Opinion
Case No. 04-CV-0279-JM (JMA).
January 25, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b) (6) [Doc. No. 18-1]
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint ("FAC") brought by Defendants G. Hernandez and D. Cornish pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to Defendants' motion, as well as all relevant pleadings and documents in the Court's file. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2002, Plaintiff was involved in a "multiracial melee" at Donovan State Prison and was placed in the Administrative Segregation Unit ("ASU"). FAC at 3. Plaintiff claims that because the "regular" ASU was full, he was initially placed in alternate housing located at Facility 2, Housing Unit 9, which was designated as an ASU. Id. Facility 2 was placed on "lockdown" status on February 11, 2002 following the melee. Id. at 23. On February 24, 2002, Plaintiff was re-housed at ASU Overflow, located at Facility 4, Housing Unit 16, where he remained until April 4, 2002. Id. at 3, 23. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when Defendants Hernandez and Cornish, Correctional Sergeants, deprived him of outdoor exercise during his placement in the ASU and/or ASU Overflow from February 11, 2002 through April 4, 2002. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff has since been relocated and is currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison.
For ease of reference, the Court has consecutively labeled all pages of the FAC, including exhibit title pages and exhibits, resulting in a total of twenty-three (23) pages.
According to Defendants, the "regular" ASU is located at Facility 2, Housing Unit 6. Defs.' Mem. at 2.
As set forth in this Court's Report and Recommendation filed May 18, 2005, Plaintiff submitted a California Department of Corrections ("CDC") Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form 602 on March 29, 2002, in which he requested an investigation into why his exercise privileges had been revoked while in the ASU. On April 14, 2002, Plaintiff's grievance was denied on the basis that Plaintiff had been placed in the ASU Overflow at Facility 4, Housing Unit 16 due to overcrowding at the ASU at Facility 2, Housing Unit 6, and that exercise yards for the ASU Overflow had not been built. The decision noted that Plaintiff wanted to proceed with an appeal of the decision despite the fact that he had already been released from ASU Overflow. Plaintiff then sought a Second Level Review on August 22, 2002 in which, inter alia, he requested that an investigation be conducted. An investigation was subsequently performed, and the Second Level Review was partially granted on September 20, 2002 to reflect that fact. No further action was taken by the prison. Plaintiff then appealed to the Director's Level on November 2, 2002. On February 6, 2003, Plaintiff's appeal was denied as Plaintiff had already been released from ASU Overflow and no further action was deemed necessary.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on February 10, 2004. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b) (6) on February 4, 2005. On May 18, 2005, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation Re Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion. Before the district judge could issue a ruling on the report and recommendation, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. On June 24, 2005, the district judge denied Defendants' first motion to dismiss as moot in light of the amended complaint. Defendants then filed the instant motion.
II. DEFENDANTS' FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b) (6) MOTION
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment claim relating to the deprivation of outdoor exercise and (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. A claim can only be dismissed if it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).
The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will "ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). Unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim, a complaint cannot be dismissed without leave to amend. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2000).
Where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel."). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a court "may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.;see also Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983). "The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim." Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).
B. Eighth Amendment — Deprivation of Outdoor Exercise
Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants when they deprived him of outdoor exercise from February 11, 2002 to April 4, 2002. FAC at 3. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claim on the grounds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled all required elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. Defs.' Mem. at 3-8.
"Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, . . . the full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes." Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979). The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," which includes those sanctions that are "so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). This includes not only physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976).
Although courts have recognized that prison administrators may need, on occasion, to briefly deprive an inmate of outdoor exercise due to logistical problems, a long-term deprivation, even due to practical difficulties, may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1995). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements, one of which is objective and the other of which is subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087.
"Under the objective requirement, the prison official's acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087 (citation omitted). A prisoner meets the objective requirement by alleging the deprivation of what courts have defined as a basic human need. Id. at 1088.
The subjective requirement, relating to the prison official's state of mind, requires "deliberate indifference." Id. at 1087. "Deliberate indifference" exists when a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Finally, the Court must analyze each claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment violations may not be based on the "totality of conditions" at a prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47.
1. Objective Requirement
Plaintiff contends that his placement in the ASU and/or ASU Overflow constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he was denied outdoor exercise for over 7 weeks, or 52 days, from February 11, 2002 to April 4, 2002. FAC at 3. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff was housed in ASU Overflow, and thus was denied outdoor exercise, for a period of only 39 days, i.e., a period less than that in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000), and because Plaintiff's placement in ASU Overflow was based on his own misbehavior. Defs.' Mem. at 6.
In Spain, the court stated that "regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being of the inmates." Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit found that a complete denial of exercise lasting 6-1/2 weeks was sufficient to invoke Eighth Amendment protection. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133. Although there is an apparent dispute concerning the amount of time that Plaintiff was deprived of outdoor exercise, the Court finds that whether the deprivation lasted for 39 days (i.e., 5-1/2 weeks), as stated by Defendants, or 52 days (i.e., 7-1/2 weeks), as alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim. Again, a denial of exercise lasting 6-1/2 weeks is sufficient to invoke Eighth Amendment protection. See id. at 1133. Neither Lopez nor any other case, however, suggests that the 6-1/2 week deprivation inLopez constitutes the minimum amount of time required to invoke Eighth Amendment protection, and the Court declines to apply a bright line test requiring that minimum duration. Indeed, inAllen, permitting inmates 45 minutes of outdoor exercise per week over a 6 week period was found to be sufficient to meet the objective element. Allen, 48 F.3d at 1086-87. In this case, Plaintiff alleges a deprivation greater than that alleged inAllen — no outdoor exercise at all over a period of 7-1/2 weeks. Even if Defendants are correct that the deprivation lasted for just 5-1/2 weeks, the Court finds that Plaintiff's alleged deprivation is sufficiently close in duration to the deprivations in both Lopez and Allen that Eighth Amendment protection may be invoked.
Furthermore, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff is precluded from meeting the objective requirement because his placement in segregated housing was due to "inmate misbehavior" is without merit. In Allen, for example, the court found that the prisoner had met the objective element even though he was placed in a segregated housing unit due to "multiple disciplinary offenses."Allen, 48 F.3d at 1086. Although the court in LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1993) found no Eighth Amendment violation for an inmate who was deprived of outdoor exercise due to his own misbehavior, LeMaire is distinguishable, as the prisoner in that case had attacked two correctional officers and had vowed to attack them again, and thus presented a grave security risk when outside his cell.LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1458. Defendants' additional argument that Plaintiff cannot meet the objective requirement because he did not allege that he could not exercise in his cell is similarly without merit. The courts in Spain and Toussaint specifically required outdoor exercise. Spain, 600 F.2d 189, 199-200;Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1984). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has previously found that the allowance of indoor exercise is insufficient to defeat an Eighth Amendment claim. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Court accordingly concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied the objective element of stating an Eighth Amendment claim.
2. Subjective Requirement
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not established the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. Defendants contend that there can be no finding of deliberate indifference because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants had actual knowledge of his desire and/or clearance for outdoor exercise, and because the ASU Overflow did not have a secure exercise area. Defs.' Mem. at 6-8.
In the Court's view, Plaintiff is not required to allege that Defendants knew about his specific desire or clearance for outdoor exercise; rather, Plaintiff must allege only that Defendants knew of and disregarded a risk to his health and safety. "To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a `sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). "In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of `deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference is found when a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837; see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). The existence of this subjective state of mind may be inferred from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002).
Therefore, the issue is not whether Defendants knew of Plaintiff's desire or clearance for outdoor exercise. Rather, the issue is whether Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health or safety — specifically, whether Defendants knew that the lack of outdoor exercise alleged by Plaintiff presented an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health or safety. Defendants' reliance on the absence of any allegations that they had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's exercise classification or desire for outdoor exercise thus misses the point. Plaintiff is not required to make such allegations. Reading the pleadings liberally, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, and is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff was required to allege that Defendants knew about his desire or clearance for outdoor exercise, in construing the allegations liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff does claim that Defendants had the requisite knowledge. See FAC at 2, 6. Additionally, Defendants' argument that there can be no finding of deliberate indifference because the ASU Overflow did not have a secure exercise yard is unavailing. Although logistical problems may justify an occasional and brief deprivation, they do not constitute a sufficient excuse for a longer-term deprivation. See, e.g., Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088.
The Court accordingly concludes that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to meet the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim be DENIED.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants further contend that they are entitled to dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) based on their qualified immunity. The entitlement to qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). "[Q]ualified immunity operates `to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.'" Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (1991)). The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
1. Step One — Constitutional Violation
The threshold question in a qualified immunity analysis is whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that because qualified immunity is "`an entitlement not to stand trial' . . . courts, not juries, [must] settle the ultimate questions of qualified immunity") (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).
As discussed above, the Court has found, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has adequately alleged an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for denying him any outdoor exercise for a period of 7-1/2 weeks. Accordingly, because Plaintiff's allegations survive the first prong of qualified immunity analysis, the Court must turn to the next inquiry.
2. Step Two — Clearly Established Law
If a constitutional violation could be made out on a favorable view of Plaintiff's allegations, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. "If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful," a finding of qualified immunity is appropriate, as "qualified immunity protects `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law'." Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
In this particular case, Plaintiff alleges denial of any outdoor exercise for 7-1/2 weeks as a result of Defendants' conduct. Defendants argue that there is no clearly established right to outdoor exercise under the specific facts of this case. Defs.' Mem. at 10. Specifically, Defendants contend that cases such as Allen, 48 F.3d 1082, and Lopez, 203 F.3d 1122, do not provide the requisite clearly established right to outdoor exercise because neither involved the situation at hand here,i.e., overcrowding in a regular segregated housing unit, the absence of a secure exercise area in the overflow housing unit, the absence of factual allegations showing that Plaintiff requested exercise of Defendants, and the absence of factual allegations showing that Defendants had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's classification for outdoor exercise. Defs.' Mem. at 10.
Under Saucier, it is not required that "courts must have agreed upon the precise formulation of the standard." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Rather, so long as various courts have found that certain conduct is a constitutional violation "under facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the case at hand," an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.Id. at 202-03. See also Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 ("This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful . . . but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent " (citations omitted)). It is also recognized that officers may make reasonable mistakes as to the legal restraints on particular conduct. "If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
The critical inquiry here is whether reasonable officers in Defendants' positions would have believed that depriving Plaintiff of outdoor exercise for 7-1/2 weeks while he was in the ASU and/or ASU Overflow, which did not have a secure exercise yard, was constitutionally permissible. Stated differently, the Court must determine whether Defendants were on "fair warning" that their alleged treatment of Plaintiff was unconstitutional.See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The Court finds that it was clearly established in 2002, when the deprivation allegedly occurred, that the denial of outdoor exercise for prison inmates for an extended period of time was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Spain, 600 F.2d at 199; Keenan, 83 F.2d at 1089-90;Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088. Although these cases do not involve precisely the same facts as those present here, they provided Defendants with fair warning concerning their conduct. "[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The Court concludes that, notwithstanding the prison's regulations, any reasonable official in Defendants' positions would have understood that the denial of outdoor exercise for an extended period of time, even due to logistical difficulties, was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on qualified immunity grounds be DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court recommends that the District Judge issue an Order:
1. DENYING Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim; and
2. DENYING Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.
This report and recommendation will be submitted to the Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) (1). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before February 14, 2006. The document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on or before February 28, 2006. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.