Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3325
January 29, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 18) filed by defendants the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Paul K. Moore ("Moore"), and Liz Phillips ("Phillips"), and the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 20) filed by
defendants Chuck Watts ("Watts") and Willie Graves, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, Louisiana ("Graves"). Plaintiff Louvenia Johnson ("Johnson") opposes defendants' motions (Rec. Doc. 23) The motions were set for hearing on the briefs on December 18, 2002. Now, having considered the record, the memoranda, and the applicable law, the Court finds that defendants' motions should be granted for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
In October of 2000, Johnson was employed at the Hammond Development Center ("HDC") as a Resident Training Specialist. On or about October 11, 2000, Moore, the Administrator of HDC, ordered Johnson to participate in an investigation with Richard Easley, investigator for the Louisiana Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Medical Fraud Control Unit ("Easley"). On or about October 13, 2000, Johnson met with Easley and alleges that during this meeting Easley was abusive and demanded that she confess to abusing a patient. The following week, Johnson's duties were changed to those of a helper in the kitchen.
After an investigation, Easley determined that Johnson, in her capacity as an employee of the HDC, had been cruel to an infirm patient in contravention of La. R.S. 14:93.3. Easley swore out an arrest warrant via affidavit through the 21st Judicial District Court of Livingston Parish. On November 2, 2000, the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Department issued a facially valid arrest warrant for the arrest of Johnson for violation of La. R.S. 14:93.3. On that day, Johnson was ordered to appear in the office of Phillips, an investigator employed by HDC. Upon her arrival at the office, Watts, as a detective for the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Department, assisted Easley in arresting Johnson and transporting her to the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Department. Johnson was processed into the Livington Parish jail system and incarcerated from November 2, 2000 until November 9, 2000, when she posted bond. Johnson alleges that she was placed in solitary confinement in unsanitary conditions and was subjected to psychological abuse. On December 27, 2000, Johnson was informed that the charges against her had been dropped by the District Attorney's Office for the 21st Judicial District Court.
Johnson has filed a complaint alleging various violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 against the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Moore, and Phillips. These three defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil procedure 12(b)(6). The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals asserts that as a state entity it is immune from Johnson's claims based on the Eleventh Amendment; Moore and Phillips assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity from all of Johnson's claims.
Johnson's complaint alleges Fourth and Eighth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 against Watts and Graves. Watts and Graves have filed a Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity asserting that as police officers taking action in their official capacities, they committed no violations of Johnson's clearly established constitutional rights.
At the request of the defendants, Johnson was ordered by the Court to file a more definitive statement setting forth more particular facts in support of the claims asserted in her complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court must accept the facts of the complaint as true and resolve all ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). The complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears "beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 284-85 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957)). It is also stated in Fernandez-Montes that "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Id. at 284.
When a plaintiff sues a public official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the defense of qualified immunity is raised, there is a heightened pleading standard for the plaintiff. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). Schultea sets forth this two-fold heightened requirement as follows:
First, the district court must insist that a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 file a short and plain statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone. Second, the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity. Vindicating the immunity doctrine will ordinarily require such a reply, and a district court's discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist.Id. at 1433-34. When a plaintiff is suing a public official under § 1983 and the defense of qualified immunity is raised, the court may likely require more definitive facts; however, a statement pursuant to 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure is not necessarily required. See id. at 1433. In the instant case, Johnson was ordered to file a more definitive statement of the facts; therefore, there is no need for Johnson to file a statement under rule 7(a).
Rule 7(a) states:
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
DISCUSSION I. The Louisiana Department of Health And Hospitals Is Entitled To Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Johnson's Lawsuit
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, a state is immune from private suits brought by its own citizens or citizens of another state unless the state consents. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (1974) ; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999). Eleventh Amendment immunity is also extended to state agencies and departments. See Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1986). In Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources is an alter ego of the state of Louisiana, and accordingly, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources is currently known as the Department of Health and Hospitals.See La. R.S. 36:259. Accordingly, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals is an alter ego of the state and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
It is also stated in Voisin's that "[c]laims under federal statutes do not override the Eleventh Amendment bar unless there is a clear showing of congressional intent to abrogate the bar. Section 1983 does not override the Eleventh Amendment bar." 799 F.2d at 185-86. Further, the court in Anderson v. Phelps, 655 F. Supp. 560, 564 (M.D. La. 1985) stated that "Louisiana has not consented to [being] sued in federal court and there has been no Congressional lifting of sovereign immunity as to civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981-1985."
For these reasons, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Johnson's lawsuit. As such, Johnson's claims asserted against the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals must be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Moore, Philips, Watts, And Graves Are Entitled To Qualified Immunity From Johnson's Lawsuit
A. The Law On Qualified Immunity
Generally, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct clearly violates established statutory or constitutional rights of the plaintiff judged by a reasonableness standard. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). As a threshold inquiry, the Court must determine if the allegations of the complaint clearly establish a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513 (2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001)). Questions of immunity should be settled by the Court at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, and the Court must determine whether defendants acted reasonably under the circumstances and under the most current settled law. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37 (1991).
In deciding whether qualified immunity should apply to a defendant, the Court must determine: (1) whether Johnson alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and (2) whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of defendants was objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law. Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1998).
Johnson has failed to establish that the conduct of Moore, Phillips, Watts, and Graves was objectively unreasonable in the light of clearly established law.
1. Moore And Phillips Are Not Vicariously Liable For The Alleged Acts of Easley
Johnson claims that her constitutional rights were violated by Moore and Phillips due to their alleged failure to properly supervise her interrogation and arrest. The law on vicarious liability of supervisors for violations of a defendant's constitutional rights caused by subordinates is stated succinctly as follows:
Supervisory officers, like the defendant officials, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates . . . on any theory of vicarious liability. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978) ; Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Only the direct acts or omissions of government officials, not the acts of subordinates, will give rise to individual liability under § 1983. See Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997). The officials, however, may be liable when enforcement of a policy or practice results in a deprivation of federally protected rights. See Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1998).Alton v. Texas AM Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit has adopted the "deliberate indifference" standard to determine if a supervisor should be held liable for the conduct of a subordinate:
(1) the defendant learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate . . . behavior by a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate was [violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights]; and (2) the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff] by failing to take action that was obviously necessary to prevent or stop the [conduct]; and (3) such failure caused a constitutional injury to the [plaintiff]Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994); See also Alton, 168 F.3d at 200. The alleged facts do not indicate that Moore and Phillips had actual knowledge or demonstrated deliberate indifference to any violations of Johnson's constitutional rights. Further, the alleged facts do not indicate that any failure of Moore or Phillips caused a violation of Johnson's rights. Moore and Phillips had no direct involvement in the interrogation, arrest, or incarceration of Johnson. Johnson fails to allege that Moore or Phillips committed any acts that were causally connected to any violation of her constitutional rights. Accordingly, Moore and Phillips are not vicariously liable for any violations of Johnson's constitutional rights occurring in the course of her interrogation, arrest, or incarceration.
Further, the Court in Shultea stated that "[t]o succeed with a claim based on substantive due process in the public employment context, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he had a clearly-established property interest in his employment." Shultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1994). Johnson has failed to clearly establish a property interest in her position as Resident Training Specialist, and, therefore, she cannot prevail on a substantive due process claim. Therefore, Moore and Philips are entitled to qualified immunity and all claims asserted by Johnson against them should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Watts And Graves Arrested Johnson Pursuant To A Facially Valid Arrest Warrant
Johnson claims that her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated by Watts and Graves when she was arrested and incarcerated. Watts and Graves respond by contending that they acted pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant issued by the 21st judicial District Court. In Simons v. Clemons, the court held that because the "plaintiff was arrested on a facially valid warrant . . . she has . . . alleged no deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." 752 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979) where the Court dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on an arrest that was pursuant to a facially valid warrant wherein the plaintiff was erroneously identified as the person charged with the crime). Since Johnson was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, she was not deprived of any constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment because probable cause was determined to have existed. Simmons, 752 F.2d at 1055. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the United States Supreme Court clearly addressed the standard for arrest, detention, and probable cause as follows:
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-295 (1973) ; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448 (1806). The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949). This standard . . . represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime . . . .
[The] standard [for] probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime . . . traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof420 U.S. 103, 116, 120 (1975). Accordingly, as evidenced by the warrant issued by the 21st Judicial District Court, probable cause existed at the time of Johnson's arrest, and she is barred from claiming a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment.
Johnson also asserts that Watts and Graves violated her constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment when she was allegedly subjected to solitary confinement and psychological abuse in unsanitary quarters. Watts and Graves assert that they are not the officials responsible for the alleged conditions of the jail. Further, the standard for cruel and unusual punishment in the context of treatment of prisoners is stringent and was recently described as follows:
Note that Graves, as Sheriff of Livingston Parish, is not liable for actions of those officials who qualify as subordinates unless the "deliberate indifference standard" is satisfied. See Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1387-88 (1997) (declining to hold the governing body liable for the conduct of a prison officer through respondeat superior or vicariously liability).
An inmate must satisfy two requirements to demonstrate that a prison official has violated the Eighth Amendment. "First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious'; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Thus, plaintiff must show deliberate indifference to his "serious medical needs" to satisfy this prong. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993). Further, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A prison official cannot be held liable "unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. If the court finds that one of the components of the test is not met, it need not address the other component.Orwig v. Galvin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6219, at *22-23 (Feb. 25, 2002) (adopted, Orwig v. Galvin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5811 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2002)). Johnson does not sufficiently plead that Watts and Graves were the officials responsible for the conditions of her confinement, nor does she sufficiently plead that this stringent standard for an Eighth Amendment violation in the context of incarceration has been satisfied. Accordingly, Graves and Watts are entitled to qualified immunity because Johnson has failed to establish that their conduct clearly violated her constitutional rights and was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Johnson's claims asserted against them must be dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
As an alter ego of the State of Louisiana, the Department of Health and Hospitals is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Moore, Phillips, Watts, and Graves are entitled to qualified immunity because the facts alleged by Johnson fail to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Thus, under Rule 12(b)(6), Johnson can prove no set of facts in support of her claims which would entitle her to relief. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Rec. Docs. 18 and 20) should be and are hereby GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of plaintiff's claims asserted against the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Paul K. Moore, Liz Phillips, Chuck Watts, and Willie Graves are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.