As the Connecticut Supreme Court has observed, the underlying purpose of § 18-98d(a)(1) "is to give recognition to the period of presentence time served and to permit the prisoner, in effect, to commence serving his sentence from the time he was compelled to remain in custody . . . because of the court's refusal to allow bail or the defendant's inability to raise bail." Holmquist v. Manson, 168 Conn. 389, 393-94, 362 A.2d 971, 974 (1975) (emphasis added); accord Johnson v. Comm'r of Corr., 80 Conn. App. 574, 580, 836 A.2d 453, 457 (2003) ("Presentence confinement credit should reduce the number of days of sentenced confinement so as to permit the detainee, in effect, to commence his sentence from the time he was compelled to remain in custody. "). Thus, it appears that, once it credits a defendant with pre-conviction detention, Connecticut treats that time exactly as if it had been served after the entry of judgment.
Hence, they cannot be counted a second time to accelerate the discharge date of any subsequent sentence without violating the language of § 18-98d (a) (1) (A). See Mirault v. Commissioner of Correction, 82 Conn. App. 520, 523, 844 A.2d 961 (2004) (presentence confinement days credited to reduce term of confinement under one information cannot be credited again to reduce term of confinement under another information); see also King v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 580, 587, 836 A.2d 466 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 919, 841 A.2d 1191 (2004); Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 574, 579-80, 836 A.2d 453 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1191 (2004); Torrice v. Commissioner of Correction, 46 Conn. Sup. 77, 82, 738 A.2d 1164 (1997) (presentence confinement credit fully utilized on date first sentence is imposed), aff'd, 55 Conn. App. 1, 739 A.2d 270 (1999). The respondent contends that his construction of § 18-98d is consistent with the intent of the legislature in enacting that statute as noted by this court in Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 440-42 n. 4, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981).
Decided February 11, 2004 The petitioner Robert Johnson's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 80 Conn. App. 574 (AC 22990), is denied. Kalisha R. Raphael, deputy assistant public defender, and Temmy Ann Pieszak, chief of habeas corpus services, in support of the petition.
See Thorpe v. Commissioner of Correction, 73 Conn. App. 773, 776-77, 809 A.2d 1126 (2002). Our resolution of that issue is controlled by our decision in King v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 580, 836 A.2d 466 (2003); see also Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 574, 836 A.2d 453 (2003). In King, we rejected the same argument and interpretation of § 18-98d (a), and held that "[e]ach day of presentence confinement, regardless of the number of informations under which such confinement accrues, should be counted only once and credited to only one day of sentenced confinement.
"The purpose of the presentence confinement credit is clear: Presentence confinement credit should reduce the number of days of sentenced confinement so as to permit the detainee, in effect, to commence his sentence from the time he was compelled to remain in custody." Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn.App. 574, 580, 836 A.2d 453 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1191 (2004). ". . . [T]he purpose of the `jail-time' statutes is to give recognition to the period of presentence time served and to permit the prisoner, in effect, to commence serving his sentence from the time he was compelled to remain in custody due to a mittimus . . . or because of the court's refusal to allow bail or the defendant's inability to raise bail . . ."