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Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.

Civil Action No. 7:12cv00507 (W.D. Va. Jul. 12, 2013)
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Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.

3 Citing cases

  1. Mayo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13cv163 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2015)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that defects in letter did not bar foreclosure where “[t]he variance between the language of the Deed of Trust and the acceleration letters was not substantial and did not alter the borrower's rights”

    10. A deficient acceleration notice "may constitute a material breach." Johnson v. Fed. Home. Loan Mortg. Corp., 2013 WL 3663058 (W.D. Va. July 11, 2013). However, "immaterial differences in language will not nullify a substantially conforming notice of acceleration."

  2. Stansbury v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.

    Civil Action No. 7:16-cv-00516 (W.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2017)   Cited 5 times
    Dismissing a claim for breach of the covenant where the defendants merely exercised their contractual rights

    A deed of trust is a contract, which, like any other contract, is construed according to ordinary contract interpretation principles. Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 7:12-cv-507, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97713, at *8-9 (W.D. Va. July 11, 2013); Matthews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 724 S.E.2d 196, at *200-01 (Va. 2012). "Under Virginia law, a viable breach of contract claim has three elements: '(1) a legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant's violation or breach of that obligation; and (3) injury or damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach of obligation.'"

  3. Gordon v. First Franklin Fin. Corp.

    15-CV-0775 (SJF)(AKT) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016)   Cited 16 times
    Finding that Rooker-Feldman barred claims "seeking . . . to quiet title to the subject premises by 'expunging' and 'erasing entirely forever' defendants' purported interest therein" (alterations omitted)

    Thus, the mortgage insurance insured the lender, i.e., FFFC, and its successors, against "certain losses," not plaintiff. See, e.g. Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 7:12-cv-00507, 2013 WL 3663058, at * 4 (W.D. Va. July 12, 2013) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim seeking to set aside a foreclosure based upon, inter alia, the lender's refusal to resort to her mortgage insurance in lieu of foreclosure as "specious," at best, because "the mortgage insurance policy insured the lender, not the plaintiff-borrower); In re St. James, No. 13-00138, 2014 WL 879642, at * (D. Haw. Mar. 5, 2014) (rejecting the debtor's argument that the mortgage note was satisfied by a payment from a mortgage insurer on the grounds, inter alia, that he had "not proven that such payment would give [him] a defense[]" since "the mortgage interest protected the lender, not the borrower.") Accordingly, the branch of FFFC's motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff's claims relating to the issue of mortgage insurance pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is granted and plaintiff's claims relating to the issue of mortgage insurance are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.