Opinion
CIVIL 3:23-cv-762
05-13-2024
ARMONI JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. BLUE SHIRT DAVIS, et al., Defendants.
Brann, Chief Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
This pro se prisoner case comes before the court for consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant Davis. (Doc. 20). Relying upon the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, that motion invites us to significantly cabin and confine the potentially recoverable damages in this inmate lawsuit.
With respect to this motion, the current factual and procedural background of this case is defined by the allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint, (Doc. 11), coupled with the court's prior ruling on the initial motion to dismiss filed in this matter which dismissed a number of claims and parties. (Doc. 17). Taken together, this complaint and these rulings reveal that at the time Armoni Johnson filed this complaint he was a state prisoner incarcerated at SCI Coal Township. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 1). At the correctional facility, Johnson had a job working the kitchen. (Id., ¶ 6). In February 2022, Johnson returned to this kitchen job after not working for a period of time to recover from COVID-19. (Id.) Johnson alleges that it was at this time that he was made aware of Defendant Davis fabricating a report to parole about Johnson. (Id.) In response, Johnson filed a grievance against Davis dated February 23, 2022. (Id.; Exhibit One). In the grievance Johnson asserted that on February 18, 2022, he discovered that Davis fabricated a report against him to parole on February 15, 2022. (Id.) The grievance also states that on February 16, 2022, Davis was harassing Johnson and Davis told Johnson “he got me.” (Id.) While this February 23, 2022, grievance was pending, Johnson alleges Davis threatened him which led him to file another grievance.
Johnson then alleged that on March 1, 2022, he went to work in the kitchen and was excused for the day. (Id., ¶ 9). When he was leaving the kitchen Johnson claims that Defendant Davis harassed and threatened him, but he ignored Davis and left the kitchen without incident. (Id., ¶ 10). Johnson was then prohibited from working from March 2, 2022, until March 8, 2022; (id., ¶ 11), and was given a misconduct report lodged by Davis on March 8, 2022. (Id.) Johnson alleges that Davis fabricated this report in retaliation for Johnson filing grievances several days earlier. (Id.)
Accordingly, following the district court's ruling on the initial motion to dismiss in this case, fairly construed, Johnson's sole remaining claim is a First Amendment retaliation claim lodged against a single defendant, Correctional Officer Davis. With his legal claim framed in this fashion, Johnson seeks compensatory damages, alleging that he lost prison income totaling $100 per month, “faced bad pictures painted to the parole board”, and experienced “emotional distress, mental anguish and irreparable harm and traumatization.” (Id., ¶ 29). Notably lacking from this prayer for relief is any averment of any physical injury suffered by Johnson as a result of this alleged constitutional infraction. Johnson's complaint also seeks punitive damages, asserting that Davis acted “willfully, deliberately, maliciously or with reckless disregard of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” (Id., ¶ 31).
Given the state of these pleadings, the instant motion challenges, at the inception of this litigation, Johnson's ability to recover either compensatory or punitive damages as a matter of law. (Doc. 20). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion be granted in part and denied in part as follows: The motion should be granted with respect to Johnson's prayer for compensatory damages, since the PLRA precludes such damages in favor of inmates on purely emotional damage claims like those set forth in the complaint. The motion should be denied, however, with respect to the plaintiff's request for punitive damages. While punitive damage claims are judged by exacting legal standards, such claims are often fact specific and cannot be conclusively resolved based solely upon the parties' pleadings.
II. Discussion
A. 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Davis has moved for a judgment on the pleadings regarding the scope of recoverable damages in this case. A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that of the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).” Brautigam v. Fraley, 684 F.Supp.2d 589, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Under Rule 12(b)(6) the court may dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S.__, 129 S.CT. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Should be Granted in Part and Denied in Part.
As we have noted, in his complaint Johnson seeks both compensatory and punitive damages from Defendant Davis. However, he advances these two prayers for relief against the backdrop of a complaint which alleges that he lost prison income totaling $100 per month, “faced bad pictures painted to the parole board,” and experienced “emotional distress, mental anguish and irreparable harm and traumatization,” but, significantly, contains no well-pleaded factual averment that Johnson suffered any physical injury as a result of this alleged constitutional infraction. (Id., ¶ 29).
Given the state of these pleadings, Defendant Davis invites us to find, as a matter of law, that Johnson is not entitled to recover compensatory or punitive damages in this prisoner litigation. In considering this question we do not write upon a blank slate. Quite the contrary, the ability of prisoner plaintiffs to sue for damages in federal court as a result of alleged constitutional infractions is defined by statute and case law. As such, the damages that a prisoner plaintiff like Johnson may recover are curbed and confined both by statute and by case law.
At the outset, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e Congress prescribes specific limitations regarding what types of prisoner civil rights claims are compensable, stating:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Thus, on its face this statutory text seems to bar damages claims by inmates, like Johnson, who simply allege that they suffered “emotional distress, mental anguish and irreparable harm and traumatization,” as a result of some constitutional infraction. Moreover, case law in this circuit interpreting the PLRA has also held that: “Under § 1997e(e), . . ., in order to bring a claim for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody, a prisoner must allege physical injury”. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, the Third Circuit has long “recognized that § 1997e(e) prohibits compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury absent allegations of physical injury.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2001). In short, it is well settled in this circuit that: “A prisoner may not bring a federal civil action for damages for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody absent a showing of physical injury.” Tate v. Wiggins, 805 Fed.Appx. 159, 163 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2020).
In this case, Johnson's prayer for relief broadly seeks damages because the plaintiff allegedly experienced “emotional distress, mental anguish and irreparable harm and traumatization,” but the complaint is devoid of any well-pleaded factual averment that Johnson suffered any physical injury as a result of this alleged constitutional infraction. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 29). To the extent that Johnson alleges a constitutional tort which caused emotional distress without any accompanying physical injury, under the PLRA, as construed in this circuit, that claim fails and should be dismissed.
We note that Johnson's compensatory damages claim also asserts that an income loss of prison income totaling $100 per month. Davis' motion does not directly address this prayer for relief, and our research reveals a paucity of case law regarding whether the PLRA forbids inmate wage loss claims, although at least one court has rejected the notion that the PLRA bars inmate wage recoveries, stating that:
Defendants have pointed to no authority holding that the PLRA bars compensatory damages where a prisoner alleges a monetary loss as a result of an alleged constitutional violation. The Court's independent search for the same has turned up empty. Accordingly, the Court declines Defendants' invitation to interpret the PLRA's limitation on damages as barring all claims for compensatory damages.Day v. Vaughn, 56 F.Supp.3d 1377, 1382-83 (S.D. Ga. 2014). Accordingly, in the absence of persuasive authority forbidding such claims, we believe that this inmate wage loss claim would survive a motion for judgment on this pleadings.
Yet, while Johnson's otherwise unadorned emotional distress claims are barred by the PLRA, this does not mean that he is totally foreclosed by the statute from seeking other categories of damages against Defendant Davis. Quite the contrary, it is well established that “§ 1997e(e) does not bar claims seeking nominal damages to vindicate constitutional rights, nor claims seeking punitive damages to deter or punish egregious violations of constitutional rights.” Doe, 257 F.3d at 314 n. 3; see e.g., Tate, 805 Fed.Appx. at 163 n. 3; Allah, 226 F.3d at 251.
Although the PLRA clearly does not bar inmate punitive damages claims, Defendant Davis nonetheless invites us to dismiss Johnson's claim for punitive damages, arguing that Johnson has not alleged well-pleaded facts which would support an award of punitive damages. On this score, it is clear that punitive damages are available in civil rights lawsuits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, but a plaintiff like Johnson must make an exacting showing in order to obtain such damages. Therefore, “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983).
To be sure, Johnson faces a high burden of proof in attempting to sustain any punitive damages claims. However:
[B]ecause the question of whether punitive damages are proper often turns on the defendants' state of mind, this question frequently cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone, but must await the development of a full factual record at trial. See generally In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 631 (3d Cir. 2015). Therefore, where a plaintiff's right to punitive damages may turn on the significance afforded to disputed factual questions, defendants are not entitled to a judgment in their favor on the plaintiff's punitive damages claims as a matter of law at the outset of this litigation. See Burke v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 647, 649 (M.D. Pa. 2009); Garden State Tire Realty Corp. v. R.K.R. Hess Assocs., Inc., 762 F.Supp. 92, 93 (M.D. Pa. 1990).Garanin v. City of Scranton, No. 3:19-CV-1275, 2019 WL 6875541, at *22 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2019).
So it is here. In this case, Johnson has alleged sufficient facts to allow this punitive damage claim to proceed forward in that he has averred that Defendant Davis engaged in a campaign of harassment against him that was premised upon a series of false statements. With our judgment limited at this stage to the pleadings, we find that the question of whether Johnson can sustain this individual capacity punitive damage claim clearly entails a consideration of disputed factual matters concerning Defendant Davis' conduct and motivation. Thus, these questions may not be answered based solely upon the pleadings through a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rather, resolution of these questions of malice and motivation require us to foray beyond the pleadings, something we may not do at this juncture. Instead, these questions must await another day. Therefore, the motion to dismiss this punitive damage claim should be denied without prejudice to renewal on a more complete factual record.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the Defendant Davis' motion for judgment on the pleadings, (Doc. 20), be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: The motion should be granted with respect to Johnson's prayer for compensatory damages based upon emotional distress in the absence of any physical injury, since the PLRA precludes such damages in favor of inmates on purely emotional damage claims like those set forth in the complaint.
The motion should be denied, however, with respect to the plaintiff's request for punitive damages without prejudice to renewal on a more complete factual record.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 13th day of May 2024.