). In addition, there cannot be any "rational basis to allow a legitimate child to recover support through college . . . and not allow an illegitimate child to recover the same." Bryant v. Schuster, 447 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). This is certainly in line with the rationale and public policy set forth by our supreme court that the educational support statute was "designed to meet a specific and limited problem, one which exists only when a home is split by divorce." In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980). The same "specific and limited" problem also exists where biological parents were never married.
We conclude that the reasoning employed by the district court must fail. In Bryant, we determined the child of parents who never married could receive postsecondary educational support under the section then applicable, Iowa Code section 598.1(2) (1987). Bryant, 447 N.W.2d at 568. We now specifically hold that a child born out of wedlock is entitled to the benefits provided by the current statute regarding postsecondary educational subsidies, section 598.21(5A). We conclude that Jared is entitled to a postsecondary educational subsidy and good cause exists for the granting of one.
The decision of the district court, as it applies to a postsecondary educational subsidy, is reversed and remanded for a determination of the proper amount of said subsidy pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.21(5A). We award Debbie $1000 in appellate attorney fees.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All judges concur except SACKETT, C.J., who dissents.
I dissent. I would affirm the district court. The question in this case is whether the benefits of Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) requiring parents under certain circumstances to contribute to the post high school education of their adult children are available to the adult child of parents who never married.
There is no suggestion that the obligation to support an adult child who is not under any disability exists at common law. The only other way such an obligation can be imposed is if it is created by the legislature. This issue has been addressed by the legislature in Iowa Code Chapter 598, captioned "Dissolution of Marriage and Domestic Relations," under section 598.21(5A). This section states, "The court may order a postsecondary education subsidy if good cause is shown." Section 598.21(5A) sets forth factors for determining whether good cause exists for the subsidy, and it also specifies that the amount of the subsidy is to be based upon those costs incurred at an in-state institution, as well as other considerations. The statute limits each parent's contribution to no more than one third of that amount and provides that the money can be payable to the educational institution, to the child, or to both. The statute further denies the benefit to a student who has repudiated or publicly disowned his or her parent.
In this case we have a parent of an adult child seeking the subsidy. This parent was never married to the child's father. The district court said the subsidy was available only to adult children of divorced parents. The majority has held that restricting an adult child of unmarried parents from an education subsidy is unconstitutional and that the adult child is entitled to an education subsidy. It has remanded to the district court for the purpose of fixing one.
I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the statute. In interpreting a statute, we look to its language, and if its meaning is clear, we are not permitted to search beyond its express terms. State v. Nelson, 329 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1983). Legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as inclusion. State v. Miller, 590 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1999). We may not — under the guise of statutory construction — enlarge or otherwise change the terms of a statute as the legislature adopted it. Id. (citation omitted).
Is the statute as it is written a subsidy limited to adult children of divorced parents, or does it extend to adult children of never-married parents and adult children of married parents? I would suggest that if it is interpreted to include children of never-married parents, as the majority finds, it must also be interpreted to include children of married parents because it is premised upon the obligation of all parents to support their minor children.
I believe the context and wording of the statute require that it be interpreted to include only children of divorced parents. This interpretation is supported by statute. First, section 598.21(5A) falls under section 598.21, which, as it states, is operative only in the case of annulment, dissolution or separate maintenance. Secondly, the legislature has crafted Iowa Code section 600B.25 for fixing obligations of unmarried parents. This code section differs in some ways from the provision fixing obligations of divorcing parents.
This applies particularly to the date retroactive child support can begin.
Although I find this interpretation necessary under the statute, I also believe that under this interpretation the statute is unconstitutional. As an unconstitutional statute, I believe it should be voided, not redrafted by our court, as I believe the majority has done. Principles of statutory construction prevent us from reading into the statute something the legislature has not included. State v. Olsen, 618 N.W.2d 346, 351 (Iowa 2000); see also State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1999). See State v. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1999) (refusing "to read something into the law that is not apparent from the words chosen by the legislature"); Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Iowa 1995) ("When the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute.").
The constitutionality of an earlier and similar provision in Iowa law was challenged by a divorced father on the basis that the requirement that parents support their children in college was limited only to divorced parents. See In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980). The Iowa court rejected the divorced father's challenge, reasoning that when a home is split by divorce, even well-intentioned parents, when deprived of the custody of their children, sometimes react by refusing to support them as they would if the family unit had been preserved. Id. I suggest that Vrban is not instructive. First, the court's reasoning in Vrban is not applicable to section 598.21(5A), as this statute establishes a support obligation on the part of both parents, even the parent who has primary care, negating the Vrban assumption that a noncustodial parent should be under court order to pay support because he or she is less likely to offer it. Furthermore, legislative and societal changes since the Vrban decision call into question the Vrban logic that parents without custody are less likely to be fair to their children, which has been used to justify disparate treatment of different classes of parents. One such change has been the legislated presumption of joint custody that postdated Vrban and has resulted in the retention by most parents of their custodial privileges. See Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a) and (2)(a). Additionally, at the time of the Vrban case we were only slowly moving away from the concept that mothers generally received custody and stayed home to raise their children, and fathers were the only wage earners.
See In re Bowen's Marriage, 219 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Iowa 1974). In that case the father challenged the inference, relied upon by trial court, that the best interests of younger children were served by placing them in their mother's custody. The court noted that this inference had been partly based upon the assumption that a mother keeps the home, performs household duties, and would have more time to devote to the children and their welfare. See id. The court said that modern redefinition and adjustment of traditional parental roles had greatly diluted the strength of the inference. The father in Bowen attacked both the constitutionality and the wisdom of the inference. Id. The Bowen court said, "We find it unnecessary to decide the constitutional issue because we hold the inference is no longer wise. Id. It is simply not justified. Id. It tends to obscure the basic tenet in custody cases, which overrides all others, the best interests of the children. . . ." Id.
For these reasons, I do not find the reasoning in Vrban persuasive in determining the constitutionality of the current statute. It is illogical and unfair to continue to follow the Vrban reasoning that divorcing parents are less fair than their married counterparts. I suggest that the presumptions in Vrban are flawed. If they are not flawed, a court should not make such presumptions unless they are supported by reliable data. Because I would find the statute unconstitutional, I would affirm the district court decision on that ground.
A college education is becoming more of a necessity in modern society. Fortunately most parents recognize their children's needs and support their educational endeavors. If the legislature believes that such support is mandated, then it should be required of all parents, not just those who have endured the misfortune of having to dissolve their marriage.