Opinion
C. A. 5:23-1970-SAL-KDW
06-17-2024
Clinton D. Johnson, Jr., #HC12311948319, a/k/a Clinton D. Johnson, Jr., #SC007900097, a/k/a Clinton Douglas Johnson, Jr., a/k/a Kayzon Ru, Plaintiff, v. Kim “Rutz” Dubose; Jeremy Chapman; and Oconee County Detention Center, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action against Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.On February 26, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 61. Plaintiff filed a Response on April 4, 2024. ECF No. 65. Defendants replied on April 5, 2024, and Plaintiff filed a Sur Reply on May 22, 2024. ECF Nos. 66 and 67.This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. Because this Motion is dispositive, a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) is entered for the court's review.
In filling out his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did not check the box signifying he was a pretrial detainee. Instead, he checked the “other” box and wrote he has been “sentenced/found N.G.R.I.” ECF No. 24 at 7. Plaintiff does not provide any explanation as to this acronym. In any event, because Plaintiff indicates he has been sentenced, the undersigned will not analyze these claims under the pretrial detainee standard.
Under Local Rule 7.07, a reply to a motion is allowed, although discouraged. The Local Rules do not provide for sur-replies. A party may seek permission from the court to file an additional response or “sur-reply.” Perez v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, No. 3:17-CV-3187-JFA, 2018 WL 2455093, at *4 n.10 (D.S.C. June 1, 2018). Plaintiff did not seek permission to file a sur-reply in this case; however, the undersigned, in her discretion, may consider any additional arguments made that address any novel arguments made in Defendants' Reply.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
While Plaintiff originally filed this action on May 11, 2023, ECF No. 1, Plaintiff's operative pleading is the Amended Complaint filed on June 16, 2023. ECF No. 24. During the timeframe related to the incidents described in Plaintiff's pleadings, he was incarcerated at the Oconee County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that eating peanut butter is or was against his religion. ECF No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff also alleges he is allergic to peanut butter. ECF No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff alleges he was served bag meals containing two peanut butter sandwiches repeatedly, despite telling officers that eating peanut butter was against his religion due to an active ingredient contained within peanut butter. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Allison Mosher, C. Henry, Matthew Gunner, and Felipe Jones knew that this was Plaintiff's religious preference. Id. Plaintiff alleges he explicitly explained his religious preferences to Defendant Chapman. Id. Plaintiff alleges an individual named Matthew Gunner Hewell falsely reported and entrapped Plaintiff, fed him peanut butter sandwiches, stopped up Plaintiff's toilets, and falsely reported that Plaintiff threw bodily fluids on him. Id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this false report, he was disciplined. Id.
These individuals are not named as parties to this lawsuit.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kim “Rutz” Dubose would not answer his requests and grievances and was negligent in her duties overseeing the kitchen with respect to providing him a religious diet. ECF No. 24 at 5. He further alleges Defendant Rutz was discriminatory toward Plaintiff by allowing staff to issue disciplinary measures based on their prejudiced opinions. ECF No. 24 at 5. He further alleges “under her charge under color of law,” other deputies are liable under “respondeat superior” for being deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health and safety. ECF No. 24 at 5. Plaintiff alleges he has a peanut butter allergy and alleges he was served peanut butter for 79 days. Id.
Defendants state that this Defendant's current legal name is Kim Rutz. The court will therefore refer to this Defendant as Defendant Rutz.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Jeremy Chapman who is the “respondeat superior Captain” over the staff, allowed false charges and statements without due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to be informed of charges related to his alleged numerous lockdowns. ECF No. 24 at 5. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Chapman was aware of Plaintiff's religious needs. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Chapman deleted his kiosk requests. Id.
Plaintiff names the Oconee County Detention Center (the “OCDC”) as a Defendant because he alleges as an organization, it caused hurt and harm to Plaintiff due to his peanut butter allergy. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was served two sandwiches for all three meals several times by officers employed by the OCDC. Id. Plaintiff believes he was wrongly and maliciously disciplined in that these meals do not comply with “USDA and South Carolina Food Service regulations.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants were negligent and acted maliciously to cause him harm. ECF No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff's alleged injuries include a fracture to his neck, a back injury, a sprained and fractured ankle and knee, fractured vertebrae and a dislocated shoulder, but because no medical release form was signed, Defendant OCDC refused to provide him medical treatment. ECF No. 24 at 9. Plaintiff alleges he filed over 100 sheets of paper form grievances, and he filed grievances electronically. ECF No. 24 at 11.
Defendants refute Plaintiff's allegations and have provided the affidavit testimony of Defendant Kim Rutz, a sergeant at the OCDC; Defendant Jeremy Chapman, director of the OCDC; and Shadae Cobb, a lieutenant at the OCDC. See ECF Nos. 61-2; 61-3; 61-4.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
III. Analysis
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment as to any claims brought against them in their official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their individual and official capacity. See ECF No. 24 at 2-3. In his Response, Plaintiff argues that “[d]efendants are being sued in their personal capacity and not their official capacity.” Pl.'s Br. at 1, ECF No. 65. Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff brings any of these claims against Defendants in their official capacity, the undersigned agrees that the Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to any of Plaintiff's claims brought against them in their official capacity pursuant to § 1983.
Relatedly, Defendants argue that they are not “persons” under § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. 58 at 71. It is well-settled law that detention centers and medical facilities cannot be sued under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating “[t]he medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at * 1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (“Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to establish that Defendant Detention Center, as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”). Thus, OCDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Therefore, the undersigned recommends dismissing any claims brought against the OCDC, as it is not subject to suit under § 1983.
Plaintiff alleges that the OCDC intentionally caused hurt and harm to him by way of inducing allergic reactions from serving him peanut butter. ECF No. 24 at 5. Aside from the fact that the OCDC is not amenable to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff does not allege that OCDC staff were aware that he had an allergy, and indeed, argues at times that he could not eat peanut butter for religious reasons. Moreover, as will be discussed in this R&R, the only evidence before the court establishes that Plaintiff ate peanut butter without incident. See Affidavit of Shadae Cobb, attached as an exhibit to Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 61-4.
2. Failure to State a Claim for Relief as to Defendant Jeremy Chapman
Defendants argue that as to Defendant Jeremy Chapman, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the pleading requirements enumerated in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that Plaintiff alleges Defendant Chapman is liable under a theory of “respondeat superior,” because he is “captain” over the staff. Defs.' Br. at 2-3, ECF No. 61-1; see also ECF No. 24 at 5. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 is to allow any named defendants to have “fair notice” of the claims and the grounds upon which they rest. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).
The undersigned agrees that any claims brought against Defendant Chapman based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior should be dismissed. Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Chapman was “personally made aware of” of Plaintiff's religious needs and that Plaintiff “explicitly” explained his religious preferences to Defendant Chapman. ECF No. 24 at 5; 8. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Chapman was in charge of the OCDC technology and computers and should be held responsible for grievance requests being deleted from the kiosk or changing dates on the grievances. ECF No. 24 at 5. Likewise, in Plaintiff's Response, he makes similar allegations and again alleges he explained his religious diet to Defendant Chapman. Pl.'s. Br. at 1, ECF No. 65. Because these allegations are not premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, these allegations will be addressed below.
3. § 1983 Claims - First Amendment/Free Exercise Claim
Defendants next argue they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim. Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his constitutional rights afforded under the First Amendment because they would not provide him a diet he requested based on his religious beliefs. Defendants have provided the affidavit testimony of Defendant Rutz to establish that there is no genuine issue of fact as to this claim. While Plaintiff was incarcerated at the OCDC, Plaintiff told Defendant Rutz that he was not able to eat peanut butter, as it violated his religious beliefs. See Affidavit of Kim Rutz, ¶ 2, attached as an exhibit to Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 61-2. Alternatively, Plaintiff complained to officers that he was allergic to peanut butter, however Defendant Rutz states Plaintiff ate peanut butter several times without detrimental effects. Rutz Aff., ¶ 2. Defendant Rutz explains that inmates may be placed on a special diet for either religious or medical reasons. Rutz Aff., ¶ 3. There are six menus available at OCDC: regular menu, vegetarian menu, kosher, heart healthy, bland diet, and soft foods. Rutz Aff., ¶ 3. Of those menus, inmates may be placed on either the vegetarian menu or the kosher menu for religious reasons. Rutz Aff., ¶ 3. In addition, inmates placed on suicide watch or facing disciplinary action may receive a bag meal consisting of two sandwiches (which sometimes included peanut butter), a cookie, and juice. Rutz Aff., ¶ 3.
Defendant Rutz states that she inquired as to what Plaintiff's religion was so she could research the matter. Rutz Aff., ¶ 4. She further explains that OCDC is unable to accommodate special diets compliant with multiple different religious groups due to the significant expense associated with such a policy; however, according to Defendant Rutz, OCDC was a pork-free facility as a means to provide neutral menus that would accommodate a variety of religious groups. Rutz Aff., ¶ 4. Initially, Plaintiff requested to be placed a vegetarian diet. Rutz Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Rutz also researched Plaintiff's stated religion, The Science of Amu Amuru. Rutz Aff., ¶ 5. After Defendant Rutz spent what she considered a significant amount of time researching this religion, she was only able to find one website which did not include any information about the stated tenets or beliefs or food restrictions but did contain a photograph of Plaintiff and identified him as the leader of the religion. Rutz Aff., ¶ 5. At Plaintiff's suggestion, Defendant Rutz also contacted the chaplain at the Horry County Detention Center to inquire about Plaintiff's religion during his placement there. Rutz Aff., ¶ 6. Defendant Rutz states that the chaplain informed her that, to his knowledge, The Science of Amu Amuru was not recognized by the South Carolina Department of Corrections or any other entity. Rutz Aff., ¶ 6. Nevertheless, Defendant Rutz placed Plaintiff on the vegetarian diet he requested. Rutz Aff., ¶ 7.
Despite conducting a Google search, the court has been unable to locate this website.
Once placed on the vegetarian diet, Plaintiff began complaining that he was receiving peanut butter, as well as food cooked in oil, which was not allowed by his religion. Rutz Aff., ¶ 7. Defendant Rutz contacted the OCDC's food services company, and the company confirmed that while food was cooked in butter, it was not cooked in oil. Rutz Aff., ¶ 7. Plaintiff then complained the food was heavily seasoned, though the food services company also indicated minimal seasoning was used. Rutz Aff., ¶ 7. When Plaintiff continued to complain about being served peanut butter, Defendant Rutz requested the kitchen staff provide Plaintiff with eggs instead of peanut butter. Rutz Aff., ¶ 8. On occasion, when Plaintiff would complain that he was still receiving peanut butter, Defendant Rutz would speak with the kitchen staff to confirm they were substituting eggs as the protein for Plaintiff. Rutz Aff., ¶ 8. Defendant Jeremy Chapman also provided an affidavit, indicating that he recalls Plaintiff's complaints that eating peanut butter violated his religious beliefs, or that he was allergic to peanut butter. Affidavit of Jeremy Chapman, ¶ 2, attached as an exhibit to Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 61-3. Defendant Chapman states he was not directly involved with food services, and these matters were handled by other staff members. Chapman Aff., ¶ 2. Defendant Chapman further explains that if he received an inmate request regarding food services, he would send that request to the appropriate staff member. Chapman Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Chapman also states that on one occasion, when Plaintiff threw bodily fluids on an officer, he was placed on administrative segregation, which resulted in Plaintiff receiving the bag lunch described by Defendant Rutz in her affidavit. Chapman Aff., ¶ 4.
Finally, Defendants provide the affidavit of Shadae Cobb, a lieutenant at the OCDC. She avers that while Plaintiff claimed he was allergic to peanut butter, he never suffered any detrimental effects from eating it. Affidavit of Shadae Cobb, ¶ 2, attached as an exhibit to Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 61-4. She further states that Plaintiff was informed that he could sign a consent form to be seen by medical personnel for the alleged peanut butter allergy, but he “refused to do so on multiple occasions.” Cobb Aff., ¶ 2. She recalls Plaintiff did sign a consent form one time, but he included so many qualifications and exceptions, that it was not accepted, and his peanut butter allergy has yet to be verified. Cobb Aff., ¶ 2.
As best the undersigned can tell, Plaintiff states the affidavits are “partially true and mostly false statements.” Pl.'s Br. at 2, ECF No. 65. However, Plaintiff does not outright disagree with any specific portion of the statements contained within the affidavits or provide any factual basis to refute that information. Instead, he generally alleges they are submitted in bad faith with an intent to mislead the court. Pl.'s Br. at 2, ECF No. 65. Plaintiff further states that Defendant Rutz should only need to speak with Plaintiff regarding his religious beliefs, as he is the founder of said religion. Id. Finally, Plaintiff concedes that Defendant Rutz “eventually changed Plaintiff's diet.” ECF No. 67 at 2.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes the adoption of laws designed to suppress religious beliefs or religious practices. Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 2014). Under the Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner has a clearly established right to a diet that is consistent with his religious beliefs. Id. On the other hand, free exercise restrictions that are “reasonably adapted to achieving a legitimate penological objective” are permissible. Id. at 499. The Fourth Circuit has explained that prison officials may restrict an inmate's religious practices subject to a “reasonableness” test that “accords substantial deference to the professional judgment of correctional officers.” Id. (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)).
In Turner v. Safley, the court fashioned a test to determine whether a prison regulation is reasonable and thus permissible in this context. Under Turner, the test is: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation or action and the interest asserted by the government, or whether this interest is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational”; (2) whether the “alternative means of exercising the right . . . remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what impact the desired accommodation would have on security staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation. 482 U.S. 78, 89-92 (1987).
However, as a preliminary matter, “prison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner's religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic. Wall, 741 F.3d at 499 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13 (2005)). The Fourth Circuit has held that a Plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) he holds a sincere religious belief; and (2) a prison practice or policy places a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion.” Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018). To establish this type of claim, a prisoner must show that a prison practice or regulation violates the rights afforded under the Free Exercise Clause prior to showing that the policy is not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Ali v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1990). The burden placed on one's ability to exercise his religion must be “more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief which is central to religious doctrine.” See Vance v. Wright, No. 1:16-cv-3431-BHH-SVH, 2016 WL 7637669, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2016), adopted at 2017 WL 26075 (D.S.C. Jan. 3. 2017). If this threshold showing is met, the court then considers the test under Turner.
Here, Plaintiff's allegation is that serving him peanut butter violated his religion. The only argument or allegation provided by Plaintiff that this action violated his First Amendment rights is that peanut butter has the “active ingredient” of rapeseed oil. ECF No. 24 at 8. However, outside of this allegation, Plaintiff has not met the threshold showing required to bring a Free Exercise claim. Plaintiff alleges he practices The Science of Amu Amuru, but he makes no allegation or provides any fact to explain the basic tenets of his religion. Further, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why ingesting peanut butter violates a sincerely held religious belief of The Science of Amu Amuru. Within his Response, Plaintiff alleges that the person to speak to about the diet and rituals of the religion is himself, as he is the founder, yet he does not provide any information regarding the diet or rituals themselves. The only other allegation Plaintiff provides is that he has a “Federal Electronic Identification Number (EIN) given to Plaintiff by the I.R.S.,” but that information provides no context regarding the sincerity of his religious beliefs. Even more problematic for Plaintiff is that he vacillates between alleging he has religious beliefs that encompass a restriction on peanut butter and his contention that he has an allergy to peanut butter. See Pl.'s Br. at 2.
In Defendant Rutz's affidavit, she also contends that Plaintiff complained about eating food cooked in oil; however, Plaintiff does not allege this to be an issue, nor does he delineate that ingesting oil conflicts with his religious beliefs.
To be sure, both Defendant Rutz and Ms. Cobb aver that Plaintiff has never shown any effects when he has ingested peanut butter, which by all accounts he admits to doing. See Rutz Aff., ¶ 2; Cobb Aff., ¶ 2; Pl.'s Br. at 2.
Plaintiff also fails to establish that a prison practice or policy placed a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. In his Response, Plaintiff does not deny that the OCDC had several different diet options, at least two of which were put in place to accommodate religious preferences. Nor does he refute the fact Defendant Rutz researched Plaintiff's stated religious beliefs and agreed to place him on a vegetarian diet. Further, Plaintiff does not refute the fact that when Defendant Rutz was informed that Plaintiff was served peanut butter, she confirmed with the kitchen staff that they needed to provide him eggs as a protein substitute. Thus, Plaintiff provides no factual support for the contention that there was a policy or practice in place that violated his religion. At best, the evidence before this court suggests that Plaintiff may have been served peanut butter by members of the kitchen staff in error.
Even were the undersigned to accept that Plaintiff could meet the threshold showing, Plaintiff's claim would still fail under the Turner test. First, there is a logical connection between the decision to provide mass-produced food items, such as peanut butter, to a large group of people, such as a prison population, for efficiency reasons. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that a prison has a legitimate interest in running a simplified food service). The affidavit testimony provided by Defendants reveals that peanut butter was a common source of protein to provide to inmates at meals, particularly when a incarcerated individual was in segregated housing for a behavior violation. Defendant Rutz provided Plaintiff a vegetarian diet and explained that the OCDC itself is a pork-free facility, in consideration of other religious diet preferences. Thus, this information supports a finding that the OCDC was mindful of religious diet restrictions. Second, it is difficult for this court to ascertain whether Plaintiff has an alternative means to exercise his religion because Plaintiff has not provided to the court any evidence to support the tenets of his belief, nor does he state what the tenets of his religion to be. Moreover, Plaintiff indicates in his Amended Complaint that officers who are not parties to this lawsuit told him he had to eat peanut butter “or starve.” ECF No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff does not allege or provide any evidence to suggest that the named Defendants were aware of these alleged comments.
As to the impact this has on the prison, Defendants explained that the OCDC does not have the resources to try and accommodate a variety of difference food choices and options based on each individual preference. Defendant Rutz explained that providing special diets for each inmates' individual precepts would impose a significant burden and expense on the detention center, increase the costs associated with feeding the inmate population, and may lead to the perception of favoritism among religious groups based on the offerings provided. Rutz Aff., ¶ 4. In Cooper v. Lanham, the Fourth Circuit, in an upublished opinion, considered the argument made by prison officials that providing an inmate with a kosher diet translated to significant cost and could violate that prison's directive to treat all religions equally, before deciding that, under Turner, this fact weighed in favor of the prison. 145 F.3d 1323 (1998). Finally, when Defendant Rutz was notified that Plaintiff was provided peanut butter, she contacted the kitchen staff to ensure that they provided him eggs as an alternative. Thus, aside from the fact that Plaintiff has not provided any information regarding his sincerely held belief against eating peanut butter, the evidence before the record establishes that while Plaintiff may have been served peanut butter, Defendant Rutz worked to provide him an alternative option when notified of this occurrence. For the reasons explained above, the undersigned finds that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's claim that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the First Amendment.
4. § 1983 Claims - Eighth Amendment/Deliberate Indifference
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. The undersigned has endeavored to glean what allegations Plaintiff asserts against these Defendants that establish an Eighth Amendment claim. However, federal courts are not required to read the mind of the plaintiff to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous or vague claims. Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. RDB-13-0478, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013).
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Rutz was deliberately indifferent in failing to answer his requests and grievances. ECF No. 24 at 5. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Chapman should be held responsible for Plaintiff's kiosk requests being deleted. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges Defendants “negligently” caused him malicious injury, which he describes as losing weight, suffering from hair loss, and being in mental duress caused by his grievances being ignored. ECF No. 24 at 8.However, the Constitution does not create an entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure established by a state. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, as to his complaints regarding his diet, Defendant Rutz provided evidence that she did work to try and resolve this issue for Plaintiff.
Defendants suggest that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”) to for failure to point to a physical injury he suffered due to the alleged action by Defendants. However, as noted above, Plaintiff does allege he suffered physical injuries. Further, Section 1997e(e) is a “limitation on recovery,” rather than a bar to filing suit. Carter v. Myers, No. 0:15-cv-2583-HMH-PMG, 2017 WL 3498878, at *5 (explaining that this Section does not preclude the recovery of nominal and punitive damages and noting that while the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue, a majority of other circuits have found it does not prevent an inmate from seeking nominal and punitive damages); see also Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2021).
As previously considered, Plaintiff further alleges he had a peanut butter allergy but was fed peanut butter during meals causing him to have an allergic reaction. ECF No. 24 at 5; 9. The government is obligated to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when two conditions are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) a prisoner must show prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Cartagena v. Lovell, No. 227279, 2024 WL 2490540, at *5 (4th Cir. May 24, 2024) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1970) and Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2016)). While Plaintiff alleges he suffered from a peanut butter allergy leading to an allergic reaction, his own Amended Complaint also alleges he did not want to eat peanut butter for religious reasons. The only evidence in the record, provided in the form of affidavits, establishes that Plaintiff ate peanut butter without any medical issues. Further, Ms. Cobb averred that Plaintiff did not sign a consent form to be seen by medical to determine whether he had an allergy. See Cobb. Aff, ¶ 2. Moreover, Plaintiff does not refute Defendant Rutz's claim that whatever the reason for Plaintiff's request to avoid eating peanut butter, she worked with the kitchen staff to provide him a substitute. Otherwise, Plaintiff has not brought forth any evidence to establish these individuals acted with any culpable state of mind to try and harm him by providing him peanut butter sandwiches.
Plaintiff also refers to a physical assault that occurred on January 4, 2021. ECF No. 24 at 7. He does not provide any additional information regarding this allegation. Plaintiff alleges he suffered a fractured neck, a misalignment to his back, a sprained and fractured ankle and knee, fractured vertebrae in his spine and a dislocated shoulder. ECF No. 24 at 9. One could surmise these alleged injuries were a result of the physical assault; however, liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). There is no indication by Plaintiff how these allegations are connected to any personal action or inaction on the part of the named Defendants. Nor does Plaintiff provide any factual support that he suffered from these injuries. Thus, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has not established that the named Defendants had any involvement with an alleged physical assault.
Likewise, Plaintiff alleges a Matthew Gunner Hewell placed “stool, boogers, fingernail shavings, etc. in food trays and served [to] Plaintiff.” ECF No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff further alleges Mr. Hewell stopped up Plaintiff's toilet for ten days, forced Plaintiff to remove his own stool in a backed-up toilet, and falsely reported that Plaintiff threw bodily fluids on him. ECF No. 24 at 8. Plaintiff attached an Oconee County Sheriff's Office Incident Report to his Amended Complaint which references an altercation with Officer Hewell on January 1, 2022. See ECF No. 24 at 6. Mr. Hewell is not a party to his action.
For the first time in his Response to Summary Judgment, Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of no recreation when he was locked away in a cell for over 179 days. See ECF No. 65 at 1.He also alleges for the first time that he was denied phone calls, soap, tissue, shampoo, and cleaning supplies for his cell and was not provided clean linens or given a mop or a broom.” Id. A plaintiff may not argue a new claim in response to a summary judgment motion. See White v. Roche Biomedical Labs, Inc., 807 F.Supp. 1212, 1216 (D.S.C. 1992) (noting that “a party is generally not permitted to raise a new claim in response to a motion for summary judgment.”). Thus, some of these claims are not properly before the court and cannot be raised for the first time in response to a motion for summary judgment. However, even if they were properly before the court, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment as to these claims. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Conditions that are restrictive and even harsh are part of the penalty criminal offenders pay for offenses against society. Id. at 347-49. The United States Supreme Court has held that prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide humane conditions of confinement: they must ensure adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. To state a viable conditions-of-confinement claim an inmate must show that: (1) the conditions were objectively serious enough to pose a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) that the prison official's state of mind was one of “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). First, the undersigned notes that these alleged conditions of confinement claims were not set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Second, Plaintiff does not provide any allegation that the named Defendants personally participated in any of these alleged violations or had knowledge of these alleged violations. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate as to these claims.
Plaintiff did allege he was in lockdown “over 179 days with no kiosk, phone, or visits,” but he does not allege this was a constitutional violation; instead, he alleges this was the reason he suffered from mental duress. ECF No. 24 at 8. Further, Plaintiff does not make any allegations regarding recreation time or being denied cleaning supplies or toiletries.
5. Due Process Violation
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege a violation of the Sixth Amendment and his right to due process, referring to a sham legal process of detention and punishment by lockdown. ECF No. 24 at 4. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rutz was “deliberately indifferent” to Plaintiff's health and safety and deliberately cruel “for warrant and false charges of throwing bodily fluids.” However, Plaintiff later alleges an unnamed officer brought the false charges against him and provided a Jail Incident Report that does not name Defendant Rutz but instead names Officer Hewell. See ECF No. 24 at 6. Thus, the record before this court provides the undersigned no facts or assertions as to how Defendant Rutz was involved in this incident. Plaintiff also vaguely asserts that Defendant Chapman “allowed false charges and statements, without due process of law and Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to be informed of charges in numerous lockdowns over one hundred and seventy-nine days.” ECF No. 24 at 5. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the undersigned has previously rejected such a claim. In Plaintiff's Sur Reply, he contends that the OCDC has a policy of “locking inmates down for a period of 60 days without a hearing” which Plaintiff believes to be unconstitutional because he was punished for a crime that was dismissed by the Solicitor's office. ECF No. 67 at 1. He also alleges he was not provided a disciplinary hearing. Id.
Prisoners are entitled to claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556. While an inmate's rights may be diminished by the needs of the institutional environment of the penal system, a prisoner is not “wholly stripped” of the protections afforded under the Constitution while incarcerated. Id. In order to state a due process violation has occurred, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest; and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Here, while Plaintiff alleges there was a policy of putting inmates in lockdown without a hearing, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence establishing this policy exists or provide the policy in question. The only evidence that Plaintiff was placed in any segregation period is within Defendant Chapman's affidavit. Within his affidavit, Defendant Chapman explains that Plaintiff was put in administrative segregation for acting aggressively when he arrived at the OCDC. Chapman Aff., ¶ 3. Defendant Chapman further explained that an inmate with a disciplinary issue while already in administrative segregation simply remains in segregation. Id. Defendant Chapman testified that Plaintiff was apparently involved in an incident where he was accused of throwing bodily fluids on an officer, but he did not receive a disciplinary charge for that. Id. This is the only information provided to the court regarding Plaintiff being placed in a lockdown status. Without more, the undersigned is unable to conduct an analysis regarding the alleged unconstitutional policy on the part of the OCDC. Further, as previously mentioned, any claims brought against the OCDC under § 1983 are not cognizable. Thus, the undersigned recommends dismissal of this claim.
6. Qualified Immunity
Finally, the Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit employs a split burden of proof for the qualified immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first prong, and the [officer] bears the burden on the second prong. Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233 (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation on the part any of the Defendants. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 61, and entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).