The Equal Protection Clause also “prohibits police officers from selectively enforcing laws based on race.” Ogunsula v. Md. State Police, No. CV ELH-20-2568, 2021 WL 6105503, at *29 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269, (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))), reconsideration denied, No. CV ELH-20-2568, 2022 WL 3290713 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2022). To sufficiently plead an equal protection claim for selective law enforcement, the complaint must allege “both discriminatory effect and that the officer's action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”
See Thompson v. Badgujar, No. DLB-20-1272, 2023 WL 6381509, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2023) (citing Cent. Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk, Va., 811 F.3d 625, 634 (4th Cir. 2016) and Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269, 276 (4th Cir. 2019)). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Deputy Graves or Deputy Rishel's conduct was motivated by a discriminatory intent and that their actions had a discriminatory effect.
How could something that was not done possibly be tracked?" Johnson v. Holmes, 782 F. App'x 269, 270 (4th Cir. 2019). The Court doubts that the Fourth Circuit intends to require defendants, such as Moore, to put forth evidence that it has explicitly deemed impossible to collect: evidence of white individuals that RPD officers could have—but chose not to—stop.
The standard for proving selective prosecution claims against prosecutors also applies to selective enforcement claims against police officers when a plaintiff alleges an officer made an enforcement decision on the basis of race. Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding Equal Protection Clause prohibits police officers “from selectively enforcing laws based on race”) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996));
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). To prevail on a selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff ultimately “must prove that [Defendants'] conduct (1) was motivated by a discriminatory intent; and (2) had a discriminatory effect.” Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2016)). “[A] plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to ‘demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.'” Green v. Maroules, 211 Fed.Appx. 159, 162 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 576 (4th Cir. 2003)).
The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits police officers from selectively enforcing laws based on race.” Ogunsula v. Maryland State Police, No. CV ELH-20-2568, 2021 WL 6105503, at *29 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))), reconsideration denied, No. CV ELH-20-2568,2022 WL 3290713 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2022). “To prevail on a selective enforcement claim,” the plaintiff must establish that she was subjected to conduct that “(1) was motivated by a discriminatory intent; and (2) had a discriminatory effect.
Therefore, Plaintiffs conclude that such testimony should be excluded because “[a]n expert cannot dispute a legal ruling of a court ...” Id. The Court can quickly dispense with Defendants' first counterargument: that the Fourth Circuit's holding in Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269 (4th Cir. 2019), “does not preclude Dr. Moore's opinions,” because the decision was unpublished and thus “not binding precedent in the cases of Polk, Cook, Grady, and Harris against Holmes.” Dkt
To state a selective enforcement claim, the plaintiff must allege that she was subjected to conduct that “(1) was motivated by a discriminatory intent; and (2) had a discriminatory effect.” Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed. App'x 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) and Cent. Radio Co. v. Cty. of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2016)). In effect, “a plaintiff must show not only that similarly situated individuals were treated differently, but that there was ‘clear and intentional discrimination.'” Cent. Radio Co., 811 F.3d at 635 (quoting Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 825 (4th Cir. 1995)).
This guarantee “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). And, of import here, the Equal Protection Clause “prohibits police officers from selectively enforcing laws based on race.” Johnson v. Holmes, 782 Fed.Appx. 269, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
"A plaintiff may make this showing by (1) naming similarly situated individuals of a different race who were treated differently by law enforcement; or (2) providing statistics that address this question." Johnson v. Holmes, 782 F. App'x 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2019); see Blackwell, 496 F. App'x at 839 ("Statistical evidence can be used to show . . . discriminatory effect[.]"). A defendant's alleged "discriminatory purpose," in turn, "need not be the only purpose, but it must be a motivating factor in the decision" the plaintiff has challenged.