Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CV-8508
November 28, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Sondra Johnson ("Plaintiff or "Johnson") appeared before the Honorable Gene D. Cohen ("Judge Cohen") on August 20, 2001, having brought a pro se civil action for defamation, fraud, and slander in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Kenneth C. Ferber, a representative of Jacques Ferber, Inc. (collectively "the Ferber Defendants"), a Philadelphia furrier that allegedly lost Plaintiffs fur coat. Catherine A. Lonergan ("Defendant Lonergan") was the Court Reporter during the defamation suit proceedings.
Plaintiff now brings a pro se federal claim alleging that Defendant Lonergan deprived her of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law when Defendant Lonergan altered and tampered with the court transcripts, supposedly in order to remove those portions that would reveal Judge Cohen's supposed bias and belligerence. Plaintiff alleges the Ferber Defendants breached their contract settlement agreement and defaulted on Plaintiffs amended complaint for defamation, fraud, and slander.
Presently before the Court are Defendant Lonergan's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the Ferber Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Lonergan contends that, as the court reporter in Plaintiff's civil action, she is entitled to judicial immunity from suit; in the alternative, Defendant Lonergan argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to theRooker-Feldman doctrine. For the reasons which follow, her Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) will be denied. The Ferber Defendants will be dismissed as parties for lack of federal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names the Honorable Gene D. Cohen and the Office of the Prothonotary as additional defendants. This Memorandum only pertains to those claims against Defendant Lonergan and the Ferber Defendants. This Court notes that, in an earlier opinion, it granted Judge Cohen's Motion to Dismiss. Johnson v. Jacques Ferber, Inc., No. 02-8508, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19589 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2003).
The "Office of the Prothonotary" has not entered an appearance and the plaintiff has not requested any relief.
I. Jurisdiction and Legal Standard
As Johnson alleges violations of her constitutional rights as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Lonergan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b).
Although Plaintiff does not specifically allege Lonergan acted under color of state law, having construed Plaintiff's complaint liberally, this Court concludes that Johnson alleges a cause of action against Defendant Lonergan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). "The purpose of Section 1983 is to provide a civil cause of action to protect persons against the misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible because the defendant was cloaked with the authority of the state." Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F. Supp.2d 358, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1251, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted only when it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved by the plaintiff. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).
A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to no less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). However, Plaintiffs complaint is confusing and unnecessarily prolix. Plaintiff will be required to replead as to Defendant Lonergan.
II. Analysis
A. Factual Background — Plaintiffs Allegations
Approximately seven years ago, the Ferber Defendants allegedly misplaced a fur coat that it had been holding in storage for Plaintiff Johnson, who was one of their customers. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) After unsuccessful negotiations and settlement talks, Johnson initiated suit against the furrier in order to secure compensation. (Id. ¶ 6.) Judging from the allegations within Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, the lawsuit and the accompanying arbitration hearings had been marked by severe enmity. (Id. ¶ 9.) Thereafter, on February 9, 2000, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil action against the Ferber Defendants for defamation, fraud, and slander in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. (Id. ¶ 15.) According to Plaintiff, the Ferber Defendants had uttered defamatory, perjurious testimony during the preceding breach of contract trial. On the morning of August 20, 2001 (a Monday), Johnson and the Ferber Defendants appeared before Judge Cohen. (Id. ¶ 18.)
As Plaintiff only had received the Ferber Defendants' answer to her amended complaint that previous Saturday afternoon, Johnson requested a continuance during which she could review the furrier's answer and respond appropriately. (Id.) Judge Cohen firmly established that the parties would resolve their dispute that day in his courtroom. (Tr. at 6, 7-8, 10.) According to Plaintiff, Judge Cohen "belligerently and vehemently" denied her requests for a continuance. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff "pleaded three times that she was being placed at a [sic] unfair disadvantage, but Judge Gene D. Cohen, screamed in a disdainful tone of voice[,] 'I DO NOT CARE ABOUT YOUR UNFAIR DISADVANTAGE.'" (Id.) (emphasis in original). Judge Cohen allegedly "verbally berated and oppressed [Plaintiff] into a state of exerucreating [sic] anxity [sic] and server [sic] duress." (Id.) That day, Plaintiff withdrew her claim without prejudice.
Having decided to initiate litigation against Judge Cohen, Plaintiff requested the corresponding trial transcripts and was surprised to learn that the version depicted therein did not comport with her recollection. The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Lonergan
did in fact alter, and/or tamper with the trial transcripts to reflect and cover-up that Trial Judge Gene D. Cohen displayed no bias, ill will, or prejudice toward [Johnson], or showed any partiallity [sic] toward the defendant Jacques Ferber[,] Inc., when in fact Judge Cohen did in fact display such bias, ill will, and prejudice, by berating, threating [sic], baggering [sic] and oppressing [Johnson] into a state of sever [sic] duress.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 50.) Alleging that her rights to due process and equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, had been violated and unjustly disregarded by Lonergan, Plaintiff brought the instant action against Defendant Lonergan.
Along with these allegations against Defendant Lonergan, Plaintiff attached two counts against the Ferber Defendants: (1) Breach of Contract, which relates back to the original lost fur coat; and (2) Default Judgment, which relates back to the Ferber Defendants' delay in filing their response to Plaintiffs defamation complaint.
B. Defendant Lonergan
i. Judicial Immunity
Defendant Lonergan contends that Johnson's claim against her must be dismissed because, as the court reporter responsible for transcribing Plaintiffs appearance before Judge Cohen, she is entitled to judicial immunity. As a matter of law, court reporters are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity simply by virtue of their position.Antoine v. Byers Anderson, Inc.,
508 U.S. 429, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993). WhileAntoine might foreclose Defendant Lonergan from asserting absolute judicial immunity, that case does not prevent her from asserting qualified immunity. Id. Antoine left open the issue whether court reporters are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 432. This Court notes that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet decided whether court reporters can raise a qualified immunity defense.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the Court concludes that the facts as alleged in the Complaint are sufficient to support a finding that Plaintiffs rights, as secured by the Constitution and its laws, were deprived by someone acting under color of state law. Therefore, Defendant Lonergan's Motion to Dismiss on the basis of judicial immunity will be denied.
ii. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendant Lonergan argues that the Rooker-Feldman preclusion doctrine requires this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs claim against her, as further review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint improperly would compromise the validity of a state court judgment. Although the United States Supreme Court, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and the Supremacy Clause contained in Article VI of the Federal Constitution, has the power to overturn judgments of state courts, this power is not granted to lower federal courts. This principle, usually referred to as theRooker-Feldman doctrine, is an important border line in the landscape of federalism, and has developed to avoid collisions between the lower federal courts and state courts.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine's name derives from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
"[A] United States District Court has no authority to review judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in [the United States Supreme] Court." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. The doctrine has been extended to decisions of lower state courts and does not apply exclusively to state courts of last resort.Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n. Inc. v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992). The doctrine precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated in state court or are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court adjudication.Parkview Assoc. P'ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000). For Rooker-Feldman purposes, a federal claim and a state claim are inextricably intertwined where the success of the federal claim would effectively void the earlier state claim. Gulla v. North Strabane Township, 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
Defendant Lonergan argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the judicial impropriety claim simply because Plaintiffs action relates back to the original defamation lawsuit. The Court disagrees. TheRooker-Feldman doctrine divests a district court of subject matter jurisdiction whenever its ruling would undermine and invalidate an earlier state court ruling. Should this Court rule on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, this Court concludes that any final disposition would neither expressly nor impliedly undermine the state court proceedings.
In her reply brief, Plaintiff contends that Rooker-Feldman should not prejudice her claim as she presents a clear, independent question of federal law against Defendant Lonergan, and cites Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002), in support. UnderBrokaw, the "pivotal inquiry" for Rooker-Feldman purposes is "whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether [she] is, in fact, presenting an independent claim." 305 F.3d at 664-65. Third Circuit precedent also establishes that a plaintiff avoids a Rooker-Feldman dismissal when she alleges a separate, independent federal claim, even though it arose in the context of an earlier state court proceeding. See, e.g.,Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs federal charges against Defendant Lonergan.
The Pennsylvania trial and appellate courts that entered judgment on Plaintiffs defamation, fraud, and slander lawsuit never considered, let alone adjudicated, the allegations of "judicial impropriety" made against Defendant Lonergan. More specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable to the claim against Defendant Lonergan because in determining whether Defendant Lonergan unconstitutionally harmed Plaintiff by altering court transcripts, this Court would not need first to question whether the disposition of the defamation lawsuit was legally correct. E.g., Gulla, 146 F.3d at 172-73. Nor would any judgment regarding Defendant Lonergan's liability under § 1983 invalidate that disposition, especially since she was not a party (or in privity with a party) to the earlier lawsuit. See, e.g.,FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840-42 841 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that, under Third Circuit precedent, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not parties to earlier state court litigation).
The instant case is distinguishable from Travis v. Miller, 226 F. Supp.2d 663 (E.D. Pa. 2002), in which court reporters accused of falsifying transcripts succeeded in having a plaintiffs § 1983 claim dismissed because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. In Travis, the plaintiff earlier had filed a state court lawsuit that asserted that the alleged falsifications prejudiced his criminal appeals in violation of the applicable Pennsylvania post-conviction relief legislation. 226 F. Supp. at 665. Thereafter, the trial court determined that the plaintiff had not been injured by any transcript tampering. This determination was upheld on appeal. Because of these explicit references to and disposition of the plaintiffs falsification charges at the state court level, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs similar federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it could not have granted relief independent of the earlier determinations.
The federal relief sought by Travis . . . can only be predicated upon a conviction that the Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court were wrong when they concluded that the . . . alleged falsification of Travis' transcripts [was] not valid and would not be material to the outcome [of] this case or the issues raised by Travis.Id. at 668 (emphasis added). Here, the state court proceedings that followed Plaintiffs voluntary withdrawal of her claim before Judge Cohen did not reference any alleged judicial impropriety perpetrated by Defendant Lonergan. In permitting this claim to continue against this defendant, this Court would not be retreading any paths forged by its state court predecessors.
C. Ferber Defendants
Johnson brings two charges against the Ferber Defendants. As alleged by Plaintiff, the Ferber Defendants breached their contract settlement agreement and defaulted on Plaintiffs amended complaint for defamation, fraud, and slander. Plaintiff initially filed and litigated a breach of contract claim in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against the Ferber Defendants on February 9, 1998. On July 9, 1999, a panel of arbitrators awarded Johnson $3500. Plaintiff appealed this award and was later awarded $4500 following an April 24, 2000 non-jury trial. On May 24, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court; by an October 13, 2000 Order, Plaintiffs appeal was quashed according to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
These facts were compiled from the Ferber Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs response thereto.
Plaintiff has failed to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction over the Ferber Defendants. The Ferber Defendants are private parties. There are no allegations of fact that they acted under color of state law, nor does the Court see any basis for Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to establish federal jurisdiction over the Ferber Defendants. The Court will not permit Plaintiffs third trip to the well.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Lonergan's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) will be denied. The Ferber Defendants will be dismissed as parties for lack of federal jurisdiction.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ___ day of November, 2003, upon the foregoing Memorandum and consideration of Defendant Catherine Lonergan's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 19), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is DENIED, and that Plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint against Defendant Lonergan only within twenty (20) days limited to "a short and plain statement of the claim," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), to which Defendant Lonergan shall file a responsive pleading.
Further, Defendants Jacques Ferber, Inc. and Kenneth C. Ferber are dismissed as parties for lack of jurisdiction. Their Motion for Dismissal (Docket No. 22) is DENIED AS MOOT.