Opinion
No. 2:06-cv-0344-GEB-GGH.
November 15, 2006
ORDER
On September 14, 2006, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations ("FRs") that recommend granting default judgment against Defendant Marie Elayne Calagna, individually and as trustee for the Calagna Survivor's Trust in the amount of $4,000. The FRs issued following Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, filed July 28, 2006, in which he requested that "[t]he Court grant judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against Marie Elayne Calagna for damages, pursuant to the California Civil Code Section 52(a) in the amount of $8,000." (Mot. for Default J. at 3.) The magistrate judge stated, however: "While plaintiff seeks $4000 for each actual visit to the restaurant and each foregone visit (see Motion for Default Judgment, at p. 3, and Complaint, at p. 18), he has pled only that he visited the restaurant parking lot one time, on September 28, 2004 (Complaint, at p. 3); plaintiff's general statement he "would like to be able to return" is inadequate to demonstrate a foregone visit." (FRs at 3 n. 3.)
Since Plaintiff's motion for default judgment only seeks damages under California law, it will be decided whether exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims is appropriate in this case.
Federal question jurisdiction exists in this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and supplemental jurisdiction is exercised over Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Only injunctive relief may be sought under the ADA. Plaintiff's default judgment motion demonstrates he has abandoned his ADA injunctive relief claims, and that a state law claim for damages is the only claim at issue.
The "issue [of] whether . . . [supplemental] jurisdiction has been properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). Once the "nature of [a plaintiff's] proofs and the relative importance of [a plaintiff's] claims" becomes apparent, the federal court need not "tolerate a litigant's effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state law case." Id. Thus, "[o]nce it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed."Id.; see also Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3rd Cir. 1995) ("Given the origin of the `substantially predominate' standard, a district court's analysis under § 1367(c)(2) should track the Supreme Court's explication of that standard in Gibbs."). "While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." ACRI v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted).
The values of fairness and comity strongly favor dismissing the state claims, since it is evident the real body of Plaintiff's case is an action for damages under state law and the ADA federal claims are "only an appendage" to the state damage claims. Plaintiff seeks $8,000 in damages under state law, but does not seek injunctive relief, which makes it apparent that damages are the essence of Plaintiff's claim, and that he should have litigated this claim in state court rather than federal court. The ADA is designed to remove barriers; it does not award damages. Where, as here, the federal ADA claims appear wholly insubstantial and were brought solely to gain access to federal court, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction should be declined and "the state claim[s] may fairly be dismissed."Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. Further, as the United States Supreme Court has stated: "Needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a matter of comity." Id. at 726. Therefore, the fairness and comity values predominate and result in the values pointing toward declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Since the real body of Plaintiff's case is a claim for damages under state law, Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367 (c)(2) and (3). Further, this federal action is dismissed since Plaintiff abandoned his ADA claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.