Under such circumstances as are shown in the instant case, it was incumbent upon Appellant, through counsel, to object as soon as was practicable, after the answer was given, and to go further and move that the objectional testimony be stricken. Johnson v. Hodges, 121 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1938, writ dism'd). A motion to strike must likewise be specific.

At the time the objection was made the same testimony was already before the jury without objection, and no motion was made to strike the prior testimony. Johnson v. Hodges, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W.2d 371. Appellants did not object to the testimony on the ground that it was prejudicial; the admission of immaterial testimony is not error unless it is calculated to influence the minds of the jury.

The difficulty in this case arises out of the confusion in authorities in attempting to define the term "unavoidable accident" as between two or more defendants. Hicks v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App. 128 S.W.2d 884; Glazer v. Wheeler, Tex.Civ.App. 130 S.W.2d 353; Dallas Ry. Terminal Co. v. Boland, Tex.Civ.App. 53 S.W.2d 158; Johnson v. Hodges, Tex.Civ.App. 121 S.W.2d 371; Dallas Ry. Term. Co. v. Redman, Tex.Civ.App. 113 S.W.2d 262; Southern Transp. Co. v. Adams, Tex.Civ.App. 141 S.W.2d 739; Yellow Cab Co. v. Underwood, Tex.Civ.App. 144 S.W.2d 291; Anizan v. Paquette, Tex. Civ. App. 113 S.W.2d 196; Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App. 145 S.W.2d 300. The point was again before the Supreme Court in Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399; 151 S.W.2d 790, where it was said that in this type of case — two or more defendants — the question of unavoidable accident should be submitted as to "all of the parties involved, by including in the definition the term `unavoidable accident' each of the acting parties involved in the accident or catastrophe which resulted in the injury."

Therefore, we think said assignments must be and they are overruled. That an objection to such testimony and an exception to the ruling of the court thereon are required is shown by the following authorities: Collins v. Panhandle Nat. Bank, 75 Tex. 254, 11 S.W. 1053; Johnson v. Hodges, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W.2d 371, 374; Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Hitt, Tex. Civ. App. 125 S.W.2d 323, 328; Foley v. Houston, B. T. Ry. Co., 50 Tex. Civ. App. 218, 110 S.W. 96, 98; Galveston, H. S. A. Ry. Co. v. Grenig, Tex. Civ. App. 142 S.W. 135, 140, writ refused; Simpson v. Whitesboro Nat. Bank, Tex. Civ. App. 120 S.W.2d 462, 463; Abshier v. Reavis, Tex. Civ. App. 54 S.W.2d 1102, 1104; Traders' General Ins. Co. v. Bulis, Tex. Civ. App. 75 S.W.2d 965, 967; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Williams, Tex.Com.App., 14 S.W.2d 1015, 1017; Wheeler v. Tyler S.E. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 356, 359, 43 S.W. 876; 3 Tex.Jur. 188 et seq.; Dist. County Court Rule 56, et seq.; Art. 2237, R.S. 1925, as amended 1939 (Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 2237); Texas P. Ry. Co. v. Hilgartner, Tex. Civ. App. 149 S.W. 1091; Texas Law of Evidence (McCormick Ray) p. 24; Sulser v. Caraway, Tex. Civ. App. 134 S.W.2d 426, 427.