Opinion
1:23-CV-252-SPB-RAL
07-18-2024
TRAVON JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. SUPERINTENDENT RANDY IRWIN, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ECF NO. 23.
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Alexander, Best, Burkhouse, Freddrickson, Gustatson, Haggerty, Randy Irwin, Lesko, Mountour, Mowrey, Richards and Walker [ECF No. 23] be granted and that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be permitted an opportunity to amend his complaint.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Background
For purposes of this motion, the following factual allegations are accepted as true. Plaintiff Travon Johnson is an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest). ECF No. 10 ¶ 5. On July 13, 2023, Johnson returned to SCI-Forest and Lieutenant Haggerty confiscated his legal property including “Documentary Evidence & Materials.” Id. ¶ 16. The remaining Defendants, each of whom is an employee or official at SCI-Forest, “set in motion Plaintiffs injuries” in an unidentified manner. Id. ¶ 17. As a result of the confiscation of his property, Johnson suggests that his ability to litigate a criminal case at CP-22-CR-4250 was impeded. Id. ¶ 19. Specifically, Johnson maintains that his criminal case “was unable to be answered” and suffered from “untimeliness.” Id. Johnson does not identify any specific pleading or motion that he was prevented from filing.
Johnson's pleading contains a heavy dose of meaningless legalese and sentence fragments, rendering portions of it indecipherable. Mindful of his pro se status, the Court has done its best to discern the operative facts at the core of his claim.
Although Johnson also alleges that Defendant Richards stole a prior version of his civil complaint in this action, there is nothing in his pleading to indicate that he had any trouble initiating this case. Id. ¶ 27.
Based on the foregoing, Johnson contends that Defendants violated his constitutional right to access the courts by intentionally confiscating and destroying his legal property. Id. ¶ 23. He also appears to suggest that this was done in retaliation for something, although he does not refer to any prior protected activity. Id.
Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims. See ECF No. 23. Despite requesting an extension of time in which to do so, Johnson failed to file a response. See ECF Nos. 26-27. This matter is ripe for review.
Johnson's failure to respond suggests that he may have abandoned his claims. See, e.g, Tambasco v. United States Dept, of Army, 2018 WL 1203466, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2018) (dismissing claims as unopposed when the plaintiff failed to respond to arguments made by the defendants in support of their motion to dismiss); Lada v. Delaware County Community College, 2009 WL 3217183, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009) (“To put it simply: plaintiffs who fail to brief their opposition to portions of motions to dismiss do so at the risk of having those parts of the motions to dismiss granted as uncontested.”). Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will address his allegations on the merits.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations of his complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it must do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
1. Access to courts
It is well-established that prisoners have a fundamental right to access the courts. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996)). To prevail on an access to courts claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) “that they suffered an ‘actual injury' in that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable' underlying claim”; and (2) that they have “no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). The complaint must “describe the underling arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,' and it must describe the Tost remedy.'” Id. (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the denial of access actually caused the alleged injury to occur. Tinsley v. Gloria, 369 Fed.Appx. 378, 381 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352-54).
Johnson's conclusory averment that the destruction of some of his legal paperwork caused him to miss an unspecified deadline in his criminal case satisfies none of these elements. While it is axiomatic that “actual injury,” for purposes of an access to courts claim, may include “missed court dates, missed filing deadlines, a denial of legal assistance to which he was entitled, or the loss of a case which he should have won,” see Fortes v. Harding, 19 F.Supp.2d 323, 327 (M.D. Pa. 1998), Johnson has provided no specifics as to what deadline he missed or how it impacted his criminal proceedings. Moreover, a review of the state court docket in his underlying criminal case does not suggest that any deadline was missed. It appears that Johnson was sentenced on June 14, 2023, shortly before the confiscation of his paperwork, and filed a timely motion for collateral relief through counsel on May 30, 2024. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Johnson, Criminal Case No. CP-22-CR-4250-2020. That petition remains under consideration in the state courts as of the date of this Report.
Additionally, Johnson has made no attempt to plead facts from which the Court might infer that the allegedly lost claim was “nonfrivolous” or had “arguable” merit. Id. at 130. The sine qua non of a “viable claim of interference with access to the courts is a showing by the inmate of direct injury to [his] access to the courts.” Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 183 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted, emphasis added). Johnson has not provided any information concerning the nature of the impacted proceedings, the substance of his hypothetical filing, or how the alleged loss of his papers resulted in the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious motion or petition. In the absence of any facts suggesting that Johnson had an “arguably actionable claim,” dismissal is warranted. Id. See also Angle v. Smeal, 2014 WL 4414917, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (dismissing access-to-courts claim where “Plaintiff merely [made] the bald assertion that he 'lost his criminal case as a result to this theft of his property'”).
2. Retaliation
To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Retaliatory motive can be inferred from either: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Id. (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Although Johnson references the phrase “retaliation” in his pleading, he has not alleged any of the elements of a retaliation claim. He has not identified a prior act of protected conduct or supplied any facts suggesting a causal link between that conduct and the destruction of his legal materials. Given these deficiencies, dismissal is appropriate.
III. Leave to amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Because it is not clear that amendment would be futile here, it is recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint within a specified time following dismissal. Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 23] be granted, but that Plaintiff be permitted an opportunity to amend his complaint.
V. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3dl87 (3d Cir. 2007).