"We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005). However, "while an administrative decision is entitled to deference, we will not perfunctorily review and rubber stamp the agency's decision."

For that reason, this court has no authority to disturb them. Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005); see Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (discussing review of decisions of an administrative agency). Hickman's third issue is based on the fact that the hearing officer referred to "STG/Blood documents," not STG/Five Percent Nation documents.

"We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citation omitted). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests on the [party] challenging the administrative action."

"We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352, (App. Div. 2005) (citation omitted). Prison disciplinary hearings are not criminal prosecutions and an inmate is not entitled to the "full panoply of rights" as is a defendant in a criminal prosecution.

Div. 2010) (citation omitted), "[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80). Considering Woods's contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.

We have recognized that even the minimal due process safeguards applicable in prison disciplinary matters require greater specificity than provided here. Fisher, supra, 240 N.J. Super. at 160-61; see also Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 351-53 (App. Div. 2005). We observed in Fisher that a hearing officer's failure to adequately comply with N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.

Div. 2010), "[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80). In light of this standard of review, we discern no legal basis to overturn or interfere with the decision reached by the DOC.

However, "[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80). Moreover, we "should give considerable weight to a state agency's interpretation of a statutory scheme that the legislature has entrusted to the agency to administer."

However, "[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80). "[A] disciplinary hearing officer's adjudication that an inmate committed a prohibited act must be based on substantial evidence in the record."

However, "[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Johnson v. Dep't of Corr., 375 N.J. Super. 347, 352 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). We may not vacate an agency's determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result.