Opinion
1:20-cv-00149 (Erie)
02-12-2021
STEFON JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff v. C.O. 1 LESKO, C.0.1 SIGWORTH, SGT. KEMP, SGT. MOOR, L.P.N. ANDRAKO, C.O. 4 GILL, LT. HARDING, C.O. 1 BOOHER, C.O. 1 WILLCOX, and C.O. 1 TERMINE, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 26)
RICHARD A. LANZILLO United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26, be granted in part and denied in part.
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Stefon Johnson, Jr., an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”), proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, employees at SCI-Forest, in their individual and official capacities, asserting violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ECF No. 6. Defendants filed the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Brief in Support on November 17, 2020. ECF Nos. 26-27. Johnson filed a Brief in Opposition on December 11, 2020. ECF No. 33. The motion is ripe for consideration.
B. Standard of Review
1 Motions to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; instead, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright &A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly. 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp.. 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly. 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. See also McTeman v. City of 2 York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iq bailing of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the' assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Burtch v. Milberg Pactors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
2. Pro Se Pleadings
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must employ less stringent standards in considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Yauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Despite this liberality, pro se litigants ate not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Paddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, has ruled that if a District Court is dismissing a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) in a civil rights case, it must sua sponte “permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
C. Analysis
In the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss, Defendants seek to dismiss: (1) all claims against Defendant Sigworth for lack of personal involvement; (2) all claims against Defendant Gill for lack of personal involvement; (3) all claims against Defendants in their official capacities; and (4) the Fourteenth Amendment claim. ECF No. 26.
1. Defendant Sigworth
Johnson does not oppose the dismissal of all claims against Defendant Sigworth; in fact, he requests that the Court dismiss all claims against Sigworth. ECF No. 33 at 11. Accordingly, Defendants' motion should be granted as to Sigworth.
2. Defendant Gill
Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Defendant Gill because Johnson makes no allegations in the Complaint concerning Gill's personal involvement in the wrongs asserted therein. ECF No. 27 at 4-6. In his response in opposition to the motion, Johnson sets forth, for the first time, allegations concerning Gill's involvement in the pertinent events. ECF No. 33 at 2-9. Because Johnson is a prisoner appearing pro se, the Court will treat the factual allegations contained in his response as though they were included in an amendment to his Complaint. See Baker v. Younkin, 529 Fed.Appx. 114 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Lewis v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 722 (3d Cir. 1989)).
In his Complaint, Johnson describes the relevant events that form the basis for his claims. These events occurred in the Restricted Housing Unit at SCI-Forest on December 5, 2018, and December 8, 2018 through December 15, 2018. ECF No. 6 at 3. Johnson alleges that on those dates, various prison employees denied him meals. Id. at 3-5. He further alleges that on December 15, 2018, he was sprayed with “O/C” spray (oleoresin capsicum spray, also known as pepper spray). Id. at 5. He does not allege that Gill participated in any of these events.
In his response to the instant motion, Johnson asserts that Gill, the Unit Manager, was aware of the above-described problems, either through grievances that he reviewed or through Johnson's direct conversation with him. ECF No. 33 at 2-5. Johnson asserts that Gill's inaction in the face of this knowledge renders him liable for the constitutional violations. Id. at 5.
As multiple courts, including this one, have held, a plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisory defendant who reviewed a grievance if the plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation that he the supervisory defendant can remedy directly. Mayo v. Opp man, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11554, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (collecting cases). In this way, the defendant can be found to be personally involved in that violation. Id. At this stage of the case, Johnson has stated a plausible claim against Gill as to the ongoing meal-denial issue on this basis. However, as to the one-time O/C spray attack, he has not. It is thus recommended that the Partial Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Gill with regard to the O/C spray attack and denied as to Gill with regard to the ongoing meal-denial of Johnson.
3. Official capacities
Defendants next argue that, as officials, officers, or employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, they are immune from the claims brought against them in their official capacity. ECF No. 27 at 3-4, Defendants are correct.
It is axiomatic that “the Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities.” See, eg., O'Donnell v. Pennsylvania Dept, of Corrections, 790 F.Supp.2d 289, 305 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Seminole Tribe v. Tlorida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)). As a department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Department of Corrections is immune from suit in federal court unless said immunity has been abrogated by Congress or waived by the state. MCI Telecomm Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001), Moreover, “[b]ecause the Pennsylvania DOC is a part of the executive department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its employees share in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent that they were sued in their official capacities.” Johnson v. Wenerowicz 440 Fed.Appx. 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011). It is well-settled that “Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court.” Toth v. California Univ, of Pennsylvania, 844 F.Supp.2d 611, 648 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b)). Nor did Congress intend by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979); see also Toth, 844 F.Supp.2d at 648. Consequently, Defendants - each of whom is an employee of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania - are entitled to immunity from any monetary claims against them in their official capacities. Defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis should be granted.
4. Fourteenth Amendment claim
Finally, Defendants argue that Johnson does not have an independent Fourteenth Amendment claim, and that it should be dismissed because it is more appropriately brought pursuant to the more specific Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 27 at 6-7. Defendants are correct.
To the extent that Johnson is asserting a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment based on the same allegations as those which support his Eighth Amendment claim, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 (1998) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)); see also Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying more-specific-provision rule, holding that Eighth Amendment covered conditions of confinement claim rather than the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause). Because the Eighth Amendment provides a more specific constitutional protection against the wrongs alleged to have been visited upon Johnson, his claims are properly addressed only under that Amendment.
The Court notes that in his response to the instant motion, Johnson appears to argue that he is asserting a procedural due process claim because he was denied meals as a means of punishment and that he was deprived of due process in the imposition of that punishment. ECF No. 33 at 9-11. His allegations do not support a plausible procedural due process claim. These “punishments” did not result from any adjudicatory process of which Johnson was entitled to have notice and at which he was entitled to have an opportunity to be heard. As this Court has stated, “[t]he very concept of procedural due process renders it inapt to the random unauthorized acts of prison officials.” Brothers V. Lawrence County Prison Bd, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102482, at *33 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
For these reasons, Johnson's Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
D. Leave to Amend
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). It would be futile for Johnson to amend his complaint to remedy the deficiencies found herein. Accordingly, it is recommended that no leave to amend be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26, be denied as to the claim against Gill with regard to the ongoing meal-denial to Johnson and be granted in all other respects. Defendant Sigworth should be terminated from the case.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Uhman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Trank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).