Johnson v. Fowler Electric Co.

15 Citing cases

  1. Shetter v. Davis Bros

    163 Ga. App. 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 14 times
    In Shetter, the contractor held itself out as an expert not only in the construction of swimming pools but also in their design, and we held that " [u]nder those circumstances, we are not willing to hold that [the contractor] can, as a matter of law, escape liability when the evidence could authorize a conclusion that the design was defective and that [the contractor] should have known that the design would result in a pool dangerous to its users."

    There are conflicts in the evidence as to whether the design of the pool is defective. Our view of the evidence is that there is a question of fact as to whether the pool, as constructed by appellee, is inherently or intrinsically dangerous. If it is, appellee is not insulated from liability by the fact that the pool was accepted and approved by the owner. Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319 (2) ( 277 S.E.2d 312). Given the conflicts in expert opinion concerning the question of whether the pool design is defective, there is also a question of fact as to whether the defect, if it exists, is "readily observable on reasonable inspection." Id.

  2. Hollis Spann v. Hopkins

    301 Ga. App. 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    "[I]t is too plain to be debated that if an action is negligent, approval of that negligence by another party or even a government agency, or rather of the conditions creating the negligence, does not as a matter of law excuse the negligence." Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 323 (2) ( 277 SE2d 312) (1981). See also Bragg, 285 Ga. at 100 (if the contractor had been negligent in the performance of the requested work to the extent that an exception to the acceptance doctrine applied, the contractor could still face liability regardless of whether or not the property owner accepted its work).

  3. Jessop v. Carmichael Management, Inc.

    614 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 1 times

    Id. at 337-338 (2).Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319 (1) ( 277 SE2d 312) (1981) (directed verdict affirmed where no evidence that apartment complex owner had any notice of defective electrical wiring). A landlord has no duty to inspect premises while a tenant is in possession, and if the premises fall into disrepair it is the tenant's duty to notify the landlord.

  4. Sinclair Disposal Service, Inc. v. Ochoa

    265 Ga. App. 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 6 times

    See Lusk, supra. See also Carlo v. Americana Healthcare Corp., 179 Ga. App. 678, 680(1) ( 347 S.E.2d 282) (1986) (fact that defendant complied with applicable governmental rules and regulations "would not relieve it of liability if it has been in fact negligent") (punctuation omitted); Johnson v. Fowler Electric Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 323(2) ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981) ("[I]t is too plain to be debated that if an action is negligent, approval of that negligence by another party or even a government agency, or rather of the conditions creating the negligence, does not as a matter of law excuse the negligence."). Compliance with governmental rules and regulations may, however, be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant exercised ordinary care.

  5. Villareal v. TGM Eagle's Pointe, Inc.

    249 Ga. App. 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times

    As this Court has recognized, See Dyer v. Wight, 163 Ga. App. 63, 64 ( 293 S.E.2d 723) (1982) (where tenant never informed landlord of any needed repairs, landlord had no duty to inspect apartment); see alsoJohnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 319-320 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981). Cf. Tribble, supra (notice of defects in one area of porch does not provide notice of defects in another area of porch).

  6. Bell South v. Widner

    229 Ga. App. 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 9 times
    In Bell South Telecommunications v. Widner, 229 Ga. App. 634, 637 (495 S.E.2d 52) (1997), we reversed the trial court's denial of Bell South's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case with the direction that summary judgment be entered in Bell South's favor.

    See Williams v. Ga. Dep. of Corrections, 224 Ga. App. 571, 573-576 ( 481 S.E.2d 272) (1997); see also OCGA § 50-21-22 (7). As to construction work that is inherently dangerous, see Powell v. Ledbetter Brothers, Inc., supra at 651-652; see also David Allen Co. v. Benton, supra at 558; Carney v. JDN Constr. Co., 206 Ga. App. 785, 786 (1) ( 426 S.E.2d 611) (1992); Samuelson v. Lord, Aeck c., 205 Ga. App. 568, 571 ( 423 S.E.2d 268) (1992); Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 320-321 (2) ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981); Wilner's, Inc. v. Fine, 153 Ga. App. 591, 592-593 (1) ( 266 S.E.2d 278) (1980); PPG Indus. v. Genson, 135 Ga. App. 248, 250-251 (2) ( 217 S.E.2d 479) (1974); Peachtree North Apts. Co. v. Huffman-Wolfe Co., 126 Ga. App. 594 ( 191 S.E.2d 485) (1972); Queen v. Craven, 95 Ga. App. 178, 183-184 (3) ( 97 S.E.2d 523) (1957). (b) Contract granting control and supervision of the work.

  7. Groves v. City of Atlanta

    444 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 8 times
    In Groves, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a contractor who cleared certain lots owned by several individuals.

    There, the contractor cleared privately owned land, and a question of fact existed whether the contractor had knowledge that the land needed no clearing. Id. at 630 (1), 631 (3). Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 323-324 ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981), cited by appellants, did not involve a public works project. Instead, it involved approval by government inspectors of privately contracted electrical work that was negligently performed but resulted in defects not visible or apparent upon inspection.

  8. Harris v. Sloan

    405 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 14 times

    There being no evidence from which the jury could find that appellee had any notice of a defective furnace, summary judgment was appropriate. See Johnson v. Fowler Electric Co., 157 Ga. App. 319 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981); Dempsey v. Smith, 108 Ga. App. 88, 89 ( 132 S.E.2d 233) (1963). As support for their claim of a breach of warranty, appellants cite the case of Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126 ( 377 S.E.2d 660) (1989).

  9. C. W. Matthews Contracting Company, Inc. v. Marasco

    361 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 13 times

    Contrary to appellees' argument, their expert's testimony that in his opinion the sign should have been placed elsewhere is not an opinion that the placement was "inherently dangerous." Shetter v. Davis Bros., 163 Ga. App. 230 ( 293 S.E.2d 397) (1982) and Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319 ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981), relied on by appellees, are distinguishable. In Shetter, the contractor held itself out as an expert not only in the construction of swimming pools but also in their design, and we held that " [u]nder those circumstances, we are not willing to hold that [the contractor] can, as a matter of law, escape liability when the evidence could authorize a conclusion that the design was defective and that [the contractor] should have known that the design would result in a pool dangerous to its users."

  10. Carlo v. Americana Healthcare Corp.

    347 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 6 times

    " Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Bernstein, 113 Ga. 175, 179 (4) ( 38 S.E. 394) (1901). See also Johnson v. Fowler Elec. Co., 157 Ga. App. 319, 323-324 ( 277 S.E.2d 312) (1981). With regard to this question of where doors may swing outward rather than which doors must do so, the regulations themselves generally provide that "[a]ll buildings and equipment shall be maintained in such condition that no hazards to the life and safety of the patients exist."