Unger alleged that the combined negligence of Sumter, Bryant, and Farmtronix injured his property, i.e., the system he had just leased/purchased and his cows. The alleged acts of negligence combined to produce a single indivisible injury, and a rational basis does not exist for an apportionment of the damages, thus we find under the facts of this case that the three may be joined as joint tortfeasors, Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 317 ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981), and venue is proper in Sumter County. Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV.

In order to establish a joint tortfeasor relationship, Warren Walker must show that the defendants' act combined naturally and directly to produce his injury. However, as discussed in Division 1 above, Melinda Walker's intentional and unforeseeable act prevents any alleged negligence by Hammock and Sullivan from acting as a proximate cause of Warren Walker's injury. Accordingly, neither Hammock nor Sullivan can be said to have acted jointly with Melinda Walker. See Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981).Judgment affirmed.

Smith v. McClendon, 142 Ga. App. 608, 609-610 ( 236 S.E.2d 692) (1977). See also Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981); Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 S.E.2d 421) (1974) aff'd Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 S.E.2d 744) (1975); City of Atlanta v. Harris, 52 Ga. App. 56 ( 182 S.E. 202) (1935).Peggy Ann of Ga., Inc. v. Scoggins, 86 Ga. App. 109, 114 ( 71 S.E.2d 89) (1952).

The trial court properly determined that the DOT may be held individually liable, just like a private entity, for the full amount of Ms. Blair's damages. See OCGA § 50-21-23(a); Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183-184(6) ( 460 S.E.2d 812) (1995); Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 317(2) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981). If the DOT believes that it is entitled to contribution from Jamie Blair, its remedy is to seek such contribution, not to have the jury in this case, in which Jamie Blair is not a named party, reduce Ms. Blair's recovery. See OCGA § 51-12-32; Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 526(1) ( 441 S.E.2d 868) (1994).

]" (Emphasis supplied.) Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 315-316 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981). Construing the evidence most strongly against Abbott as the moving party, it would appear that genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to whether his actions undertaken during the relevant period demonstrate the exercise of ordinary care by one operating the water system under the then-existing circumstances.

[Cits.]" Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313, 315-316 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981). (a) We find no error in the trial court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment as to appellant's allegations that appellees acted negligently by hiring and/or supervising Brown. The evidence reveals that Howard, captain of the Game and Fish Division of DNR, accepted DOC's offer that an inmate trusty be placed in the Waycross office to perform public services. It is uncontroverted that none of the appellees selected Brown as the specific inmate trusty to work in the Waycross office, but instead, relied on DOC's selection of Brown.

This includes liability to third persons resulting from negligent inspections. Huggins v. Aetna Cas. c. Co., 245 Ga. 248 ( 264 S.E.2d 191) (1980); Johnson v. Handling, 157 Ga. App. 313, 315 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981). Thus, having taken the aegis of a "Good Samaritan," one is responsible for negligently performing the duties assumed.

Manheim Services Corp. v. Connell, 153 Ga. App. 533 ( 265 S.E.2d 862) (1980). It should be made clear that this court is not stating here that herpes victims have a specific duty to warn any person of their condition; however, they, like all citizens, are to be guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, and they may be sued in this state for negligence in the omission to do something which a reasonable person would do. Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981). Of course, the question whether or not a person acted negligently must be viewed in light of facts commonly known and within the factual context of each case. Allen v. Gornto, 100 Ga. App. 744 ( 112 S.E.2d 368) (1959).

We disagree. A charge on waiver would have been inappropriate because plaintiffs did not challenge the termite letter per se to show breach of contract or negligence (compare Perloe v. Getz Exterminators, 163 Ga. App. 397 ( 294 S.E.2d 640) (1982); Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313 ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981)), but used the letter as evidence of the exterminating company's involvement in the conspiracy to defraud. Defendants requested the court read certain lengthy contract provisions setting forth the buyers' duties and they claim it was error for the court to refuse the request.

If the title certificate or policy in Sherrill v. Louisville Title Ins. Co., 134 Ga. App. 322 ( 214 S.E.2d 410) (1975) had been addressed "to whom it may concern" a different result may have been obtained. Allred v. Dobbs, 137 Ga. App. 227 ( 223 S.E.2d 265) (1975), one judge concurring in the judgment only, and Johnson v. Landing, 157 Ga. App. 313 ( 277 S.E.2d 307) (1981) appear to differ from MacNerland, supra, in that the inspection or report is certified and audited and a guarantee or a type of warranty exists which is based on a comprehensive complete inspection. The latter cases (a) indicate that where a third party might reasonably rely on the inspection and (b) where a definite audited, unlimited, certified, guaranteed inspection exists liability to a third party may occur.