Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-1133
08-17-2022
ADA JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. WARDEN JOE DeMORE, Respondent.
MARILYN J. HORAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Petitioner, Ada Johnson, be dismissed without prejudice and Petitioner be granted leave to file an amended petition.
II. REPORT
Petitioner initiated this case through the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Petition was signed on July 28, 2022, not by Petitioner, but by Jonathan Smith, as “attorney or other authorized person.” (ECF No. 1). From a review of the public dockets on PACER, it appears that Petitioner has two active ongoing criminal actions in this Court: at Criminal Case No. 16-cr-0195, she is awaiting a supervised release hearing and at Criminal Case No. 22-cr-0046, she was recently indicted on a three-count indictment charging her with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, heroin, fentanyl, and fluorfentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, heroin, fentanyl, and fluorfentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and 1 possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). From the face of the Petition, it appears that Petitioner is currently confined at Butler County Prison and is asking this Court to release her on house arrest. The only ground listed in support of Petitioner's claim is that “My children need me home to supply steady housing and parenting. Release on house arrest.” Petition at p. 7.
Under Rule 4 of the rules governing habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court must promptly review a petition and dismiss it if it is plain from the face of the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 4. District courts have the discretion to apply this rule in habeas corpus cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 1.
The undersigned recommends dismissal of this case pre-service under Rule 4 because the Court simply cannot discern any basis for recommending that habeas corpus relief be granted from the petition. Absent any factual allegations, it is impossible for the Court to meaningfully review Petitioner's claim for habeas relief and it will be equally impossible for Respondent to prepare a meaningful response to the Petition. It is therefore recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice and Petitioner be granted leave to file an amended petition.
However, if Petitioner continues to seek pretrial release, she is advised that the law in this Circuit is clear that federal defendants who seek pretrial release should do so through the means authorized by the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, not through a separate § 2241 action. Reese v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2018). The presumptive means to challenge a federal conviction or sentence is the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under § 2255 in the district which imposed the sentence in question. See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. §2255(a). Because Petitioner has not yet 2 been sentenced, however, relief under § 2255 is not yet available, and she could only acquire habeas relief prior to the issuance of her sentence and any appeal by pursuing his claims as part of a habeas petition instead filed pursuant to § 2241. Although § 2241 has the capability of providing a jurisdictional basis for a challenge to confinement in violation of the Constitution prior to trial or a sentence, it does not follow that the habeas statute may be used as an end-run around criminal motion practice or appeal. See Reese, 904 F.3d at 246. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained,
[E]ven in cases where the habeas court has the authority to grant relief, it must consider “whether this be a case in which that power ought to be exercised.” [Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).]
...
Courts have consistently refused to exercise their habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought relief before standing trial. Instead, courts have long stressed that defendants should pursue the remedies available within the criminal action. See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedures should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 551 (1905) (vacating order granting habeas relief to federal pretrial detainees because there was “nothing in this record to disclose that there were any special circumstances which justified a departure from the regular course of judicial procedure” of pretrial motions and, if necessary, appeal); see also Medina v. Choate, 875 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting “the general rule that §2241 is not a proper avenue for relief for federal prisoners awaiting federal trial”).
Funneling requests for pretrial relief through the criminal action encourages an orderly, efficient resolution of the issues, maintains respect for the appellate process and prevents duplication of judicial work and judge-shopping See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 10 (1979) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal,” and that “[t]his rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be maintained”); see also Medina, 875 F.3d at 1029-29 (identifying similar interests.)
We relied on this rationale in Government of Virgin Islands v. Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), to affirm the District Court's denial of pretrial habeas petitions filed by federal defendants. We rejected the defendants' challenges to their arrest and interrogation on the ground that a pretrial motion in3
the criminal case, “rather than their petition for writs of habeas corpus, provides the appropriate avenue of relief before trial.” Id. at 1136. We similarly held that the defendants' claim that they had been denied a speedy trial should be resolved “on an appropriate pretrial motion.” Id. Accordingly, insofar as Reese sought to challenge the charges against him or the conduct of law-enforcement officers during arrest or interrogation, he was required to do so through pretrial motions in his criminal case, not via a pretrial §2241 petition. See id.
Section 2241 is likewise not the proper vehicle for Reese to challenge his detention pending trial. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§3141 - 3150, provides a comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release decisions. See generally, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-43 (1987)....Reese, 904 F.3d at 246-47.
Thus, it is clear that under the controlling law of this Circuit, a petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the wrong vehicle to challenge detention pending trial. Petitioner should seek pretrial relief through the filing of pretrial motions in her criminal cases. Reese, 904 F.3d at 245. As such, if Petitioner files an amended petition seeking pretrial release, it will be recommended that the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice and Petitioner be granted leave to file a proper petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner shall file an Amended Petition for writ of habeas corpus by September 17, 2022. Failure to file an amended petition will result in dismissal of this case without prejudice.
Petitioner is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Petitioner may file written objections to this Report and 4 Recommendation by September 6, 2022. Petitioner is cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error). 5